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Executive Summary
The already serious situation on the Korean Peninsula is worsen-ing. North Korea is on a path to credibly threaten South Korea, 
Japan, U.S. forces in Northeast Asia, and eventually the United States 
with nuclear attack. Inter-Korean relations have become dangerously 
unstable, with the risk of renewed military conflict. U.S. relations with 
China and Russia are deteriorating and China is gradually incorporat-
ing North Korea’s economy, deepening the geopolitical divide between 
North and South Korea. 
To address the growing crisis, concerned countries need to use all 
available means, including engagement of the North. With the United 
States and China showing no disposition to change their approaches, 
however, the principal hope for an engagement initiative rests with 
Seoul. South Korea’s special relationship with the North and its status 
as a dynamic middle power give it the potential to play a much larger 
leadership role in dealing with North Korea.
To be sure, developing and implementing a major North Korea 
initiative will not be easy, but it can be done. As a conservative lead-
er, President Park has the “Nixon to China” political space in South 
Korea to pursue engagement. Despite North Korea’s criticism of South 
Korea, its leaders need foreign assistance and do not wish to be com-
pletely reliant on China. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) sup-
ports increased inter-Korean engagement, and the United States will 
not oppose it as long as it does not preclude continued application of 
pressure on North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program. 
Seoul has an opportunity to begin to bridge the gap with 
Pyongyang by pursuing a hardheaded approach that we call tailored 
engagement. Its aim is to reduce the risk of conflict now while foster-
ing inter-Korean reconciliation and effecting positive change in North 
Korea, with the ultimate goal of laying the basis for peaceful unifica-
tion. The concept is based on the conviction that engagement is only 
one means—albeit an essential one—of dealing with North Korea, 
xbut that engagement must be carefully “tailored” or fitted to chang-
ing political and security realities on and around the Korean Peninsula. 
Like President Park’s trustpolitik, it is based on a step-by-step confi-
dence-building approach. It eschews both an “appeasement” approach 
to Pyongyang and the notion that inter-Korean engagement under the 
current circumstances would be tantamount to accepting the North’s 
misbehavior, especially its nuclear weapons program. 
Under tailored engagement, South Korea would make a renewed 
attempt to engage the North in various types of exchanges in a princi-
pled and systematic way. Guiding principles include: (1) a focus on the 
pursuit of mutual interests and benefits rather than on symbolism and 
appeals to national sentiment; (2) the application of market principles 
and international standards in economic activities; (3) collaboration 
with other countries and third-party companies in both economic and 
people-to-people projects; (4) and pragmatism and flexibility in pursu-
ing engagement at both the state-to-state and grassroots levels in com-
plementary ways.
Key to implementing tailored engagement will be the achieve-
ment of greater consensus within South Korea and close consultation 
with allies and partners. President Park should begin by creating a new 
senior-level North Korea policy representative position to assist her 
in developing the initiative, furthering domestic consensus, managing 
the South Korean interagency process, and leading negotiations with 
Pyongyang, similar to the “Perry Process” in the United States in the 
late 1990s. 
A significant portion of this study is devoted to a discussion of 
projects that a government-prepared, comprehensive road map of tai-
lored engagement might include. Such a road map should proceed from 
projects that are easier to implement, politically and substantively, to 
those that are more difficult. In practice, this will generally mean start-
ing by expanding existing engagement efforts and resuming worthwhile 
projects that have been suspended. 
There is considerable urgency for Seoul to act. Further rounds 
of North Korean nuclear and missile tests will make engagement even 
harder, and strategic mistrust between the United States and China and 
Russia continues to mount. Despite the challenges, tailored engage-
ment can bear fruit. The authors hope this study will serve as a useful 
reference for leaders and citizens of the Republic of Korea as well as 
contribute to the global discussion about how to ensure peace, security, 
and prosperity in Northeast Asia.
Introduction
Situation on the Korean Peninsula
More than six decades after the establishment of competing Korean states and a devastating war, the situation on the Korean Penin-
sula remains a major threat to regional peace and security as well as a 
national and humanitarian tragedy for the Korean people. In import-
ant respects, the situation has worsened in recent decades, and coming 
years may bring increased risk and uncertainty if current trends are 
not reversed. In the worst case, another war could break out in Korea 
involving U.S.-China military confrontation and potential resort to nu-
clear weapons by one or more of the belligerents.3
Despite two decades of international opposition led by the United 
States, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) 
has developed and tested nuclear devices and long-range rockets. Orig-
inally denying any interest in having nuclear weapons, Pyongyang has 
since enshrined the possession of nuclear weapons in its constitution, 
and it is continuing its development of nuclear weapons and the mis-
siles to deliver them.4 It appears to be only a matter of time before it 
will be able to credibly threaten U.S. forces and allies in the Pacific and 
eventually the United States itself with deliverable nuclear weapons.5
In response to North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear “deterrent,” 
South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK), the United States, and Japan 
have increased their own defense budgets and are accelerating North 
Korea–targeted deterrence and defense measures such as missile de-
In the worst case, another war could break out in Korea 
involving U.S.-China military confrontation and potential 
resort to nuclear weapons by one or more of the belligerents.
2fense. Some prominent figures in both South Korea and Japan have 
argued that the United States’ failure to prevent North Korea from 
developing nuclear weapons is calling into question the United States’ 
steadfastness and capability to defend its allies and that their countries 
need to consider developing their own nuclear weapons in response.6 
Recent events in Syria and Ukraine have only heightened such concerns. 
Moreover, North Korea’s actions may weaken respect for nuclear non-
proliferation not only in East Asia but globally as well.
Even if North Korea never actually uses nuclear weapons, its 
possession of a nuclear weapons capability may have already embold-
ened it to adopt a more aggressive posture toward South Korea, Japan, 
and the United States. Pyongyang sank a South Korean naval ship and 
shelled a South Korean island in sneak attacks in 2010, killing fifty peo-
ple. Over the past few years, North Korea has publicly threatened to 
attack the United States preemptively with nuclear weapons.7
In response to the North Korean attacks of 2010, South Korea 
has declared publicly that it will respond with force to another North 
Korean military attack, something it has not done before. Many South 
Korean leaders have argued that this explains why North Korea has 
refrained from launching another attack. If this assumption proves in-
correct and North Korea does again strike the South, there could be a 
violent escalatory spiral on the Korean Peninsula, with unpredictable 
consequences that could be difficult to control.8
The effectiveness of international sanctions against Pyongyang’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons has been reduced due to a dramatic in-
crease in the People’s Republic of China aid, trade, and investment 
with North Korea.9 China has parried U.S. demands that it apply more 
pressure against North Korea by disclaiming sufficient influence,10 and 
has reacted sharply to the U.S. dispatch of significant military assets to 
waters and air space adjacent to North Korea and thus also to China. 
While the United States has asserted that such shows of force are neces-
sary to deter North Korea and to support its South Korean ally, Beijing 
has seen it through the optic of increased pressure against China in its 
own neighborhood.
Recently, U.S. relations with China and Russia have been deterio-
rating, while China is gradually incorporating North Korea’s economy 
and Russia is improving its relations with the North. These develop-
ments are deepening the geopolitical divide between North and South 
Korea and complicating the already difficult international environment 
to address Korean Peninsula issues.
3Historical Origins of the Problem
Any realistic approach to dealing with North Korea must take into ac-
count the deep and complex historical roots of the problem, which ne-
cessitate a policy that is principled, patient, and persistent.
From the Korean War to the end of the Cold War, the Korean 
Peninsula was characterized by national division into mutually hostile 
states, with American and Western support for Seoul, and Soviet and 
PRC support for Pyongyang. Seoul adopted the forms of capitalist de-
mocracy but was governed by authoritarian leaders, while Pyongyang 
emulated the institutions and followed the policies of the communist 
regimes in Moscow and Beijing. Leaders in both Seoul and Pyongyang 
each regarded theirs as the only legitimate Korean state. The respective 
patrons of North and South Korea would have been happy to see unifi-
cation on the terms of their client but would have adamantly opposed 
unification led by the other camp’s Korean state. As a result of the bit-
ter experience of the Korean War, however, the United States, Soviet 
Union, and PRC were not prepared to support Korean unification even 
on their respective client’s terms if this entailed the risk of military 
hostilities.11 
The end of the Cold War coincided with major developments 
that reshaped, but failed to resolve, the situation on the Korean Pen-
insula. While South Korea democratized in 1987, North Korea in 1994 
saw the establishment of the world’s first “communist” dynasty, with 
Kim Jong-il succeeding his father as North Korea’s supreme leader. 
Moscow and Beijing established diplomatic relations with Seoul in the 
early 1990s, but Washington did not normalize relations with Pyong-
yang. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern 
Europe left North Korea ideologically isolated, one of only a handful 
of “rogue” states in the eyes of many in the international community. 
It also meant an end to aid from these states to North Korea, and the 
PRC, too, reduced its economic and political support for Pyongyang. 
These developments disastrously deepened the stagnation of North 
Korea’s command economy, culminating in economic collapse and a 
famine that contributed to the deaths of at least hundreds of thousands 
of people in the mid-1990s. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, many observers rea-
soned by analogy with the Soviet and German cases that the North 
Korean regime would also soon “collapse” and Korea would be unified 
under Seoul’s leadership. As hindsight suggests, such reasoning did not 
take into account the particular historical, strategic, and political cir-
4cumstances on the Korean Peninsula. The leaders of North Korea re-
garded their regime as the only legitimate Korea regime, and they were 
less dependent on outside political support than East Germany was on 
the Soviet Union. They also kept the people of North Korea far more 
isolated from the outside world than East Germans had ever been. 
The two decades following the end of the Cold War saw the nu-
clear issue become a major American concern on the Korean Peninsu-
la. The United States first focused on North Korea’s nuclear program 
in the late 1980s and thereafter sought unsuccessfully to prevent the 
regime from developing nuclear weapons. In the process, it engaged 
Pyongyang diplomatically in negotiations and provided it with $1.3 bil-
lion in food, energy, and other aid between 1995 and 2009.12 As bilateral 
talks faltered, the Six-Party Talks began in Beijing in 2003 to prevent 
North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in 2006 
Pyongyang tested its first nuclear device. The Six-Party Talks have not 
resumed since North Korea conducted a second nuclear test in 2009. A 
third nuclear test, in 2013, only seemed to underline the regime’s deter-
mination to become a nuclear power. 
The nuclear issue today remains a primary U.S. concern about 
North Korea, second only to the deterrence of a North Korean attack 
on the South. If Pyongyang conducts a fourth nuclear test, the United 
States and many other members of the international community will 
press for even stronger measures against North Korea.13 Kim Jong-un’s 
declared policy of byeongjin, i.e., the “parallel development” of both 
North Korea’s economy and nuclear weapons, runs directly contrary 
to the United States’ position that the international community must 
never accept North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. 
If Pyongyang conducts a fourth nuclear test the international 
community will press for even stronger measures against 
North Korea.
5Policy Parameters of the 
Major Players
North Korea: In Flux
A primary argument against engaging North Korea is that the es-sence of the problem is the nature of the regime and until that has 
changed, engagement will not result in progress and may even reinforce 
regime misbehavior. But any regime will change over time, including 
by adjusting its policies as it reassesses changing circumstances and its 
vital interests. The task thus is to influence Pyongyang’s calculus. Prop-
erly structured, engagement should eventually facilitate positive change 
in North Korea, including in the regime’s policies.
In fact, politically, economically, and socially, North Korea al-
ready appears to be changing as rapidly as at any time since the end 
of the Korean War. A new leadership, albeit dynastic, appears to be 
consolidating. Gray and black markets are growing as the state hesi-
tates to implement economic reform. A middle class is developing in 
Pyongyang, and more information about the outside world is seeping 
into the country due to the IT revolution. This flux could contribute 
to more reckless behavior on the part of the regime, but it may also 
present opportunities for increased engagement and influence by South 
Korea and others. 
The young14 Kim Jong-un has led North Korea since the sudden 
death of his father Kim Jong-il in December 2011. In unprecedented 
acts of dynastic succession in a nominally communist state, Kim Jong-
il chose a son to succeed him, as he himself succeeded his own father 
Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-il’s reasons presumably were the same as those 
The task is to infl
6of other absolute monarchs: he wished to maintain his own grip on 
power while alive and ensure his family’s rule after his death. A critical 
mass of other power holders in Pyongyang must have supported, or at 
least not opposed, Kim Jong-il’s decision as the best way to ensure a 
succession that would not endanger the system and their place in it. 
Almost immediately following his father’s death, Kim Jong-un 
was named the country’s “supreme leader.” Lacking accurate intelli-
gence about leadership dynamics in North Korea, outside observers 
speculated about the degree to which Kim Jong-un personally would 
govern or serve only as a figurehead, with major decisions made by 
older and more experienced leaders. They wondered about his per-
sonal views and abilities, hoping that his study abroad in Switzerland 
might have encouraged a reformist bent, but they also worried about 
his youth, lack of experience, and reputed aggressiveness. 
Since coming to power, Kim appears to have been consolidating 
his position amid deep divisions within the ruling circle, as evidenced 
by numerous personnel changes in the top ranks of the military, par-
ty, and government.15 His execution of his uncle Jang Seong-taek fur-
ther tarnished the regime’s image abroad.16 For whatever reasons, Kim 
Jong-un has not set foot out of North Korea as the country’s new ruler, 
and he and the PRC leadership have yet to meet.17 Kim is emulating his 
grandfather’s leadership style, but he still shows signs of immaturity, 
as in his partying with American former pro basketball player Dennis 
Rodman and his focus on building luxury facilities in the capital for 
the elite. 
In terms of the DPRK’s economy, Kim Jong-un has stressed that 
the people of North Korea should never again have to suffer from hun-
ger and want.18 So far under his leadership, however, the government 
has taken few steps toward even limited market-oriented reforms. An-
nouncements such as plans for foreign investment zones appear not to 
have been carefully prepared or thought out. Instead, extralegal and 
illegal markets and de facto private businesses are flourishing. Chinese 
trade and private investment, especially in the mining sector, has risen 
dramatically, albeit from a low base; even the execution of Jang Seong-
taek—a known proponent of following the Chinese model—does not 
seem likely to change the trend. More laborers are being dispatched 
abroad to earn hard currency. The result is that the North Korean 
economy has been growing, even if quite slowly.19 The government has 
pushed apartment construction in the capital and some development 
is also occurring in provincial cities, but absolute poverty continues to 
characterize life in the countryside. A significant portion of the popu-
7lation is still forced to rely on foreign official and private donations of 
food and medicine. 
In defense of the byeongjin policy, leaders in Pyongyang say that 
North Korea’s possession of a “nuclear deterrent” counters the alleged 
security threat from the United States and allows them to focus on eco-
nomic development. North Korea’s actual reasons for developing nu-
clear weapons cannot be verified. In any event, this “guns and butter” 
policy is at cross purposes with the international community, which 
under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has 
deemed North Korea’s nuclear weapons program to be illegitimate and 
has imposed successively more stringent economic sanctions. The inter-
national community has, in effect, declared that until Pyongyang gives 
up nuclear weapons it will discourage the very international trade and 
investment the regime must have to grow its economy. Pyongyang, in 
turn, has rejected the UNSC’s authority and reacted angrily to foreign 
statements, including by President Park Geun-hye, that North Korea 
cannot expect the international community to assist it in developing its 
economy as long as it pursues nuclear weapons.20 
Meanwhile, despite its continuing relative isolation, North 
Korean society is ever more rapidly changing. In North Korea, the 
1990s famine resulted in a loosening of regime control over the people 
and reduced popular respect for it. The regime was taken aback by the 
popular reaction to its confiscatory currency “reform” in December 
2009 that threatened people’s savings, and found itself forced to ease 
the provisions and offer an apology. The IT revolution has seen increas-
ing amounts of information about the outside world reaching the pop-
ulation, especially the elite, through such things as South Korean soap 
operas on thumb drives and DVDs smuggled across the border with 
China. The regime allowed an Egyptian company to provide cellular 
telephone service in Pyongyang beginning in 2008, and now over two 
million people throughout the country own cell phones. Even though 
the cell phones, like North Korea’s version of the Internet, are config-
ured to permit domestic use only, the greatly increased popular ability 
to communicate could have long-term implications for the develop-
ment of public opinion.
In addition, the regime’s need for hard currency and economic 
growth has forced it to rely increasingly on exchanges with the PRC, in 
the process exposing many North Koreans to a relatively much more 
open and developed society.21 As noted above, Pyongyang is also dis-
patching more North Koreans to work abroad, not only in the PRC but 
also in Russia and in many countries in Europe, the Middle East, and 
8Africa. Perhaps between 100,000 and 200,000 North Koreans are work-
ing in the PRC alone.22 Although most such North Koreans are closely 
supervised and have few meaningful opportunities to engage with the 
host country, even limited exposure to the outside world may eventually 
contribute to positive change in North Korea. 
It is premature to exclude the possibility that the new Pyongyang 
leadership—which faces so many pressures and challenges—may be 
amenable eventually to taking a more positive course. Kim is a different 
person than his father; he is of a different generation and has had differ-
ent formative experiences; he has been in office less than three years. He 
is still a young man and has time to mature and change with increasing 
age, experience, and authority. His stated emphasis on improving the 
popular standard of living provides a potential opening to engage his 
regime to improve both the humanitarian and the security situations 
on the Korean Peninsula. It is a fact that so far Kim Jong-un’s regime 
has adopted a harsh and threatening attitude toward South Korea and 
toward President Park personally, but this is likely due at least in part to 
Kim’s need to look “tough” at home as he consolidates power. 
United States:  
The Limits of Diplomatic Flexibility
While Kim Jong-un cannot be expected on his own initiative to change 
the current trajectory on the Korean Peninsula, neither can another 
major player: the United States. The United States has compelling rea-
sons for having adopted its current North Korea policy of “strategic 
patience” toward North Korea and de facto containment of the threats 
it poses. The Obama administration has pursued essentially the same 
policy since Pyongyang responded to its immediate post-inauguration 
diplomatic initiative in 2009 by launching a long-range rocket and con-
ducting its second test of a nuclear device.23 This is not idiosyncrasy on 
the part of President Obama: future American presidents are also very 
likely to maintain substantially the same policy. 
Kim Jong-un’s stated emphasis on improving the popular 
standard of living provides a potential opening to engage his 
regime to improve both the humanitarian and the security 
situations on the Korean Peninsula.
9Since its entry into the Korean War to defend the Republic of 
Korea, the United States’ top priority on the Korean Peninsula has re-
mained the preservation of the Republic of Korea within its current 
boundaries. (As discussed above, the United States supports Korean 
unification but is not prepared to risk war to achieve it.) This is due 
as much to political as to strategic factors: the 33,686 Americans who 
died in battle in Korea became an imperative for U.S. political leaders 
never to “lose” South Korea.24 The fact that South Korea has become 
one of the world’s great economic and political success stories has 
only strengthened the political need for the United States to stand with 
Seoul. More recently, South Korea’s strategic importance to Washing-
ton has grown as China increasingly challenges the United States’ post-
war position in East Asia.
The emergence and salience of the North Korean nuclear issue 
since the late 1980s misled many observers into thinking that its resolu-
tion was as important as or even more important to the United States 
than the security of the Republic of Korea. That this is not the case 
is demonstrated by the United States’ unwillingness to use military 
force against North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities, in large part 
for fear that Pyongyang might engage in massive military retaliation 
against South Korea. But the United States has devoted enormous ef-
forts and resources to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons tech-
nology ever since its own development of nuclear weapons in 1945, and 
it certainly has no interest in a regime such as North Korea possessing 
nuclear weapons. The events of September 11, 2001, and Iran’s appar-
ent efforts to develop at least a latent nuclear weapons capability have 
only reinforced this American attitude. 
U.S. flexibility in dealing with North Korea is further limited by 
the profound American dislike of the North Korean regime. While 
Pyongyang cynically makes tactical use of this “hostility” to try to paint 
the United States as the offending party in the eyes of the internation-
al community,25 it is a political reality in the United States.26 In major 
opinion polls, North Korea has long ranked as one of the countries, if 
not the country, most disliked by the American public.27 American elite 
opinion of North Korea is no more favorable. Americans dislike North 
Korea for its “communist” regime; its lack of respect for basic human 
The United States has compelling reasons for having adopted 
its current North Korea policy of “strategic patience” toward 
North Korea and de facto containment of the threats it poses.
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rights, including religious liberty; its failure to feed its own people; its 
relationships with other “rogue” states; its—at times—stated readiness 
to proliferate its weapons and technology; and its pattern of verbal 
threats against the United States and its allies, not to mention actual 
military action against South Korea. Together, these reasons make it all 
the more unacceptable to Americans that North Korea should pursue 
nuclear weapons. 
The experience of the past two decades has underlined the limits 
on American options in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. 
The use of military force against North Korea’s weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) is not a viable option due to the risk of a convention-
al North Korean counterattack on the South Korean capital of Seoul. 
As a result of PRC support for Pyongyang, U.S. and other international 
sanctions against North Korea’s WMD development have not worked 
and are unlikely to change the regime’s basic approach anytime soon. 
The United States rejects engaging in negotiations with North Korea 
under the current circumstances, because doing so would be tanta-
mount to accepting the regime’s assertion that it is a legitimate nuclear 
weapons state and because the regime’s words no longer have any cred-
ibility in Washington. Finally, the United States cannot rely on reform 
occurring in North Korea in time to address the increasing threats and 
problems that Pyongyang poses. 
Almost by default, the United States has adopted a policy of up-
ward-ratcheting containment until Pyongyang changes its fundamental 
approach. American top officials are undoubtedly well aware of the 
risks and problems with the current policy. That they have not adopt-
ed another approach apparently reflects their judgment that all other 
options would be worse in terms of their understanding of American 
interests. Exhortations to American leaders to engage North Korea ab-
sent Pyongyang’s willingness to negotiate an end to its nuclear weapons 
program are thus very unlikely to be heeded. 
The United States has adopted a policy of upward-ratcheting 
containment until Pyongyang changes its fundamental 
approach.
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PRC: Wedded to Pyongyang
With North Korea unlikely to begin to reform on its own and the Unit-
ed States committed to a policy of strategic patience and containment, 
the only other outside player with the potential influence and inter-
est to fundamentally change the situation on the Korean Peninsula is 
the PRC. China is not only North Korea’s only treaty ally, committed 
militarily to its defense, it has also become the only country on which 
North Korea can rely for substantial material and moral support.28 The 
United States, Japan, and South Korea, once major aid providers at 
various times during the past two decades, have slashed assistance to 
the country. China also predominates in trade with North Korea. Since 
2009, the PRC’s trade has increased dramatically and by 2013 consti-
tuted over three-quarters of the DPRK’s total trade abroad (including 
with South Korea); the PRC has also provided the North with most of 
its vital oil supply.29 
Since the second North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2003, 
many third-country observers have found the PRC’s continued, not 
to mention increasing, support of the North to be puzzling. The PRC 
asserts that it does not want North Korea to continue to develop nu-
clear weapons. The PRC is interested above all in maintaining peace 
and stability on its borders, but DPRK possession of nuclear weapons 
might make the regime even more reckless in its confrontation with 
the South. PRC leaders must also take into account the possibility that 
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons might eventually im-
pel the ROK and Japan toward a decision to develop their own nuclear 
weapons. In addition, the PRC has been under constant pressure from 
major international partners, including the United States, South Korea, 
Japan, and the European Union, to use its influence to end North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program. U.S. officials have made it clear that 
if China does not, the United States will take strategic countermeasures 
that China will not appreciate, such as bolstering the U.S. military pres-
ence in the region, including missile defense architecture.30 
Chinese officials have frequently expressed what appears to be 
genuine frustration and even anger at North Korea’s dismissal of their 
calls to negotiate an end to the nuclear weapons program and to imple-
ment Chinese-style economic reform. They have supported some UN 
Security Council condemnations of and sanctions against North Korea 
for its nuclear and missile programs. They have also apparently been 
deeply concerned about North Korean military attacks on and threats 
against South Korea. Whether due to Chinese rejection or to Kim Jong-
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un’s own decision, the new North Korean leader has yet to visit the 
PRC. In addition to official Chinese displeasure with North Korea, 
Chinese academics and other citizens frequently publish criticism of 
Pyongyang for ignoring Chinese advice and for failing to express grati-
tude, much less reciprocate, China’s largesse. 
Given all this, and in light of the fact that China has good political 
relations with Seoul and that its trade and people-to-people ties with 
the South are far greater than those with the North, some Americans 
and South Korean observers have speculated that the PRC might even-
tually reduce or end support for the North. Stated U.S. policy toward 
North Korea relies heavily on the PRC’s placing substantially increased 
pressure on North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program.31 
Despite such hopes, there is little prospect that Beijing will take a 
fundamentally different approach to its socialist neighbor in the fore-
seeable future. China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula has “long 
been characterized by the ‘three no’s’: ‘no war, no instability, no nukes’ 
(buzhan, buluan, wuhe), in descending order of importance.”32 The 
PRC is much less concerned about the North’s pursuit of nuclear weap-
ons than it is about the possibility that applying too much pressure on 
Pyongyang could result in chaos and regime collapse in North Korea. 
Today as well as traditionally, Chinese leaders have tended to think 
of the Korean Peninsula as a quasi-domestic matter.33 The PRC feels 
strongly bound to the North Korean regime for geographical, histori-
cal, and strategic reasons. The two states share an 880-mile border and 
are separated only by two narrow rivers. The leaders of what would 
become the DPRK and the PRC fought together in the Communists’ 
victory over the Nationalists in China, and the PRC’s entry into the 
Korean War saved the DPRK. Both regimes are profoundly suspicious 
of U.S. strategic intentions. China is concerned that a unified Korea 
would be allied with the United States and that U.S. forces might re-
main on the peninsula. In case of instability in North Korea, China 
fears that the United States and South Korea might intervene militarily 
to achieve unification. 
On the Korean Peninsula, the PRC’s guiding principle has thus 
been and will most likely remain “better the devil you know than the 
There is little prospect that Beijing will take a fundamentally 
different approach to its socialist neighbor in the foreseeable 
future.
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devil you don’t.” While the PRC will continue to express frustration 
with North Korea and support some new international sanctions 
against the regime when its behavior is egregious, for the foreseeable 
future Beijing will be unwilling to use enough of its potential lever-
age to risk internal instability in the country. The PRC thus cannot be 
counted on to take what it itself would regard as major risks to press 
Pyongyang to resolve the nuclear problem and implement fundamental 
political and economic reforms.
Japan and Russia: Wild Cards?
Japan has major interests on the Korean Peninsula due to its geograph-
ic proximity, its economic ties to the Republic of Korea, and its own 
large Korean ethnic population. Through its alliance with the United 
States, Japan serves as a vital rear-area support base for U.S. forces 
deterring, and if necessary, defending against another North Korean 
invasion of the South. In the event of conflict with the United States, 
North Korea might well seek to strike U.S. bases in Japan. Japan itself 
feels increasingly threatened by North Korea’s development of nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles. North Korea’s failure to return innocent 
Japanese citizens it abducted in decades past is one of the biggest con-
tinuing political issues in Japan. Tokyo has strongly supported interna-
tional sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear and missiles programs 
and has imposed its own, even stricter bilateral, sanctions over the ab-
ductions. Just a little more than a decade ago, Japan was one of North 
Korea’s largest sources of trade and official and private aid; today, there 
is virtually no trade between the two and only a trickle of private aid 
reaches North Koreans from Japan.34
Japan is not in a position to serve as a catalyst to change the cur-
rent trajectory on the Korean Peninsula. Continuing bilateral histori-
cal and territorial issues limit Japan’s standing with both North and 
South Korea. Even a full resolution of the abductee issue in the bilateral 
talks now underway, which is unlikely, would not fundamentally change 
Tokyo’s relations with Pyongyang. Japan will, in any event, continue to 
enforce international sanctions against North Korea. Moreover, since 
the end of World War II, Japan has outsourced most of its defense 
Even a full resolution of the abductee issue in the 
bilateral talks now underway, which is unlikely, would not 
fundamentally change Tokyo’s relations with Pyongyang.
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efforts to the United States and has generally followed the American 
lead in foreign policy, especially in East Asia. Although Japan’s cur-
rent leaders are adopting a somewhat more independent approach in 
foreign policy even as they are strengthening security cooperation with 
the United States, “going rogue” in dealing with North Korea would 
not be in Tokyo’s interests. Japan will thus continue to play an import-
ant but nevertheless secondary role in Korean Peninsula affairs for the 
foreseeable future.
Russia is also unable to change the basic trajectory of Korean Pen-
insula affairs. Although it has a short border with North Korea, Russia’s 
interest in the Korean Peninsula is limited. Its bilateral trade even with 
South Korea is small; with North Korea, it is negligible. Moscow is not 
prepared to give large sums of grant aid to North Korea. Russia does 
have commercial interests in potential energy and transportation deals 
in Northeast Asia. These could become part of a broader reconcilia-
tion and peace process on the Korean Peninsula, but only after con-
siderable progress has been made in inter-Korean confidence-building. 
In terms of diplomacy, Russia has generally followed the PRC’s line in 
the Six-Party Talks, while sometimes being more willing than the PRC 
to speak critically about Pyongyang’s behavior. This may be offset by 
President Putin’s increasing animus toward the Obama administration, 
especially after the crisis in Ukraine.
South Korea:  
The Need to Exercise Leadership
With North Korea, the United States, and China locked into their po-
sitions, and with Japan and Russia having insufficient influence, the 
only remaining actor that might be able to improve the situation on 
the Korean Peninsula is the Republic of Korea. If it does not exert 
more leadership soon, inter-Korean relations may deteriorate further, 
North Korea will continue to increase the pace of its nuclear weapons 
and missile development, and the North Korean economy increasingly 
will be incorporated into that of the PRC. “Strategic patience” carries 
greater risks for South Korea than would a new diplomatic effort seek-
ing to change the current trajectory. 
South Korea has not only the need but also the potential to as-
sume greater leadership of North Korea policy internationally, includ-
ing by engaging the regime and its people. No other state has South 
Korea’s combination of potential influence and the need to change the 
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status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul long ago won the competi-
tion of systems with Pyongyang, vastly outperforming it economically, 
politically, and diplomatically. While North Korea can devastate the 
city of Seoul with its artillery just north of the Demilitarized Zone, 
South Korea’s conventional forces overall are far stronger and South 
Korea can rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to nullify North Korean 
nuclear intimidation. 
Not only in comparison with Pyongyang but also regionally and 
even globally, South Korea has become a leading middle power.35 Its 
fifty million people make it the world’s twenty-sixth most populous 
country. (A unified Korea would have seventy-five million people, more 
than every European country except Germany.) With nearly seven hun-
dred thousand active personnel, South Korea’s military is the world’s 
sixth-largest (immediately following North Korea, with 1.1 million, 
and Russia, with one million). It has the world’s fifteenth-largest econ-
omy and is the sixth-largest exporter. Its manufactures, including cell 
phones, automobiles, and ships, enjoy global brand recognition, and 
Korean popular culture is a force not only in Asia but increasingly also 
throughout the world. 
Since its democratization a quarter century ago, South Korea has 
in fact been exercising increasing influence globally, including on how 
the international community regards North Korea. Most notably, Ban 
Ki-moon, a South Korean citizen and former ROK foreign minister, is 
serving as secretary general of the United Nations. Korea has been the 
focus of global attention as the host of a succession of major interna-
tional conclaves, including the ASEAN–Republic of Korea Commem-
orative Summit in 2009, the G20 summit in 2010, and the Nuclear Se-
curity Summit in 2012. Korea hosted the 1988 Olympics and will again 
host the Summer Olympics in 2018. As the first and only major former 
recipient of overseas development assistance to become a major foreign 
aid provider, South Korea is a leading model globally of economic and 
political development.
Perhaps due to the recentness and rapidity of the ROK’s rise, 
however, many South Koreans’ consciousness of their country’s inter-
national influence lags reality. Korea may have been a helpless “shrimp 
“Strategic patience” carries greater risks for South Korea than 
would a new diplomatic effort seeking to change the current 
trajectory.
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among whales” such as China and Japan a century ago, but today it as-
suredly is at least a dolphin, capable of maneuvering effectively among 
whales. The main impediment to South Korea’s assuming a greater 
international leadership role on the Korean question is not a lack of 
national power but a lack of domestic political consensus about how 
to deal with North Korea and the consequent inconsistency in ROK 
policy across administrations. 
Since South Korea’s democratization, Korean presidents have 
been limited to a single five-year term of office, and conservatives and 
progressives have each taken control of the Blue House at various 
times. South Korea’s North Korea policy has thus also changed every 
five years, reflecting the personal preferences of the new president and 
the politics of his or her party as well as changing circumstances in 
North Korea and the international community. 
• As the Cold War was ending, conservative President Roh Tae-woo 
(1988–93) pursued what he called Nordpolitik, a policy intended 
to isolate and influence North Korea by persuading its partners, 
the USSR and the PRC, to normalize relations with South Korea 
and to support Seoul’s full membership in the United Nations. 
The Roh administration succeeded in its immediate aims but was 
unable to induce sustained change in North Korean policies. 
• President Kim Young-sam (1993–98) was a longtime opponent 
of authoritarian rule but after democratization he ensured his 
election to the Blue House by allying himself with Roh Tae-woo. 
He initially advocated coexistence and cooperation with North 
Korea. Coinciding with the first nuclear crisis, famine in the 
North, and Kim Il-sung’s death, the North Korea policy of Kim’s 
term was characterized by inconsistency. He veered between 
large-scale aid and a quest for a summit meeting to condemna-
tions of Pyongyang. North Korea under its new leader, Kim Jong-
il, refused to deal with him.
• As Korea’s first progressive president, Kim Dae-jung (1998–03) 
pursued what he called the “Sunshine Policy” toward North 
Korea. This was based on the belief that pressure on North Korea 
would not work, but assistance and exposure to the outside world 
would produce inter-Korean reconciliation, North Korean re-
form, and, eventually, peaceful unification. Kim initiated various 
types of exchanges with the North and even held an unprecedent-
ed summit with Kim Jong-il, but Pyongyang almost immediately 
began to backtrack on inter-Korean engagement and then used 
the election of George W. Bush as U.S. president as a pretext to 
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nearly end it. Kim’s long-term vision was well intentioned but 
its implementation was undermined by North Korea’s concern 
about the corrosive effect of contacts with the South, opposi-
tion within South Korea exacerbated by the government’s un-
der-the-table cash payment to Pyongyang, and a lack of support 
from the George W. Bush administration. 
• Roh Moo-hyun (2004–08), also a progressive, sought to pursue 
the Sunshine Policy under the name of the “Policy of Peace and 
Prosperity.” Weak at home and with North Korea focused on 
pursuing nuclear weapons and missile development in confron-
tation with the George W. Bush administration, President Roh 
had little success in engaging North Korea. He finally held one 
summit meeting with Kim Jong-il only a couple of months before 
his term ended. With opposition in the South to the Sunshine Pol-
icy stronger than under Kim Dae-jung, Roh’s last-minute summit 
was strongly opposed by many Korean conservatives.
• As a candidate, Lee Myung-bak (2008–13) suggested that his 
North Korea policy would be midway between previous conserva-
tive and progressive administrations. He promised to give massive 
infrastructure aid and other help to North Korea but conditioned 
it on the North’s denuclearization. After his election, it became 
clear that he did not intend to carry out the far-reaching and con-
troversial understandings President Roh had reached in his sum-
mit with Kim Jong-il. President Lee also sought a summit with 
Kim Jong-il, but the effort fell through due to North Korea’s de-
mand for “payment in advance.” Thereafter, Pyongyang refused 
to deal with the Lee administration and instead engaged in such 
provocations as the sinking of a South Korean navy vessel and the 
shelling of an inhabited South Korean island. In December 2011, 
Kim suddenly died and was immediately replaced by his son Kim 
Jong-un. The younger Kim was preoccupied with shoring up his 
position at home and apparently was not prepared to explore im-
proved relations with the South. 
Thus, South Korea’s leadership on the North Korea question has 
been undercut not just by North Korea’s behavior and changes in the 
international situation but also by South Korea’s own frequent changes 
of North Korea policy and deep division at home. 
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President Park’s North 
Korea Policy
Stated Policy
Inaugurated in February 2013, President Park Geun-hye said that her North Korea policy would incorporate the best aspects of both the 
“principled” approach of her conservative predecessor Lee Myung-bak 
and the engagement policy of progressive presidents Kim Dae-jung and 
Roh Moo-hyun. As a presidential candidate, she began laying out her 
North Korea policy in a major speech at Stanford University in 2009 
and an essay in Foreign Affairs magazine in 2011.36 In her first year in 
office, Park was fleshing out the policy and also modifying it as she 
dealt with numerous challenges from North Korea, including another 
round of nuclear and missile tests, harsh threats, and an extended with-
drawal of North Korean workers from the North-South joint industrial 
park in the North Korean city of Kaesong.37 
The name of Park’s North Korea policy, trustpolitik, has caused 
confusion. It derives from West German chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ost-
politik or “eastern policy” toward East Germany and its Soviet patron, 
from which South Korean president Roh Tae-woo coined the term 
Nord politik for his policy toward North Korea and the Soviet Union in 
the final years of the Cold War. In coming up with the term trustpolitik, 
President Park apparently was reflecting not only this historical con-
nection but also the importance she personally attaches to trust with 
those with whom she deals. In that sense, it describes an attitude or an 
approach more than it does the substance of her North Korea policy. 
President Park stresses that trust must be mutual and built up 
through a series of steps, from smaller and easier to larger and more dif-
ficult issues. In the academic literature of international relations, such 
an approach is usually called “confidence-building.” Confidence-build-
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ing measures in international relations originally were intended to re-
duce tensions and the risk of war. Evidently, however, President Park 
intends for her trustpolitik to focus first on economic and social ex-
changes, where there is also a lack of mutual confidence between the 
two Koreas. Meanwhile, like all of her predecessors, President Park si-
multaneously places great stress on maintaining a strong defense and 
deterrence against North Korea.
Park’s stated policy differs from that of her conservative predeces-
sor Lee Myung-bak, especially in the latter part of his term, primarily 
in that she made it clear she was prepared to “pursue a low level [italics 
added] of engagement with the North in the form of exchange, coop-
eration, and humanitarian aid” without linkage to the nuclear issue. 
She also declared that she would “respect and adhere to  . . . existing 
inter-Korean agreements.” Like Lee, however, she has linked large-scale 
help for the development of North Korea’s economy, which she calls 
“Vision Korea Projects,” to progress on denuclearization. President 
Park apparently also does not support beginning peace treaty negotia-
tions until progress is being made on the nuclear issue.38 
Other elements of President Park’s policy include establishing a 
“peace park” in the Demilitarized Zone and a Northeast Asia Peace 
and Cooperation Initiative, which she says would complement her 
trust-building process with North Korea. The Initiative would involve 
dialogue and cooperation among the countries of Northeast Asia and 
the United States, starting with “terrorism, environment, humanitarian 
assistance, disaster relief and other non-conventional areas of securi-
ty.”39 To what extent or at what point President Park would link this to 
progress on North Korean denuclearization, she has not yet clarified.
In short, President Park’s declarative North Korea policy shares 
many similarities with those of previous progressive and conservative 
South Korean governments. Indeed, apart from the degree of linkage 
to progress on the North Korean nuclear issue, most of the stated prin-
ciples of all previous conservative and progressive polices have been 
similar. The key distinguishing factor across ROK administrations has 
The key distinguishing factor across ROK administrations has 
not been the language of stated North Korea policy, not even 
about the nuclear issue, but the actual priority attached to the 
various elements of their policies and the manner and tone of 
their implementation.
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not been the language of stated North Korea policy, not even about the 
nuclear issue, but the actual priority attached to the various elements 
of their policies and the manner and tone of their implementation. In 
this sense, not only President Park’s declarative policy toward North 
Korea but also, as we shall now discuss, her actual approach toward 
Pyongyang is squarely in the mainstream of conservative South Korean 
thinking.
Implementation 
President Park has only been in office for a year and a half, and her 
approach and policies toward the North continue to evolve. She has 
demonstrated both a desire to engage North Korea and a principled ap-
proach toward that effort—as in her astute handling of North Korea’s 
de facto closure of the Kaesong industrial park—that has garnered her 
relatively strong support from the South Korean public. Partly due to 
North Korea’s numerous threats against the South during this period, 
however, she has not actively implemented her campaign pledges to 
assist ordinary North Koreans. Her administration has provided the 
North with very little food aid and medical supplies. It has also al-
lowed few civilian exchanges and little private South Korea aid to reach 
the North.40 Her stated policy of implementing existing inter-Korean 
agreements apparently did not include controversial understandings 
reached by President Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il at their summit 
in 2007, including regarding the joint use of the Yellow Sea (West Sea).41
As her first year in office wore on, President Park began to sound 
less optimistic in the face of the North’s belligerent attitude, and a 
strong linkage of inter-Korean exchanges to denuclearization became 
increasingly apparent. In advance of a trip to the United Kingdom in 
November 2013, President Park told the BBC: “We must sever that vi-
cious cycle of the past. We must make sure that we do not repeat a 
situation where North Korea says it will engage but instead buys time 
to advance the sophistication of its nuclear weapons.” She added: 
“North Korea’s actions and their behavior are very disappointing be-
cause they have not honored their promises. It’s hard to trust someone 
who doesn’t honor their promises because it makes things very hard to 
predict . . . . But this is not to say that we will close the door entirely on 
North Korea. We will keep the door to dialogue open and continue our 
efforts to build trust.”42
Nevertheless, the two sides continued some official talks, includ-
ing on the “normalization” of the Kaesong industrial project, where a 
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new coordinating committee staffed by North and South Korean offi-
cials met and reportedly made some progress. South Korea also contin-
ued to allow some visits by its citizens to North Korea as well as pro-
vided limited humanitarian aid to the North. In February 2014, North 
Korea finally allowed the first family reunions to be held since 2010, 
after abruptly canceling a planned reunion in fall 2013. A round of 
senior-level official talks was also held. Unfortunately, the intervening 
months have seen no further official talks or family reunions. 
Emphasis on Unification
As President Park began the second calendar year of her presidency, she 
suddenly put much more emphasis on the goal of unification. While 
working toward eventual unification had always been a primary stated 
aim of her North Korea policy, she declared at a press conference on 
January 6, 2014, that unification would represent a “jackpot” for the 
Korean people and for the country’s neighbors.43 
Park’s speech brought unification back into the political dis-
course in South Korea after a long absence. Nearly two decades ago, as 
South Koreans reflected on the lessons of German unification, concerns 
about the costs and risks of Korean unification became predominant. 
During the following decade, Presidents Kim and Roh stressed their 
concern that an early unification, without extensive preparation, could 
prove disastrous. South Koreans, especially the younger generation, be-
came skeptical about unification other than as a vague, long-term ideal. 
President Park’s remarks sparked a useful debate about not only the 
costs and risks of unification but also the costs—including opportuni-
ty costs, and risks of the status quo—as well as of the advantages of 
unification.44 
On the other hand, observers were surprised by President Park’s 
uncharacteristic use of the “un-presidential” buzzword “jackpot” to 
highlight the importance of unification. Commentators speculated 
about the motivation for making such a statement. Theories included 
her reportedly having read a recent book about unification that includ-
ed the term in its title; that she might have felt that the Pyongyang re-
gime was near collapse after the execution of Jang Seong-taek; or that, 
as she herself indicated, she wanted, among other things, to reassure 
foreign powers, especially the PRC, that unification on South Korean 
terms would not run counter to their interests. 
Then, on March 28, 2014, during a visit to Dresden, Germany, 
President Park gave a major address updating and modifying her North 
23
Korea policy. Entitled “An Initiative for Peaceful Unification of the 
Korean Peninsula,” she offered a number of engagement ideas to North 
Korean authorities “in the hope of laying the groundwork for peaceful 
unification.”45 Among other things, she proposed to
• hold regular reunions of divided families while the ROK provides 
health care for pregnant mothers and infants and unspecified “as-
sistance” for children in the North;
• collaborate in setting up complexes to support agriculture, an-
imal husbandry, and forestry, and invest in transportation and 
telecommunications infrastructure; and
• engage in educational, cultural, and sports exchanges to “narrow 
the distance between our values and our thinking.”
She concluded by declaring that “. . . Korean unification is a mat-
ter of historical inevitability” and “Wir sind ein Volk!”
Long-time observers of the North Korea problem in South Korea 
and in the West reacted with puzzlement to President Park’s new fo-
cus on unification. Although she directed her proposals at “North 
Korean authorities,” neither the substance nor the tone of her remarks 
seemed calculated to appeal to them. Indeed, the very focus on unifi-
cation seemed likely to heighten North Korean leaders’ concerns that 
the South might be aiming for “unification by absorption,” as in the 
German case. Moreover, President Park continued to leave unclear the 
extent to which she would link offers of assistance to North Korea to 
progress on the nuclear issue.46 
Responses of the Major Players
North Korea: Perhaps partly because the government in Pyongyang un-
der the new leadership of Kim Jong-un has been preoccupied with its 
own consolidation, North Korea’s attitude toward President Park has 
appeared erratic. At the beginning of President Park’s term, the govern-
ment-controlled media in Pyongyang avoided personal criticism of her 
and her policy. By the second half of her first year in office, however, 
the media were declaring her North Korea policy “hypocritical” and a 
“brigandish” policy of confrontation, “aimed at forcing the DPRK to 
unilaterally dismantle its nukes. . . .”47 North Korean rhetoric directed 
at Park’s administration and at Park personally became increasingly 
detailed, harsh, and even vulgar.
North Korea appeared to be especially sensitive to South Korean 
calls for it to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The spokesman 
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for the Policy Department of the DPRK National Defense Commis-
sion, one of the regime’s top authorities, declared that her “demand 
that the DPRK should dismantle its nukes and missiles is, in the final 
analysis, little short of forcing it to give up its sovereignty and dignity 
to be a slave of imperialism.” In the same statement, the first of three 
“warnings” to the Park administration read: “. . . they should not dare 
utter words about the nukes of the DPRK and its line of simultaneously 
pushing forward economic construction and the building of nuclear 
force any longer.”48 
Pyongyang also remained neuralgic about U.S.-ROK combined 
military exercises and reacted with hostility toward President Park’s 
Dresden Declaration. In 2014, the annual U.S.-ROK combined military 
exercises and President Park’s new focus on unification prompted the 
North Korean authorities and media to launch attacks on President 
Park and her policies as harsh as any of those made against the Lee 
Myung-bak administration. North Korean official comment on her 
meetings with President Obama during his trip to Seoul in April was 
even more extreme.49 
As of the summer of 2014, Pyongyang’s apparently contradictory 
“messaging” was continuing. While test launching an unprecedented 
number of missiles and rockets, some personally overseen by Kim Jong-
un, North Korea’s National Defense Commission on June 30 repeated 
a message that the regime had sent publicly in various forms, beginning 
with Kim Jong-un’s own New Year’s address.50 Essentially, it declared 
the Korean people’s—and thus its own—great interest in an improve-
ment in inter-Korean relations. Unfortunately, the appeal was burdened 
with conditions unacceptable to President Park’s government, includ-
ing an end to joint military exercises with the United States and the 
implementation of all previous inter-Korean agreements, which would 
include those reached at the Roh-Kim summit. The statement also re-
jected President Park’s Dresden Declaration on Korean unification and 
denounced South Korea’s criticism of the North’s byeongjin policy. 
The South Korean government almost immediately dismissed the state-
ment, as it had done with the earlier North Korean statements along 
these lines. 
As of this writing, official interaction between North and South 
is very limited. The situation has led to speculation on the part of some 
experts that Pyongyang may be close to writing off President Park’s 
government as an engagement partner, as it eventually did the Lee 
Myung-bak administration. (North Korea’s official media has in fact 
been suggesting as much, although such statements may instead be in-
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tended to press the ROK to agree to Pyongyang’s proposals.51) Other 
experts, however, believe that the high-level North Korean statements 
calling for improved ties, as problematic as their wording has been, re-
flect a possible genuine opening to dialogue in Pyongyang that should 
at least be explored.52
United States: The United States has expressed strong support 
for President Park’s North Korea policy. After President Obama’s first 
meeting with President Park, he declared, “The United States and the 
Republic of Korea are as united as ever. . . . Our two nations are pre-
pared to engage with North Korea diplomatically and, over time, build 
trust.” Reflecting the American emphasis on North Korean denuclear-
ization, however, he added, “But as always—and as President Park has 
made clear—the burden is on Pyongyang to take meaningful steps to 
abide by its commitments and obligations, particularly the denuclear-
ization of the Korean Peninsula.” President Park responded in perhaps 
even starker terms about the necessity of denuclearization: “North 
Korea will not be able to survive if it only clings to developing its nu-
clear weapons at the expense of its people’s happiness. Concurrently 
pursuing nuclear arsenals and economic development can by no means 
succeed.”53 
American officials appreciate that South Korea has a special rela-
tionship with North Korea. They have thus been inclined not to object 
if South Korea engages with North Korea on many matters without 
linkage to the nuclear issue, especially humanitarian aid and peo-
ple-to-people exchanges but also economic cooperation such as Kae-
song, even though the United States itself is no longer prepared to do 
so. However, the United States under the Obama administration has 
only grown firmer in its efforts to induce North Korea to give up its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons. Since President Park’s administration itself 
has not actively sought to expand engagement with North Korea so 
far, the exact limits of such American tolerance currently are unclear. 
Key to maintaining U.S. understanding, if not active support, of ROK 
engagement of the North will be close advance ROK consultation with 
the United States about any new engagement programs or major ex-
pansions of existing projects.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials appear to be fairly comfortable with 
the Park administration’s effort to strengthen relations with the PRC, 
American officials appreciate that South Korea has a special 
relationship with North Korea.
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since they too have long sought to improve relations with Beijing, in-
cluding to induce it to put more pressure on Pyongyang to abandon 
nuclear weapons. While the Obama administration reportedly oppos-
es some PRC overtures to Seoul, such as its proposal to establish an 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, American officials generally do 
not regard Seoul’s relations with Washington and Beijing as being a 
zero-sum game. Moreover, American leaders will have been reassured 
by popular opinion polls in South Korea showing near-record levels of 
popular support for the U.S. alliance and considerably greater affini-
ty for the United States than for China—even as South Korean appre-
ciation of China has grown.54 American officials are more concerned 
about the current tensions between the ROK and Japan than they are 
about the development of South Korea’s ties with China, because they 
regard trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan security cooperation as essential both 
to countering North Korean threats and to send a clear message to Bei-
jing about the need to abide by international norms in its relations with 
East Asian neighbors. 
PRC: China has said little publicly about the Park administra-
tion’s North Korea policy, but President Park personally has made a 
good impression on both the PRC’s leadership and public. A Chinese 
translation of her autobiography has been a bestseller in the PRC. 
While the Chinese felt some distance from President Lee Myung-bak 
due to his emphasis on the alliance with the United States, President 
Park’s gestures toward the PRC, including speaking in Chinese on her 
first visit to Beijing, won many friends there. Chinese officials have re-
sponded by engaging in a “charm offensive” toward Park and her ad-
ministration. Also, in the wake of North Korean nuclear and missile 
tests and threats against South Korea during the early months of Pres-
ident Park’s tenure, PRC leaders reportedly expressed strong criticism 
of the DPRK to both South Korean and American leaders. This stood 
in contrast to Beijing’s decision not to take a position on the sinking 
of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan in 2010, a step that alien-
ated President Lee Myung-bak and many South Koreans. Moreover, 
President Park’s strong position on historical and territorial issues with 
Japan resonated with Chinese leaders and the Chinese public. 
Nevertheless, there were few indications that the PRC would 
change its basic approach toward North Korea, despite hopes in both 
Seoul and Washington. This was underlined by President Xi Jinping’s 
failure, during his visit to South Korea on July 3–4, to specify the need 
for North Korea to denuclearize. Although South Korean officials had 
suggested in advance of his visit that he would, for the first time, do 
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just that, he continued to call only for “the denuclearization of Korean 
Peninsula” as a whole.55 Since South Korea has no nuclear weapons 
program, Xi’s position confirms the PRC’s continuing unwillingness to 
put increased public pressure on Pyongyang regarding its nuclear weap-
ons program. It may also reflect Beijing’s sympathy with Pyongyang’s 
argument that it must have nuclear weapons to deter the United States’ 
extended nuclear umbrella for South Korea.
Japan and Russia: Japan appears to be generally supportive of 
President Park’s North Korea policy, but this has been overshadowed 
by the ROK-Japan historical and territorial disputes. No bilateral sum-
mits have been held between President Park and Prime Minister Abe, 
and lower-level diplomatic exchanges have also been reduced. Dialogue 
continues, however, between the South Korean and Japanese diplomats 
in charge of the Six-Party Talks. Both the U.S. and South Korean gov-
ernments appear concerned that Japan’s resumption of negotiations 
with North Korea over the abductee issue might undercut their efforts 
to press Pyongyang to abandon nuclear weapons.56 Some sources spec-
ulate that the Abe administration is using the talks in part to counter 
Seoul’s diplomatic campaign against it on historical and territorial is-
sues. Because of Japan’s reliance on the United States, however, it is 
likely to continue to be generally supportive of U.S. and ROK diploma-
cy regarding North Korea. 
Russia has said little publicly about the trustpolitik. In some ways 
Russia’s policy is supportive of the elements of trustpolitik, in other 
ways not. Like China, Russia opposes North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program but prefers (American and South Korean) sweetening of in-
ducements rather than increasing sanctions and other pressures against 
North Korea. Russia has long supported North-South engagement and 
exchanges and confidence-building measures. President Putin is eager 
for South Korean engagement of North Korea to include cooperation 
on Russian commercial energy and transportation projects, but wants 
others to foot the bill. Under Putin, Russia is tempted to counter the 
United States for the sake of countering the United States, including on 
the Korean Peninsula, but this tendency will be limited by the fact that 
South Korea is now, in many respects, more important to Russia than 
North Korea is. 
Russia is tempted to counter the United States for the sake 
of countering the United States, including on the Korean 
Peninsula.
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Assessment of  
Current South Korean Policy
The authors support most of the basic elements of President Park’s 
North Korea policy as stated, including that the ROK has no inten-
tion of threatening North Korea, support for North-South Korean 
confidence-building measures, humanitarian aid for ordinary North 
Koreans that is not linked to the nuclear issue, and a willingness to 
offer large-scale developmental assistance and economic cooperation 
as the DPRK evinces a genuine willingness to rethink its nuclear policy. 
Elements of President Park’s North Korea policy, however, war-
rant further consideration and adjustment. In practice, as discussed 
above, the implementation of her policy has shown considerable sim-
ilarity to that of President Lee Myung-bak. For example, despite a 
clear-stated willingness to provide humanitarian aid without linkage 
to the nuclear issue, so far very little has been provided. Linkages be-
tween the nuclear issue and the various elements of the current policy 
have largely been left unclarified.57 The Park administration has also 
left in place the sweeping May 24 sanctions imposed by President Lee 
on North Korea after its sinking of the Cheonan in 2010. Moreover, 
the administration needs to adjust the focus on unification to reassure 
Pyongyang that Seoul is not seeking its collapse, or at least not waiting 
for it. 
Even after more than a year in office, President Park’s North 
Korea policy remains vague and reactive rather than clear and bold. It 
is unclear whether the administration has a short- to mid-term vision 
for inter-Korean relations that would mobilize ROK bureaucracies and 
win widespread public support in the South. The long-term goal of 
unification by itself is unlikely to be able to serve that purpose. De-
spite the fact that President Park’s North Korea policy to date has been 
process-oriented, there appears to have been inadequate coordination 
among the main stakeholders at home. This may be due in part to the 
multiplicity of North Korea policy-involved agencies, including the 
It is unclear whether the Park administration has a short- 
to mid-term vision for inter-Korean relations that would 
mobilize ROK bureaucracies and win widespread public 
support in the South.
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new Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation, announced 
July 15. So far more stress seems to have been laid on rhetoric and im-
age than on substance. 
At this point, it is not even clear whether President Park remains 
committed to trustpolitik or if that has been superseded by her new 
focus on unification. For reasons we discuss below, we believe that uni-
fication should be the ultimate aim of the ROK’s North Korea policy. 
Until, however, circumstances are in place for a peaceful unification 
that will likely succeed, the immediate aims should be a reduction of 
tensions, reconciliation, and convergence of the two societies.
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The Policy Context
As we have stressed, engagement is only one aspect—but an essen-tial part—of a comprehensive North Korea policy. Particular en-
gagement projects can and should be mutually beneficial on their own 
merits. At the same time, engagement occurs in a broad policy context 
and so should contribute to the achievement of the particular as well as 
the overall goals of a comprehensive policy. There are four major areas 
of contention within the Republic of Korea about North Korea policy 
that currently limit such consensus: the type and timing of unification, 
how to respond to the North’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, what posi-
tion the South should take on North Korea’s human rights situation, 
and the role of sanctions in dealing with North Korea. In the following, 
we analyze these issues and suggest approaches to them that could be 
part of an expanded public consensus in South Korea toward North 
Korea policy. 
Unification
We agree with President Park that unification should be the end-state on 
the Korean Peninsula. Unification could bring enormous benefits to the 
people of North and South Korea. A unified Korea would likely rank 
among the world’s top ten states in many areas, including economi-
cally, socially, and culturally. Contrary to the widespread focus both 
within South Korea and the international community on the financial 
costs of unification, these will likely prove to be quite manageable if  the 
environment for unification is suitable before it is attempted. In fact, 
after a transition period, unification should result in an economically 
stronger Korean state with a higher standard of living for the people in 
both the north and the south. The constant threat of war on the Korean 
Peninsula would be removed. Unified Korea should pose a threat to 
no state, and no state in the region or elsewhere should have reason to 
threaten unified Korea. 
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Nevertheless, a ROK focus now on Korean unification would be 
unrealistic and unhelpful. The key to both achieving unification and 
ensuring that unified Korea survives and prospers is preparing the stra-
tegic, political, economic, and social groundwork. Currently, neither 
North Korea nor South Korea is interested in unification unless it oc-
curs on its own terms. North Korea will not engage in a sustained way 
with a South Korean government actually aiming to achieve unifica-
tion on terms acceptable to South Koreans, and no conceivable South 
Korean government is prepared to pursue unification on terms current-
ly acceptable to Pyongyang. Moreover, many if not most South Koreans 
today themselves do not support unification except in the long run and 
as an abstract concept,58 and the younger generation in South Korea 
feels increasingly alienated from Koreans in the North. In any event, 
an East German–style collapse in North Korea seems unlikely for the 
foreseeable future.59 
Major foreign powers currently also would not actually support 
an active policy of unification. In its joint statements with the ROK, 
the Obama administration has offered rhetorical support for the goal 
of unification,60 and indeed most Americans feel that in an ideal world 
Korea would be peacefully unified under ROK leadership. However, 
there is no evidence that the United States currently regards it as realis-
tic to aim for unification, presumably because (1) pursuing unification 
now would not actually contribute to achieving unification, (2) it would 
complicate efforts to persuade China to press North Korea harder for 
denuclearization, and (3) it might increase the risk of military conflict 
on the peninsula. Meanwhile, China will not support unification for 
the foreseeable future, because doing so would force it to choose be-
tween the North and the South and because the prospect of unification 
on ROK terms makes China feel strategically threatened by the United 
States. 
Instead of focusing on unification now, we believe that the im-
mediate South Korean goal should be North-South reconciliation and 
convergence through a trustpolitik based on the pursuit of North-
South mutual benefits. Reconciliation and convergence would improve 
many aspects of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, including even-
tually facilitating North Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear weapons 
program and the achievement of unification.
A ROK focus now on Korean unification would be unrealistic 
and unhelpful.
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Denuclearization
Currently, the main issue shaping North Korea policy is North Korea’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons and the related problem of its long-range 
missile development. Conservatives and progressives in South Korea are 
deeply divided over how and to what extent to focus now on ending 
the North’s nuclear weapons program, including the degree of linkage 
to the nuclear issue that should be applied to various types of dealings 
with Pyongyang. Without greater domestic consensus on this issue in 
particular, South Korea is unlikely to be able to sustain a consistent 
long-term strategy toward North Korea. 
North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-
range missiles raises many concerns. Pyongyang could feel more em-
boldened to attack the South and the U.S. military with conventional 
forces. It may again proliferate nuclear technology and materials, in-
creasing instability and the risk of nuclear war in other volatile regions 
and further weakening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.61 
The regime may feel less need to consider economic reforms. Moreover, 
the safety of North Korea’s civilian and military nuclear programs is 
questionable, posing a health risk not only to the people of the North 
but also of the South. 
South Korean conservatives hold that North Korea’s nucle-
ar weapons are directed not only against the United States but also 
against the Republic of Korea. They do not exclude the possibility that 
Pyongyang might one day attack the South with nuclear weapons. In 
the meantime, they are convinced that North Korea seeks to use nucle-
ar weapons to blackmail the South. Their concern is intensified because 
South Korea itself has renounced the development of nuclear weapons 
and must depend on a foreign power, the United States, to counter the 
North’s nuclear weapons. Conservatives also believe that Pyongyang is 
using its successes in developing nuclear weapons and rockets to fend 
off the need to engage in domestic economic and political reforms that 
ultimately could bring the two societies closer together. Given the im-
portance of this issue, many conservatives insist that concessions to 
North Korea, even humanitarian aid, must remain limited unless and 
until Pyongyang changes course on the nuclear issue. To that end, they 
Without greater domestic consensus, South Korea is unlikely 
to be able to sustain a consistent long-term strategy toward 
North Korea.
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support sanctions against Pyongyang as a means of placing additional 
pressure on Pyongyang. 
Progressives also take the position that North Korea must aban-
don nuclear weapons, but many of them believe that North Korea is 
pursuing nuclear weapons in significant part because of a profound 
sense of insecurity, especially due to a perceived military threat from 
the United States, with its nuclear weapons capability. They believe 
that North Korea is developing deliverable nuclear weapons to deter 
the United States, not to attack it or the South. They are convinced that 
Pyongyang’s leaders will not abandon their pursuit of these weapons 
until they are assured that the United States no longer poses a threat.62 
They thus feel that sanctions will not move North Korea from its cur-
rent path. Instead, sanctions will only reinforce the regime’s sense of 
vulnerability, raising tensions and the risk of war on the peninsula. 
Meanwhile, sanctions hurt the ordinary people of North Korea, not 
the elite, and reduce the likelihood of long-term reform in North Ko-
rea that will bring about the social, economic, and, eventually, politi-
cal convergence of North and South Korea. Progressives thus seek to 
minimize the use of sanctions and maximize the provision of aid and 
support to North Korea. 
President Park herself leans strongly toward the traditional con-
servative position in terms of linkage of inter-Korean relations with the 
nuclear issue. Her administration’s position was stated by the Ministry 
of Unification: 
It would not be desirable to solely promote the development of in-
ter-Korean relations without progress in denuclearization, but at the same 
time, it would not be feasible to relate every inter-Korean issue to the North 
Korean nuclear program. Accordingly, the ROK will pursue a low level of 
engagement with the North in the form of exchange, cooperation, and hu-
manitarian aid, to build a sense of inter-Korean trust. In the meantime, as 
inter-Korean trust grows stronger and progress is made regarding denucle-
arization, the ROK government will launch Vision Korea Projects and other 
large-scale projects of economic cooperation with the North.63 
Beyond this, the Park administration has not clarified its linkage 
of engagement to the nuclear issue, but in practice it appears that the 
Park administration is linking the nuclear issue even to many basic hu-
manitarian aid projects. 
The authors believe that North Korea does not intend to attack 
the United States or South Korea with nuclear weapons, but is devel-
oping them for many interlocking reasons: to deter a perceived con-
ventional and nuclear threat from the United States; to make up for its 
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weakened conventional forces in the military competition with South 
Korea; to press for the removal of sanctions and to deflect other inter-
national pressures against it, such as on human rights; and to bolster 
domestic elite and public support for the regime and its leadership. For 
the record, we believe that the United States and South Korea have no 
intention of attacking the North, and that the threat to the regime is 
primarily domestic in nature, stemming from its own policies and in-
stitutional rigidities.
Given the risks of North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear 
weapons, ending the nuclear program must remain a top South Korean 
priority. In engaging the North, Seoul must take care not to act in a 
manner that undermines international efforts to press Pyongyang to 
abandon nuclear weapons. This means avoiding engagement projects 
that strengthen the Pyongyang regime at the expense of the ordinary 
people of North Korea. Apart from improving the well-being of the 
North Korean people, engagement projects should aim to promote 
positive mid- to long-term change in the behavior of the regime. This 
leaves considerable room for Seoul to pursue humanitarian aid, peo-
ple-to-people exchanges, and other engagement projects without link-
age to the nuclear issue. 
South Korean and international pressure against North Korea’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons should continue but in a more focused way. 
The aim of such pressure should be to resume Six-Party Talks or to 
hold Four-Party Talks to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program 
as North Korea indicates a genuine willingness to negotiate toward that 
goal. Tailored engagement of North Korea could contribute to North 
Korea’s moving in that direction.
Human Rights
How to deal with the human rights situation in North Korea is one 
of the most divisive issues between South Korean conservatives and 
progressives. Conservatives advocate a very active program of publi-
cizing and condemning North Korea’s human rights situation. Many 
support steps such as taking the matter before the International Court 
of Justice with the aim of charging North Korea’s leaders with crimes 
South Korean and international pressure against North 
Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons should continue but in a 
more focused way.
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against humanity. Conservatives argue that this is the morally correct 
approach and that it would also put pressure on the regime to reform, 
if not contribute to its collapse. Progressives, while acknowledging the 
seriousness of the situation, are adamant that focusing on the human 
rights problem will not serve to improve the situation. Instead, they say, 
by making the regime feel even less secure, it would actually worsen it. 
Progressives argue the ROK should focus for the time being on state-
to-state dialogue while providing aid to the North. Eventually, they say, 
this will contribute to Pyongyang taking its own reform measures, in-
cluding improving the human rights situation. 
As a result of these different perspectives, the Republic of Korea 
has adopted significantly different human rights policies depending on 
whether a progressive or a conservative occupies the Blue House. When 
progressives Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun held office as presi-
dent, the ROK typically abstained on votes in UN bodies addressing 
North Korea’s human rights situation. Conservative governments vot-
ed in favor of international criticism of North Korea’s human rights 
situation and sometimes took the lead in raising the issue. Meanwhile, 
South Korea’s unicameral National Assembly has been unable to pass 
a North Korean human rights bill. Progressives favor “human rights” 
legislation that deals primarily with providing humanitarian aid to the 
North, while conservatives have drafted a bill that focuses on human 
rights along the lines of the United States’ North Korea Human Rights 
Act, first passed in 2004.
Any South Korean policy must take into account that the North 
Korean human rights issue has developed dramatically in recent years. 
It was not until the administration of President Carter (1977–81) that 
the United States embraced an activist policy placing international hu-
man rights on its foreign policy agenda. Today democratic governments 
throughout the world criticize aspects of the human rights situations 
even in friendly and allied countries, not just in those of adversaries. 
Actions on behalf of human rights that in earlier decades would have 
been considered unacceptable interference in domestic affairs now en-
joy broad international legitimacy and support. Concepts such as the 
“responsibility to protect” (R2P) assert that sovereignty is not absolute 
and that the international community must intervene to stop situations 
such as crimes against humanity. The scope of human rights itself is 
being greatly elaborated, including the current focus on education for 
girls and women and equal rights for all people no matter their sexual 
orientation or gender category.
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That the human rights situation in North Korea was serious was 
never a secret, but the closed nature of the regime and Cold War dy-
namics made many people in the international community doubt that 
the situation was as bad as some asserted. South Korean progressives 
also associated strong criticism of North Korea’s internal situation 
with those who desired an end to the Pyongyang regime. Pyongyang 
made it virtually impossible for Western journalists to report out of the 
country, much less to obtain video that could dramatize the situation of 
the ordinary people of North Korea for an international audience. The 
result was that the international community paid little heed to North 
Korean human rights until the end of the Cold War. In any event, there 
were few practical means for the international community to address 
the problem in North Korea. 
Coincidentally with the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, 
the World Wide Web was becoming established, eventually resulting 
in an unprecedented expansion of the ability of people throughout the 
world to produce, share, and analyze information of all sorts. One con-
sequence has been an enormous increase in the amount of information 
available about circumstances inside North Korea. Along with chang-
ing international norms about human rights, this has contributed to a 
dramatic growth during the past decade in the number of people, orga-
nizations, and states throughout the world actively focusing on human 
rights in North Korea.64 
In a logical conclusion to these developments, a special United 
Nations Commission of Inquiry published a report in February 2014 
detailing what it called “unspeakable atrocities” in North Korea.65 The 
head of the inquiry sent a letter to Kim Jong-un, warning, in effect, 
that Kim himself might be brought before the International Criminal 
Court.66 The international focus on the North Korean human rights 
situation will almost certainly continue to increase. 
While the authors share the concern that a focus on the North 
Korean human rights situation burdens any engagement effort and will 
not improve the lives of the people of North Korea in the short- to mid-
term, the Republic of Korea cannot ignore the human rights situation. 
We believe that an approach is available that would constitute a credi-
An approach toward North Korean human rights is available, 
one that would constitute a credible policy for the Republic of 
Korea and gain the support of the broad middle of the South 
Korea political spectrum.
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ble policy for the Republic of Korea and gain the support of the broad 
middle of the South Korea political spectrum. Steps should include the 
following: 
• The Republic of Korea should establish a standing commission 
with bipartisan membership to research North Korea’s human 
rights situation with an eye toward developing ROK programs to 
address the areas of greatest apparent need. 
• Generally, South Korea should allow international organizations 
and other countries to take the lead internationally in addressing 
North Korea’s human rights abuses. This will be more persuasive 
internationally and also deprive North Korea of the pretext that 
South Korea is not really concerned about human rights but is 
using the issue as a weapon against Pyongyang. 
• In votes in international organizations, the Republic of Korea 
should join in supporting all important and accurate criticism of 
North Korea’s human rights situation. 
• To underline its support for the well-being of the people of North 
Korea, the ROK should increase humanitarian provision of nutri-
tional assistance and public health services to the people of North 
Korea without linkage to the nuclear issue. 
• At home, the Republic of Korea should redouble its efforts to fa-
cilitate the full integration of North Korean refugees into South 
Korean society. 
• Seoul should support increased public broadcasting to the peo-
ple of North Korea. Such broadcasting should provide detailed, 
objective information about North Korea, South Korea, and 
global affairs to the people of North Korea. It should eschew 
heavy-handed propaganda and instead allow the people of North 
Korea to draw their own conclusions. 
• The ROK should take all necessary legislative and legal steps to 
prevent the counterproductive and dangerous practice of private 
South Korean groups sending propaganda balloons into North 
Korean territory. 
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Sanctions
Along with Iran, North Korea is one of the world’s most heavily sanc-
tioned countries.67 The United States and other countries imposed 
sanctions on North Korea immediately after its invasion of South 
Korea in June 1950. Over the decades, the United States and many oth-
er countries continued to add to the list and types of sanctions against 
North Korea. Since North Korea began testing nuclear devices in 2006, 
the UN Security Council has been adding its own sanctions to the mix. 
The increasing salience of the North Korean human rights situation 
means that that issue will also likely result in further sanctions. Mean-
while, moves are afoot in the U.S. legislature to add to the number and 
type of U.S. sanctions,68 and, as noted above, public statements by U.S. 
officials and media accounts suggest that the Obama administration is 
preparing to increase U.S. sanctions in the event of another nuclear or 
long-range missile test, including in the area of banking and finances. 
Additional UN sanctions are also likely in response to further North 
Korean nuclear and missile tests. 
The DPRK leadership rejects all sanctions against it as illegiti-
mate and as reflecting double standards imposed by the United States. 
It regards sanctions as a violation of its sovereignty and asserts they 
are the cause of its economic and other difficulties. It has consistently 
declared that international pressures against it will never succeed, and 
that it will respond to such pressures a thousand-fold. It uses public 
statements, threats including its nuclear weapons program, and inter-
national negotiations in an effort to induce the international communi-
ty to ease sanctions, with occasional but not lasting success. 
Similar to the development of new norms about human rights, 
the international community increasingly has come to regard sanc-
tions not only as legitimate but also as required in the case of egregious 
state misbehavior. Sanctions typically are aimed at changing offensive 
state behavior and of punishing those responsible. Sanctions may also 
serve as a warning and deterrent to other states against engaging in 
the problematic behavior. International organizations and individual 
states thus feel compelled to impose sanctions due to public pressure, 
even if they actually believe that the pressure is unlikely to achieve the 
announced aims. In terms of satisfying domestic political pressures, 
sanctions can also be a substitute for other riskier or costlier measures, 
such as military attack. But sanctions sometimes do work, such as in 
their contribution to ending apartheid in South Africa and apparently 
in bringing Iran to the negotiating table. Together, these factors ensure 
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that international organizations and individual states will continue to 
make frequent resort to sanctions. 
Unfortunately, sanctions are also inherently problematic even 
for the states imposing them. They often do not achieve their stated 
intended results, and they invariably anger the targeted regime. They 
may exacerbate the immediate situation, and they may contribute to 
military conflict. As sanctions are often imposed in the heat of the mo-
ment, they may go farther than is actually warranted and they may have 
unintended consequences. Sanctions themselves can become the focus 
of attention, distracting from the issues for which they were imposed. 
Sanctions can reduce the flexibility of the states imposing them, for 
without a resolution of the causes for which they were imposed, states 
cannot ease them without losing face at home, even if they are no longer 
proving useful. Even if an agreement to lift sanctions is reached, the ex-
ecutive of the imposing state may not be able to do so due to opposition 
within the legislature or to coordination problems with other countries 
and international organizations.69 International sanctions may be even 
more difficult to ease due to veto powers and other consensus rules and 
practices. Sanctions thus tend to accumulate as time passes. 
The effect of sanctions on legitimate and desirable business activ-
ities is far-reaching. To the extent that sanctions are vaguely worded, 
businesses and others may forego any activities with sanctioned states 
that might even remotely be interpreted as sanctioned, even activities 
that the sanctions-imposing entity would regard as being unobjection-
able or in its own interests. Even carefully delineated sanctions tend to 
result in reputational risks for entities that wish to engage in non-sanc-
tioned activities with sanctioned states. Even completely lifting sanc-
tions may not result in businesses dealing again with the formerly sanc-
tioned but still tainted state.70 In any event, sanctions require significant 
legal input into transactions involving possibly sanctioned activities, 
thus delaying and raising the costs for those seeking to engage in ex-
changes involving a sanctioned state. 
The Republic of Korea has imposed many sanctions against 
North Korea over the decades, including most recently the blanket 
May 24 Measures of 2010 after North Korea apparently engaged in a 
The May 24 sanctions were too broad and have proven very 
difficult to ease, even for exchanges or projects in South 
Korea’s interests.
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sneak attack that sank a South Korean naval vessel, resulting in the loss 
of forty-six lives. The unprecedented North Korean artillery shelling 
of Yeonpyeong Island in November of that year, killing another four 
people, only reinforced the South Korean government’s determination 
to sanction the North. Unfortunately, the May 24 sanctions, which 
banned virtually all interchange with the North except the industrial 
park in Kaesong, were too broad and, once imposed, have proven very 
difficult to ease, even for exchanges or projects in South Korea’s inter-
ests. The sanctions suspended or ended many projects in the long-term 
interests of the South, without having pressured the North into behav-
ing better, since leaders of the North Korean regime are able to isolate 
themselves—if not their people—from the consequences of sanctions. 
If anything, the breadth and duration of the sanctions may have exac-
erbated the North’s objectionable behavior. 
The May 24 sanctions, as announced and, even more so, as imple-
mented, would make it very difficult to implement the tailored engage-
ment we advocate here. There has been an increasingly lively debate 
in South Korea about easing or ending the sanctions, apparently even 
among officials, although the government’s position remains that the 
measures cannot be changed absent a North Korea apology and oth-
er steps to atone for its actions in 2010. The government’s position is 
understandable, and we acknowledge that it will be politically difficult 
to lift the sanctions without proper actions from the North. Still, we 
believe that an executive decision by President Park to ease or ignore 
certain aspects of the May 24 sanctions necessary to begin a process 
of tailored engagement would be both tactically sound and enjoy wide 
support in South Korea. As progress is made in inter-Korean changes, 
North Korea would be likelier to act in ways making it possible to ease 
further aspects of the May 24 Measures and eventually to remove them 
completely. 
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Toward Tailored Engagement
Despite the many obstacles and difficulties, we believe that Seoul has an opportunity to begin to bridge the gap with Pyongyang by 
pursuing a hardheaded approach that we call tailored engagement. Its 
aim is to reduce the risk of conflict now while fostering inter-Korean 
reconciliation and effecting positive change in North Korea, with the 
ultimate goal of laying the basis for peaceful unification. The concept 
is based on the conviction that engagement is only one means—albeit 
an essential one—of dealing with North Korea, but that engagement 
must be carefully “tailored” or fitted to changing political and security 
realities on and around the Korean Peninsula. Under tailored engage-
ment, South Korea would make a renewed attempt to engage the North 
in various types of exchanges in a principled and systematic way, based 
on an increased domestic consensus and with the understanding and 
support of international allies and partners.
Tailored engagement is informed by the difficult history of efforts 
by South Korea and other countries to engage Pyongyang over the past 
two decades. Great patience and flexibility will be necessary to imple-
ment it. Tailored engagement seeks to incorporate the best parts and 
avoid the problematic aspects of the North Korea policies of President 
Park’s predecessors, both conservative and progressive, as President 
Park herself has argued is needed. It eschews both an “appeasement” 
approach to Pyongyang and the notion that inter-Korean engagement 
under the current circumstances would be tantamount to accepting the 
North’s misbehavior, especially its nuclear weapons program. 
We have chosen to use the English term “engagement” although 
well aware that its vagueness has left many Korean conservatives with 
Engagement must be carefully “tailored” or fitted to changing 
political and security realities on and around the Korean 
Peninsula.
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the misapprehension that it is equivalent to President Kim Dae-jung’s 
Sunshine Policy, which conservatives tend to equate with “appease-
ment” of North Korea. Yet “engagement” does not necessarily mean 
such an approach. In English, “engagement” can be used differently in 
many contexts. For examples, “rules of engagement” are the guidelines 
for when and how militaries should use force against an opponent. In 
fact, tailored engagement differs from the engagement policies of the 
progressive Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations by tak-
ing a longer-term approach to dealing with North Korea, based on do-
mestically and internationally supportable positions on the fundamen-
tal issues of unification, nuclear weapons, human rights, and sanctions. 
Despite progressives’ rhetoric, they were often seen as overlooking or 
ignoring the nuclear and human rights issues. On the other hand, the 
conservative administration of Lee Myung-bak ultimately linked near-
ly all engagement to the nuclear issue, which was neither necessary nor 
pragmatic. Like President Park’s trustpolitik, tailored engagement is a 
step-by-step confidence-building approach. A grand comprehensive ap-
proach is no longer suited to current conditions on the Korean Peninsu-
la, if indeed it ever was. Until much trust is established in inter-Korean 
relations, a comprehensive approach is virtually bound to fail, in the 
process making the situation even worse. 
Implementing tailored engagement will require action in three 
areas. The first is reorganizing the Korean government itself to facil-
itate a more coordinated formulation and implementation of North 
Korea policy. The second is achieving much more consensus within 
South Korea on how to deal with North Korea. Based on that, South 
Korea should seek to win the support of the major powers, especially 
the United States and the PRC, for its approach to North Korea. With 
that, South Korea will have a firm basis to pursue tailored engagement 
of North Korea. While the process should generally follow this logical 
order, North Korea will of course not wait for Seoul to complete what 
will be a long and complex undertaking. It will be necessary to deal 
with Pyongyang on an ongoing basis even as this longer-term process is 
undertaken. In doing so, the Park administration would still be able to 
draw on tailored engagement’s principles, concepts, and strategies as 
outlined in this study. 
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Establishing a  
South Korean “Perry Process”
The magnitude of the tasks that must be accomplished to achieve South 
Korean leadership of the North Korea problem requires a restructuring 
of the way the ROK government deals with North Korea. Currently, the 
president is in overall charge of North Korea policy, with the support 
of a national security adviser, and other Blue House staff, officials in 
numerous agencies, including the unification, foreign, and defense min-
istries, and intelligence service, and, now, the newly established Presi-
dential Committee for Unification Preparation. The formulation and 
implementation of North Korea policy is spread among many, often 
competing officials and agencies. Meanwhile, the president has myriad 
responsibilities not only for external but also for all domestic policies, 
and does not have the time personally to ensure consistency of purpose 
and implementation of North Korea policy. 
For this reason, we recommend that President Park emulate the 
“Perry Process” of the Clinton administration. She should appoint a 
very senior figure with the political stature to take overall charge of 
the formulation and implementation of North Korea policy under her 
direct guidance, as former secretary of defense William “Bill” Perry did 
during President Clinton’s second term. This person would be charged 
with building a domestic consensus on North Korea policy, garnering 
international support, managing ROK government engagement with 
North Korea, and personally leading or directing all high-level negoti-
ations with North Korea apart from summits. 
We recognize that establishing such a position and finding the 
right person to fill it will be far from easy. The person appointed to this 
vital mission would, in the first instance, of course need to have the 
complete confidence of the president. But he or she would also need 
to have the respect and trust of the responsible opposition and of pub-
lic opinion as a whole. Moreover, the person would need to have the 
intelligence, experience, and energy to meet the demands of these re-
sponsibilities, and be prepared to exercise the role at least through the 
remainder of President Park’s term of office. 
The magnitude of the North Korea problem requires a 
restructuring of the way the ROK government deals with 
North Korea.
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It is not only the United States that has taken such an approach. 
In West Germany, Chancellor Willi Brandt had an analogous aide in the 
person of Egon Bahr. Bahr was an architect of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, his 
main adviser on relations with East Germany and the Soviet Union and 
its satellite states, and a negotiator of some of the most important trea-
ties with them. Similarly, conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl relied 
heavily on his minister of finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, who was serving 
as interior minister when unification occurred.71
Achieving Domestic Consensus
Apart from the attitude of North Korea itself, the greatest obstacle to 
greater South Korean leadership on the North Korea problem is in-
ternal division in South Korea. Achieving greater consensus in South 
Korea is essential to pursuing a sustainable and effective approach to-
ward North Korea, not only in dealing directly with North Korea but 
also in shoring up international support for South Korean efforts.
Without a North Korea policy consensus, a South Korean presi-
dent is exposed to sudden swings in public opinion at home. The next 
election can always mean a change of government to the opposition 
party, with a corresponding major change in North Korea policy. North 
Korea is well aware of this, which only adds to its doubts about the 
reliability of any South Korean government and tempts it to seek to en-
courage and exploit internal divisions in the South. The lack of a con-
sensus within South Korea also weakens Seoul’s influence with major 
foreign actors such as the United States and the PRC, who are similarly 
unable to count on long-term consistency in Seoul’s policy.
The historical record demonstrates that impatient, short-term, 
partisan-based approaches to dealing with North Korea will not work. 
They are not sustainable at home, and may actually make matters worse 
by antagonizing North Korea and polarizing opinion about DPRK pol-
icy in the ROK and internationally. Such inconsistency also contributes 
to North Korean leaders believing that they need not implement ma-
jor political and economic reforms, much less abandon the pursuit of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
South Korean progressives have a tendency to see the DPRK as a 
“victim” of the United States and (in their view) its conservative allies 
in South Korea. (In actuality, North Korea is a full actor in its own 
right, its behavior driven mostly by the nature of its system and its 
own history and domestic politics.) South Korean progressives believe 
that if the ROK and the United States would show more forbearance 
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of the DPRK and provide it with assurances and assistance, it would 
eventually change its behavior for the better. South Korean progressives 
so strongly believe this and are so suspicious of their conservative coun-
terparts that, when in power, they are anxious to politically “lock in” 
their policies toward the North. Progressives also show a tendency to 
downplay North Korea’s WMD programs—despite assertions to the 
contrary—and to ignore North Korea’s human rights situation, on the 
grounds that this is the only pragmatic course.72 Knowing this, North 
Korean leaders “take the money and run,” abusing progressives’ good 
intentions by accepting concessions and aid without intending to recip-
rocate, even when they could. This in turn leads to a backlash on the 
part of South Korean conservatives, making such a policy toward the 
DPRK politically unsustainable over the long term.
For their part, South Korean conservatives have a tendency to as-
sume that the North Korean system, regime, and policy are fundamen-
tally unchanging and unchangeable absent their complete replacement, 
an attitude of which the DPRK is aware and which only reinforces its 
suspicion, hostility, and aggressiveness. Conservatives tend not to plan 
to make opportunities to improve the situation, and not to recognize 
opportunities when they arise. They are often reactive and engage in 
tit-for-tat responses to North Korea rather than seek and retain the 
initiative in dealing with the DPRK based on a sustained “getting to 
yes” approach. They underestimate the risks of the status quo and, by 
analogy with German unification, engage in wishful thinking that the 
North Korea problem will eventually disappear relatively painlessly.73
Political consensus is of course easy to call for but very hard 
to achieve. In recent years, however, there has been a growing under-
standing among both conservatives and progressives in South Korea 
that policy division on North Korea is a major problem.74 President 
Park’s trustpolitik itself promises to “forge a greater consensus in the 
domestic arena by means of public feedback, transparent information 
sharing, and policy implementation.”75 Recent survey data show that 
during the past decade the main progressive and conservative parties 
have been further to the left and right, respectively, than their voters. 
This suggests both an opportunity for achieving greater consensus, as 
well as political incentives for parties to do so.76
On July 15, President Park established the Presidential Commit-
tee for Unification Preparation under her direct leadership. It includes 
fifty members from both government and the private sector, along with 
nearly one hundred more supporting players. She named two deputies, 
one the unification minister, the other a private citizen who served as 
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President Kim Young-sam’s national security adviser. Originally an-
nounced in February, the committee is supposed to support President 
Park’s unification planning as first detailed in her Dresden speech. Un-
fortunately, as currently constituted, the committee may well contrib-
ute to, rather than ease, policy incoherence, because it overlaps with 
the many existing agencies and advisory committees involved in North 
Korea policy. Moreover, progressives constitute only a small minority 
of the committee’s members, which will make it difficult for the com-
mittee to contribute to an increased public consensus on North Korea 
policy. President Park should consider naming the Korean Bill Perry 
equivalent as chairman of the committee, reporting directly to her, and 
significantly increasing progressive representation on the committee.
Fortunately, President Park has what is perhaps a unique opportu-
nity in domestic political terms to take a more activist, pro-engagement 
approach in dealing with the North. As a conservative and the daughter 
of President Park Chung-hee, she might be able to facilitate a broad and 
sustainable domestic consensus in South Korea for a new engagement 
approach toward North Korea, something a progressive leader would 
find much more difficult to do. Moreover, her campaign platform and 
her stated policy toward North Korea as president include many of the 
basic concepts and principles needed to build a broad domestic consen-
sus and forge a viable engagement policy toward the North. By “tailor-
ing” those concepts and principles, a significantly expanded consensus 
on North Korea policy should be achievable. 
Winning International Support
With more domestic consensus, the Republic of Korea will be much 
better positioned to obtain greater international support for its leader-
ship on the North Korea problem. The United States and China are the 
key foreign players, but Russia and Japan also have major interests in 
peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The “South Korean Bill Perry” 
can play a crucial role in coordinating North Korea policy at the high-
est levels with these countries, as Perry did with China as well as with 
American allies the ROK and Japan. 
President Park has what is perhaps a unique opportunity 
in domestic political terms to take a more activist, pro-
engagement approach in dealing with the North
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South Korea enjoys strong support from the United States govern-
ment on the North Korea problem as long as it gives priority to North 
Korea’s denuclearization. American officials recognize South Korea’s 
unique role in dealing with North Korea as another Korean state, and 
most accept that South Korea may need or wish to engage with and 
provide aid to North Korea in ways that the United States cannot do 
without at least de facto linkage to denuclearization. 
The key to maintaining strong U.S. support, not to mention meet-
ing South Korea’s own strategic interests, will be to have a clear and 
convincing rationale as to why particular engagement and aid plans 
need not be linked to denuclearization and to consult and coordinate 
fully in advance with the United States. This is because engaging North 
Korea economically under the current circumstances could reinforce the 
regime’s belief in and commitment to byeongjin, at least in the short- 
to mid-term. Unless undertaken with careful planning, providing aid 
and engaging in economic exchanges could also reduce the regime’s 
incentives to implement economic and political reforms. On the other 
hand, there is little reason to believe that North Korea will abandon its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, while outside en-
gagement may help to unleash forces for positive change within North 
Korea over the longer run. 
The PRC will generally support increased South Korean engage-
ment of North Korea. Although the PRC has far more economic and 
people-to-people ties with South Korea than North Korea and disap-
proves of Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, the PRC continues 
to regard stability in North Korea as essential to its strategic interests 
and thus supports actions that reduce tensions. Moreover, there is a 
significant potential for the ROK and the PRC to pursue joint projects 
of various types with North Korea, both within the North and along 
the PRC-North Korea border. Over the longer term, China’s increasing 
tendency to see the Korean Peninsula through the lens of its strategic 
mistrust of the United States will pose challenges to ROK interests, in-
cluding in regard to North Korea. This phenomenon can be addressed 
in part by astute ROK diplomacy toward both the United States and 
China. 
An expanded domestic consensus in the ROK along with Chinese 
support for the ROK’s North Korea policy will tend to increase Russian 
support for the ROK’s dealing with North Korea. As with China, the 
ROK may be able, with Russia, to pursue joint economic and infra-
structure projects involving North Korea. 
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If the ROK has won U.S. support for a more proactive North 
Korea policy, Japan is unlikely to oppose it. The status of the abductee 
issue, however, will be important. If it is not resolved in the current 
Japanese–North Korean talks, Japan itself will likely remain reluc-
tant about engaging the North and will not provide active support for 
ROK efforts. In any event, like the United States, Japan will be con-
cerned that ROK engagement does not undermine efforts to end North 
Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. 
Obtaining the moral support of the international community as 
a whole will be very helpful in Seoul’s engagement of North Korea. In 
addition to the United States, PRC, Russia, and Japan, the ROK should 
seek the support of the United Nations, European Union, ASEAN, 
and other regional organizations. Although relatively isolated, North 
Korean leaders will find it harder to persuade themselves that domestic 
reform and denuclearization are not necessary to the extent that the 
international community is united in support of ROK engagement ef-
forts and opposed to the North’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
North Korean leaders will find it harder to persuade 
themselves that domestic reform and denuclearization are 
not necessary to the extent that the international community 
is united in support of ROK engagement efforts.
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Engaging North Korea
Basic Engagement Principles
In light of the serious and highly complex situation on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK should lean farther forward in terms of the types 
and scale of exchange, cooperation, and humanitarian aid it offers to 
North Korea. But for a sustainable, successful ROK North Korea policy, 
it is critically important that engagement be principled and not swayed 
by momentary political considerations. Guiding principles of tailored 
engagement should include: (1) a focus on the pursuit of mutual in-
terests and benefits rather than on symbolism and appeals to national 
sentiment; (2) the application of market principles and international 
standards in economic activities; (3) collaboration with other countries 
and third-party companies in both economic and people-to-people 
projects; and (4) pragmatism and flexibility in pursuing engagement 
at both the state-to-state and grassroots levels in complementary ways. 
These principles applying to the process of engagement are gen-
erally self-explanatory. Engagement primarily based on appeals to na-
tional sentiment will not be sustainable, as even under the most opti-
mistic scenarios, North Korea will undoubtedly engage in misbehavior 
for some time to come. The pursuit of tangible mutual benefits, the 
application of market principles and international standards, and co-
operation with third countries are all intended to increase the prospects 
of success and the sustainability of projects. Pragmatism and flexibility 
are essential because dealing with North Korea presents a formidable, 
long-term challenge. Engagement must be principled and consistent, 
but rigid formulas or a top-down approach only will not succeed. The 
It is critically important that engagement be principled and 
not swayed by momentary political considerations.
52
principles cannot work in a vacuum; they must be applied in the larger 
context of politics and security as laid out above. Engagement must be 
“tailored” to the current policy environment and adapted as it changes, 
always keeping the basic principles and ultimate goals clearly in mind. 
Illustrative Projects
Having the support of the people at home and of the international 
community will greatly increase South Korea’s influence and make it 
likelier that North Korea will eventually respond positively to South 
Korean overtures. But winning domestic and international support it-
self requires that the ROK develop a clearer and more detailed vision 
for engaging North Korea and pursue it in a principled and proactive 
manner. 
In her Dresden Declaration, President Park called for a “broad-
ening of inter-Korean exchanges in areas such as history, culture, and 
sports to recover a sense of homogeneity between the people of the two 
Koreas.” Inter-Korean exchange projects, most active during the peri-
ods of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments, have come 
to a halt on nearly all fronts since the ROK’s May 24 sanctions came 
into effect in 2010. In light of President Park’s declaration to the in-
ternational community of her commitment to improving inter-Korean 
relations by broadening inter-Korean exchanges in apolitical areas, the 
authors hope that appropriate South Korean engagement projects with 
North Korea will gain new momentum. 
Engagement with the DPRK can and should begin with smaller-
scale projects in areas that are simpler and politically less controversial, 
and proceed, as progress is made, to larger projects that may be more 
complex and politically contentious. In general, the focus should first 
be on the improvement and expansion of existing projects and the re-
sumption of those that have previously been implemented or approved. 
The first engagement efforts should be in the area of humanitarian 
aid, followed by educational and cultural exchanges. If Seoul, with its 
profound national, family, and personal ties to the people of North 
Korea, does not provide more nutritional and public health aid, few 
The first engagement efforts should be in the area of 
humanitarian aid, followed by educational and cultural 
exchanges.
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other countries are likely to do so. Educational and cultural exchang-
es will serve at least to slow down the current social divergence. The 
government should be much more liberal in allowing South Korean pri-
vate-sector groups to engage with North Korean counterparts and to 
provide aid and assistance to ordinary North Koreans. 
New economic and developmental engagement projects can be 
considered as progress is made in humanitarian, educational, and cul-
tural exchanges. Economic and developmental projects are more dif-
ficult, as they may impinge on efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program. If in the meantime negotiations on ending North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program resume, South Korea could coordi-
nate with its international partners to offer the North economic and 
developmental projects as major incentives in the nuclear talks. Even 
if the nuclear issue remains, some economic and development projects 
could be identified that would not imply acceptance of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons program. Even projects that would be problematic 
in terms of the nuclear program could, after coordination with inter-
national partners, be raised with Pyongyang as possible as progress is 
made on the nuclear issue. 
In the following, we offer examples of some possible inter-Korean 
projects, from humanitarian to educational, cultural, economic, and 
developmental. The discussion is by no means comprehensive or con-
clusive. Rather, it is conceptual and illustrative of the kinds of projects 
that could be included in a South Korean government road map imple-
menting tailored engagement.
I. Humanitarian Engagement
Humanitarian aid activities are widely recognized as having a special 
status among all types of engagement with the DPRK, especially from 
the ROK point of view. The sense of “one family” and humanitarian 
impulses have led South Korea to feel strongly about and take the lead 
in providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea in the past. Such 
activities can be an effective and powerful way of demonstrating the 
South’s goodwill and commitment to improving the situation in the 
North. Showing the ROK’s unwavering support and commitment to 
the DPRK’s humanitarian situation through both word and action is a 
fundamental step in building trust, which is at the core of trustpolitik. 
Thus, humanitarian assistance should represent an obvious first step in 
South Korea’s endeavors to engage North Korea. 
Food shortages, together with the lack of even basic medical care, 
have been the most critical problems facing the ordinary people of 
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North Korea, resulting in widespread malnutrition, infectious diseases, 
and death. Since the termination of ROK food and fertilizer shipments, 
the northern regime has reportedly devoted more efforts and resources 
to agriculture, resulting in increased food production. Despite this im-
provement, however, malnutrition persists among vulnerable sectors of 
the population, especially children. Among children under the age of 
five, 4 percent suffer from physical wasting and 28 percent are stunted; 
80 percent are constantly worried about hunger.77 In addition, while 
average caloric intake has increased, a lack of proteins, fats, and micro-
nutrients remains a serious concern.
Although an extensive public health infrastructure exists in the 
DPRK, there are virtually no resources to support it. There is an al-
most complete lack of medicines, and medical technology and training 
are outdated. The result is needless suffering and death and the evo-
lution of extreme forms of infectious and epidemic disease, such as 
multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB) and extremely drug-resis-
tant tuberculosis (XDR TB). The situation is exacerbated by a lack of 
safe drinking water and an inadequate supply of electricity not only to 
people’s homes but also to medical facilities. Health indicators provid-
ed by the North Korean Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) for 1994, 
the period just before the great famine, depict a TB incidence rate of 
about 38 per 100,000 people.78 Currently, according to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the rate has risen to 345 per 100,000 people, one 
of the highest outside of sub-Saharan Africa.79 Unsanitary conditions, 
along with malnutrition and inadequate medical treatment, have com-
bined to fan the epidemic. 
While humanitarian aid, including food and public health assis-
tance, benefits ordinary people and is thus politically the most sup-
portable form of North Korean engagement in South Korea as well as 
elsewhere, international political tensions have posed major obstacles 
to humanitarian engagement with North Korea. Food assistance, at 
different times from China, South Korea, the United States, and Japan, 
was essential to fill the gap between food supply and demand in North 
Korea during the 1990s and 2000s. In recent years, however, food aid to 
North Korea has dwindled due to the worsening of inter-Korean and 
DPRK-U.S. relations, the inadvertent effects of sanctions, and donor 
Food and public health assistance benefits ordinary people 
and is thus politically the most supportable form of North 
Korean engagement.
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fatigue. World Food Program (WFP) food assistance to North Korea 
in 2013 was down to its lowest level since 1996.80 Similarly, despite the 
Park Geun-hye government’s ostensible policy of delinking humanitar-
ian assistance to the North Korean people from the diplomatic and 
security situation—a core element of trustpolitik— South Korean aid 
has been very limited. In 2013, the Park government provided only $6 
million for vaccines, medicine, and nutritional supplements for chil-
dren and pregnant women in the North through the United Nations 
Children’s’ Fund (UNICEF) and another $6 million through WHO.81 
In addition, according to the annual White Paper on Unification, the 
total amount of private South Korean aid to North Korea authorized 
by the Ministry of Unification in 2013 stood at only 5.1 billion won ($5 
million), only one-sixth of the reported $30.5 million annual average 
authorized during the Lee Myung-bak years.82
South Korea’s humanitarian engagement of the North gained re-
newed focus with President Park’s March 2014 Dresden speech. It laid 
out specific proposals for a humanitarian agenda, including a “thou-
sand-day package” project to support nursing North Korean mothers 
and infants in the first one thousand days of their lives. It remains to 
be seen to what extent and how effectively this initiative will be imple-
mented, given Seoul’s limited humanitarian engagement in recent years 
and the obstacles Pyongyang itself sometimes poses.83 Still, a number 
of factors—such as the strong moral and humanitarian nature of such 
engagement, the ROK’s special status as “family” to North Koreans, 
and humanitarian assistance’s role in contributing to a healthier and 
more equal North Korean population for future unification—place 
the ROK in a much better position than any other country to take the 
lead in international efforts to improve basic living conditions in North 
Korea over the mid- to long-term. 
The authors thus believe that the ROK government should play 
a more proactive role in the humanitarian sector. In the following, we 
analyze how such projects accord with the basic principles of tailored 
engagement. 
1. Humanitarian projects should aim to pursue mutual interests and 
benefits rather than focusing on symbolism and appeals to national 
sentiment.
ROK humanitarian assistance should aim to improve the general 
health and nutrition of the North Korean people. With North Korea 
recently having made some progress in increasing its grain harvests and 
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thus in supplying the population with carbohydrates, food aid should 
be focused on supplemental “nutritional assistance” such as micronu-
trients and oils. It should target vulnerable populations such as children 
and the elderly. Since the children of North Korea will grow to become 
the leaders and citizens of an eventual unified Korea, their health and 
physical development are crucial not only to North Korea but to South 
Korea as well. If nutritional issues are not addressed before unification, 
the consequences for national unity could be serious. The provision of 
infant- and child-specific assistance also minimizes the risk of aid being 
diverted from intended recipients, since infant formula and food are 
not appealing to others.
The ROK should identify several projects that can be sustainable 
regardless of politics and designate these as “ongoing humanitarian 
projects” that function under normal humanitarian aid criteria. These 
projects should transcend political considerations and be post-parti-
san in nature. The ROK government should resist the temptation to 
use food or other forms of humanitarian assistance for political lever-
age, as the linking of such aid may result in harm to vulnerable North 
Koreans. In any event, humanitarian aid programs could contribute to 
the expansion of nascent changes in the DPRK and the improvement 
of inter-Korean relations.
2. Market principles should be applied to the provision of  humanitar-
ian assistance whenever possible. 
While food assistance is politically and legally the most feasible—
and the most humanitarian—way to engage North Korea, some factors 
tend to undermine the effectiveness of, and call into question, the ratio-
nale for such assistance. Over the long term, grant-type food assistance 
poses a moral hazard by increasing aid dependency on the part of the 
recipient country. The primary form of ROK humanitarian assistance 
to the DPRK should no longer be the provision of rice or fertilizer. 
Instead, the ROK should focus on programs that increase food security 
and improve public health. Food and nutritional assistance should en-
compass technical assistance and training to boost and diversify agri-
cultural output and otherwise contribute to improved diets. Assistance 
with sloping land management, for instance, could be an excellent in-
centive program for the North Koreans, as it results in higher yields 
and reduces flooding, as Swiss government efforts in North Korea have 
demonstrated.84
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Aid programs should also be designed to provide the DPRK with 
incentives to engage in normal business as opposed to “illicit activi-
ties.” The aim should be for trade to trump aid. In particular, the ROK 
should seek to commercially engage the DPRK in the humanitarian 
sector so as to foster the development of markets. China’s commer-
cial engagement with North Korea has already contributed greatly to 
the expansion of North Korea markets, authorized as well as gray and 
black, in recent years. China has provided rice and other agricultural 
products through border trade, bypassing the North Korean public dis-
tribution system and stimulating the market economy. The price of rice 
in North Korea’s border markets is about the same as Chinese prices, 
demonstrating that the market mechanism is functioning.85 The ROK 
should take care not to provide food assistance that props up the North 
Korean public distribution system at the expense of developing mar-
kets.
3. The ROK government should take efforts to increase its leadership 
internationally on humanitarian assistance to North Korea, includ-
ing encouraging greater accountability and adherence to interna-
tional standards.
The ROK should provide greater leadership internationally on 
humanitarian aid to the DPRK. It should develop a global humani-
tarian engagement plan for North Korea with the aim of encouraging 
more coordination and cooperation among international aid providers, 
the better to meet the nutritional and medical needs of ordinary North 
Koreans. The ROK should work with the international community to 
ensure that humanitarian assistance is as unaffected as possible by in-
ternational sanctions and at the same time encourage the international 
community to expand such assistance to the DPRK. To best meet the 
needs of ordinary North Koreans and to ensure the sustainability of 
aid programs, the ROK should itself apply international standards in 
providing aid to North Korea and insist that UN agencies and other 
third parties do so as well.
To enhance aid effectiveness, the ROK government should lay 
out a two- to five-year plan. Ideally, aid provision should be consis-
tent across presidential administrations. Internally, the ROK should 
assign Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) experts to 
administer and review various programs, but also work closely with 
the UN and other international agencies and NGOs with extensive 
DPRK experience to implement and evaluate programming. The ROK 
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should use proven monitoring protocols to ensure the transparency and 
effectiveness of aid delivery and to minimize bilateral political risk. If 
initially it is not possible to do so bilaterally, the ROK should provide 
food aid through multilateral agencies that are following appropriate 
monitoring procedures.
4. Humanitarian assistance should encompass both state-level initia-
tives and support for bottom-up efforts in the DPRK. 
The ROK government should engage in humanitarian assistance 
to the DPRK both directly through state-level initiatives and through 
support for bottom-up private-sector efforts. The ROK should cooper-
ate with NGOs specializing in humanitarian assistance operations and 
academic institutions that can support the research and development 
and expertise needed for sophisticated planning. The ROK government 
should aim to help connect South Korean and international profession-
al communities with North Korean public health officials and practi-
tioners. 
A successful U.S. model that illustrates multilevel cooperation on 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea is the Stanford-DPRK Tuber-
culosis Project, launched in 2007.86 The project is a unique undertaking 
of Asian policy specialists from Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Re-
search Center, part of the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI), and medical 
faculty from the School of Medicine (SOM) that seeks to develop pro-
fessional engagement opportunities with North Korea and focuses on 
mutual interest in tuberculosis control. In 2008, Stanford SOM hosted 
five DPRK Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) officials for a week-long 
visit to Stanford for discussions with professionals of the Bay Area TB 
Consortium (BATC) and officials of the U.S. Center for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) and WHO. With funds raised through the 
Global Health & Security Initiative of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
the project purchased a WHO-recommended inventory of TB labora-
tory equipment and supplies and formed a partnership with the U.S. 
NGO Christian Friends of Korea (CFK) to assist with in-country logis-
tics, export licensing, and physical infrastructure requirements. Since 
the spring of 2009, joint Stanford-CFK teams have completed six trips 
to North Korea and made a combined contribution of over $500,000 to 
remodel and equip a thirteen-room, 2500+ square foot space at the #3 
TB Hospital in Pyongyang for reference-level quality assurance, TB cul-
ture, and drug susceptibility testing services. Over thirty MOPH per-
sonnel have worked in tandem with American teams in all phases, and 
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fourteen North Korean physicians and technicians have participated 
in orientation workshops and training self-assessments organized by 
Stanford-BATC expert laboratory teams. The project has also seen the 
development of important networks of officials in Washington, Beijing, 
New Delhi, and Pyongyang to raise awareness of the North Korean TB 
epidemic. These efforts were instrumental in triggering the resumption 
of negotiations for a Global Fund award to North Korea and in conven-
ing U.S. government and world health officials at a face-to-face meet-
ing regarding the long-term funding needs of the DPRK TB control 
program. Within the DPRK itself, the project has high credibility for 
its momentum, follow-through, and multiple capabilities, and it has 
remained unaffected by adverse political and security situations. The 
process of implementing this project has created a highly successful 
model of cooperative effort with the potential to expand professional 
engagement opportunities with North Korea focused on mutual health 
security interests. 
II. Educational Engagement
Educational engagement is a key subset of people-to-people exchanges. 
It has long been recognized as one of the most powerful and effective 
means of contributing directly and indirectly to many aspects of na-
tional development. Educational engagement should aim to strengthen 
the North’s human capital and institutional capacity. These in turn will 
improve living standards and support a shift to a sustainable develop-
ment track, both of which will contribute to eventual peaceful unifica-
tion. Education builds a crucial constituency for modern economic and 
social policies and nurtures individuals able to influence policy debates. 
Educational collaboration between countries can flourish even when 
bilateral political relations are difficult. 
North Koreans and their government place considerable value on 
education. The DPRK is among the world’s poorest countries but it 
has a literacy rate of 99 percent, according to the CIA World Factbook. 
The DPRK now teaches English to its children as the primary foreign 
language and is eager to make use of global scientific and technical 
advances. In existing educational exchange programs with Americans 
Education builds a crucial constituency for modern economic 
and social policies and nurtures individuals able to influence 
policy debates.
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as well as others, North Korean partners typically seek to acquire up-
to-date technical and scientific information, learn applied techniques 
that can be adopted for or adapted to DPRK conditions, and collect 
relevant materials such as seeds and equipment. 
Even apart from the May 24 Measures effectively banning 
inter-Korean people-to-people exchanges, South Korea has faced dif-
ficulty in implementing educational engagement programs with the 
North due to political sensitivities at home and North Korean wari-
ness of direct dialogue with South Korea. However, with the Park gov-
ernment’s stated delinking of humanitarian assistance to North Korea 
from political circumstances, South Korean educational engagement 
with the DPRK could start from knowledge sharing in apolitical hu-
manitarian sectors such as agriculture and medicine. As circumstances 
permit, it could later expand gradually into the economic sector, sci-
ence and technology, and eventually politics. Knowledge-sharing pro-
grams that bring North Koreans to other countries could also play a 
role in facilitating North Korea’s entry into more normalized relations 
with the rest of the world. To lay the groundwork for unification and 
the peaceful integration of the peoples of the two Koreas, the ROK 
government should devote more resources to inter-Korean education 
projects.
Educational engagement efforts can and should be conducted in 
ways consistent with the basic principles of tailored engagement, as 
elaborated in the following.
1. Educational projects should aim to pursue mutual interests and ben-
efits.
Education engagement can be an effective means of uniting the 
people of two Koreas through improved mutual understanding and co-
operation in many non-political sectors. For instance, the ROK could 
work with North Korea on the writing of a common history of Korea 
to the nineteenth century. Not only would such a project serve as an op-
portunity for the two Koreas to speak in a unified voice, as one nation, 
about Korea’s past, but it would also allow North Korea to feel a sense 
of responsibility for the global representation of national and regional 
history. While it may be challenging for the two Koreas to produce a 
jointly written history, the process and practice of joint history writing 
itself would nevertheless prove educational to both sides. 
Archaeological and ethnological exchanges between North and 
South Korean scholars and students would advance the level of research 
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in these areas on both sides and contribute to a shared national under-
standing of history. Beginning in 2007, there was an effort to this end 
in which archaeologists from North and South jointly excavated the 
Koryo dynasty palace grounds near Koryo’s capital of Kaesong. Co-
operation was halted, however, in late 2011 when Pyongyang asked the 
South Koreans to leave shortly after Kim Jong-il’s death. In June 2013, 
UNESCO placed Kaesong on its list of global historic sites, and North 
Korea has since shown interest in resuming joint excavation of the pal-
ace grounds. In response, the ROK recently approved a visit by South 
Korean scholars to the North to discuss a resumption. Meanwhile, an-
other group of South Korean cultural researchers has also been given 
permission to visit Kaesong for talks with Pyongyang officials about a 
joint project to help preserve a village of traditional Korean houses in 
Kaesong. Greater efforts should be made on behalf of these and similar 
exchanges and joint projects. 
Another potentially fruitful area of inter-Korean educational 
exchanges would be knowledge sharing of textbooks and school cur-
ricula. Because North Korea is unlikely to agree soon to this type of 
exchange, the ROK should take the initiative to adapt its own texts and 
curricula for use in North Korea. This would involve slight revisions to 
take into account vocabulary differences between North and South or 
the provision of glossaries to explain vocabulary differences. The ROK 
could employ North Koreans in the South for this purpose. The ROK 
should offer to provide the texts and curricula directly to North Korean 
authorities. In any event, they should also be posted on the Internet and 
made available to all without the need for registration. North Korean 
authorities would then have the choice of receiving these officially or of 
making use of the materials unofficially and without acknowledgment. 
In 2013, North Korea produced and released its first tablet PC, Samji-
yon, an Android-based device preloaded not only with the complete 
works of Kim Il-Sung but also containing an encyclopedia, dictionaries, 
school textbooks, and a collection of world and North Korean litera-
ture.87 The availability of devices such as this, which undoubtedly will 
become common even in North Korea in the coming years, will great-
ly increase the potential usefulness of South Korean–provided texts. 
Ideally, North Korea will also make its texts and curricula available to 
the South. These can be used to inform and update South Koreans in 
various fields about North Korean scholarship and views. 
Similarly, more general lexical studies and especially the produc-
tion of an unabridged North-South Korean dictionary would be very 
useful in all areas of study and cooperation while also helping perhaps 
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to slow the rate of linguistic divergence. The two Germanys jointly de-
veloped the so-called Goethe dictionary before unification, and China 
and Taiwan have published a Chinese-Taiwanese dictionary (Liang’an 
Changyong Cidian ղבગ·අյ). North and South Korea also coop-
erated on the compilation of a common dictionary (Gyeoremal-keun-
sajeon) beginning in 1989, but the project was halted in 2010 due to the 
worsening of inter-Korean relations.88 Fortunately, with the approval of 
the South Korean government, efforts to resume the project have been 
underway in 2014. The ROK should provide all possible support to this 
project given its importance and the magnitude of the task. (Reported-
ly, the South Korean side has only been able to complete a little more 
than 10 percent of its half of the project, even though the entire effort 
was originally scheduled to be completed by 2012.89) In this regard, it 
should be noted that, in spite of the East-West German cooperation to 
maintain the unity of their language, unified Germany is still struggling 
with linguistic divergence between the eastern and western parts, more 
than two decades after unification. 
2. Market principles should be applied to educational engagement 
projects when possible, and international standards should be ap-
plied to programs when applicable.
The most rigorous educational exchanges are long-term academic 
exchange programs. These include extended study and research in both 
countries, including extensive contact between professors, students, 
and administrators at universities in both countries. North American 
universities such as  the University of British Columbia and, to a less-
er extent, Syracuse have been conducting these types of academic ex-
change with North Korean universities such as Kim Il-Sung University, 
Kim Chaek University of Technology, and Pyongyang University of Sci-
ence and Technology (PUST).
North Korea is eager to foster young global talent to enter the 
international community and enhance international cooperation, but 
it does not have sufficient resources to do so and therefore requires out-
side help. An example of such cooperation is the Pyongyang University 
of Science and Technology, North Korea’s first private international 
university. It was founded by and is jointly funded and operated by en-
tities in the two Koreas; religious groups and individuals from other 
countries have also helped with its financing. Currently, PUST enrolls 
five hundred students hand-picked by the North Korean authorities 
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to receive a Western-style education. The university’s official aim is to 
equip its students with the skills to help modernize their country and 
engage with the international community. Since its establishment in 
2010, PUST has also sent a total of twelve graduate students to the Uni-
versity of Westminster and Cambridge University in the UK and to Up-
psala University in Sweden.90 (Their studies have included electronics, 
computer science, international finance and management, agriculture, 
and life sciences.) 
The study abroad program at PUST is currently funded by the 
hosting governments. To attract more stakeholders and thus ensure 
sustainability, however, such efforts must eventually be able to stand 
more on their own as financially viable programs. For now, the ROK 
government can support the establishment of more academic institu-
tions in the DPRK such as PUST and encourage ROK institutions to 
engage actively in academic exchanges with them. The ROK govern-
ment should also encourage North Korean educators and other author-
ities to realize the merit of these institutes and the benefits of becoming 
a more responsible, open, independent stakeholder in foreign exchange 
programs. When these institutions and programs can stand on their 
own, according to international standards, the interest of other coun-
tries and institutions and the impact of such projects and programs on 
the people and government of North Korea will be far greater. 
3. The ROK government should recognize its comparative advantages 
in educational engagement projects with the DPRK and increase its 
international leadership in this sector.
The ROK should devote greater resources to educational engage-
ment with the DPRK. It should focus especially on areas in which it has 
a comparative advantage. These include agricultural and public health 
education, as South Korea is very knowledgeable about the soils and 
weather conditions on the Korean Peninsula and the diets of the peo-
ple of North Korea. More generally, because the two Koreas share a 
language and because South Korea possesses advanced technologies in 
many areas, the ROK can assist the DPRK with educational exchanges 
in key fields such as the physical and life sciences. South Korea could, 
for example, modify its existing medical texts and manuals for use 
by personnel in the North. It could further assist North Koreans by 
preparing North-South medical terminology glossaries and providing 
them directly to North Korean authorities as well as publishing them 
on the Internet. (Such glossaries are needed because North Korea tends 
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to use Russian and Latin loan words in medicine, while South Korea 
uses many terms derived from English.) Doing so would contribute to 
the well-being of the North Korean people, promote social convergence 
in the medical sector, and facilitate integration of the North and South 
medical establishments after unification. 
The ROK should also seek to take a leadership role internation-
ally in educational engagement with the DPRK. It can identify areas of 
unmet needs, catalogue international educational engagement projects, 
and suggest and support increased or additional efforts. For example, 
the ROK should support and encourage programs abroad for North 
Korean exchange students. Ideally, most would eventually come to the 
ROK for study (and South Koreans would study in the North), but until 
that becomes possible the ROK should support educational exchanges 
between the DPRK and third countries. Such assistance could include 
information sharing and financial support. The ROK could also pro-
vide more funding to international agencies and personnel providing 
educational assistance to North Koreans inside and outside of the 
North. Even in the case of such indirect assistance, South Korea would 
still benefit. It would help the ordinary people of North Korea, demon-
strate the ROK’s goodwill, allow South Koreans to gain a better under-
standing of the North Korean situation, and prepare North and South 
Koreans for eventual direct collaboration.
4. The ROK’s educational engagement projects should include both 
state-level and people-to-people–level exchanges. 
Pyongyang University of Science and Technology serves as a good 
example also of the need for collaboration at both the state and pop-
ular levels. PUST is a joint project of the DPRK state and the ROK’s 
Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture. Currently, de-
grees are offered in electrical and computer engineering, agriculture 
and life sciences, and international finance and management. A school 
of public health, along with medical and dental laboratories, will open 
in the 2014–15 academic year. 
Despite the difficulties in inter-Korean relations, the ROK could 
support the expansion and deepening of academic exchanges with 
PUST and develop new projects in the DPRK similar to PUST. As PUST 
is not an officially recognized institution by the ROK Ministry of Uni-
fication, the ROK government should start by approving PUST and 
South Korean faculty exchange visits for academic purposes as a first 
step to vitalizing educational engagement with the DPRK. While South 
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Korean entities are the main source of funding for PUST, no student 
or faculty exchanges have taken place between the dozen or so South 
Korean institutions that have academic memoranda of understanding 
(MOU) with PUST. These include Korea University, Korea Advanced 
Institute of Science and Technology, Konkuk University, Dankook 
University, and the Korean Railroad Research Institute. The ROK gov-
ernment should allow and encourage further such MOUs with South 
Korean educational institutions to expand to academic and student and 
faculty exchanges with the North.
PUST began operations in 2010 only after seven years of delay, 
primarily due to a funding shortfall but also to sanctions on the ex-
port of materials to North Korea. The ROK should both devote more 
resources to such projects and work to ensure that neither bilateral nor 
multilateral sanctions hinder such mutually worthwhile projects.
III. Cultural Engagement
With decades of territorial division, the language, culture, and lifestyle 
of the two Koreas have grown increasingly different. To foster meaning-
ful communication and improve understanding between the two sides, 
some degree of cultural homogeneity should be restored among the cit-
izens of the two countries, and the gap between their values and mind-
sets should be narrowed. Cultural engagement in nearly any form will 
carry the long-term benefit of transforming North Korea and helping 
lay the basis for reconciliation and peaceful unification. It should thus 
be promoted even if it means that South Korea must bear the bulk of 
the financial burden.
As North Korean refugees and South Korean workers at Kaesong 
testify, North Koreans are surprisingly well informed of—yet still curi-
ous about—what life is like outside of their country, especially in South 
Korea. Cultural engagement is an effective means of exposing North 
Koreans to the outside world and of increasing understanding in the 
South about North Korean society and culture. To this end, there must 
be more opportunities for inter-Korean exchanges at the popular level, 
including in sectors such as tourism, sports, art, and popular culture. 
Although the North is tightly controlled, South Korean and foreign cul-
tures have already been penetrating its society, especially in the shape 
of popular culture such as movies, cartoons, soap operas, and music. 
Cultural engagement should be promoted even if it means 
that South Korea must bear the bulk of the financial burden.
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These are mostly illegally copied and brought into the country by way 
of China. 
Tourism 
Tourism creates opportunities for popular and business exchanges be-
tween the DPRK, ROK, and foreign countries. It allows information 
to flow into and out of North Korea, and offers non-hostile ways for 
the people of the DPRK to engage with the international community. 
Despite the DPRK’s new emphasis on tourism and a resulting increase 
in the numbers, however, only about five or six thousand Western and 
eight to ten thousand Chinese tourists traveled to North Korea last 
year. This is clearly an area in which much more could be done.
Despite its desire to limit popular exposure to the outside world, 
the DPRK recently has taken significant steps to promote tourism to 
earn hard currency. It has relaxed restrictions on travelers and tour 
programs, permitted foreign cellphones to be used inside North Korea, 
supported 3G networks, and allowed increased if still limited access 
to and interaction with local residents. It is providing more opportu-
nities for sports and cultural tourism in particular. For example, the 
new Masik Ski Resort is open to tourists; tourists may go on bike tours 
of Pyongyang; and this year, for the first time, foreign amateurs were 
allowed to run in Pyongyang’s annual marathon. 
On the other hand, political tensions and the arrest of some tour-
ists have resulted in the United States government advising American 
citizens against all travel to North Korea and other governments issuing 
travel warnings. Critics argue that tourism supports the DPRK regime 
by allowing it access to more hard currency without engaging in re-
form, and thus undermines the effectiveness of sanctions posed on the 
country to end its nuclear weapons program and human rights abuses. 
We believe, however, that the benefits of tourism to North Korea 
outweigh the problematic considerations. The amount of money the 
regime earns through tourism is limited, especially after operating 
costs are deducted. Tourism provides an opportunity for North Korean 
tour guides to interact with foreigners. Even if the guides are mem-
bers of the privileged class, the interaction is still worthwhile. Indeed, 
the fact that they come from the privileged class may make such inter-
action even more significant. Moreover, by all accounts, the DPRK is 
permitting more casual interaction between tourists and average North 
Koreans than ever before. While still limited, such interaction serves to 
expose ordinary North Koreans to the outside world. 
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Sports
For over two decades, sporting events have offered opportunities for 
high-profile inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. This began with 
the 1990 Beijing Asian Games, when players were supported by a uni-
fied cheerleading team, and has included unified teams, such as the 1991 
inter-Korean table tennis team that defeated China, and the two Koreas 
marching together in the opening ceremonies of the 2000, 2004, and 
2006 Olympics. Inter-Korean sports exchanges, especially joint training 
and unified teams, allow athletes, officials, and peoples of the two sides 
the chance to learn more about each other and increase their interest 
in further cooperation and eventual unification. The formation of joint 
teams does all this and also allows both sides to cheer for each other. 
In the DPRK, where everyday life is spartan, sports provide ordi-
nary people with welcome entertainment and a sense of global connec-
tion when their teams compete on the international stage. Opportuni-
ties to engage in sports diplomacy with the North may be increasing. 
Kim Jong-un himself appears to be behind the DPRK’s recent increased 
emphasis on sports. Educated as a boy in Switzerland, he is known 
to be a fan of winter sports, among others, and he apparently seeks 
to promote his country’s sports diplomacy through the DPRK’s new 
Masik Ski Resort. 
While inter-Korean sporting exchanges have languished in recent 
years, President Park’s trustpolitik and Dresden Declaration provide a 
basis for their resumption and expansion. The ROK has an excellent 
opportunity to be proactive in promoting sports exchanges and cooper-
ation with the DPRK in the near future, as both the 2014 Asian Games 
and the Summer Universiade will take place in the South, in Incheon 
and Gwangju, respectively. The 2018 Winter Olympics, which will be 
held in Pyeongchang in South Korea, will provide another major op-
portunity for the ROK to demonstrate its commitment to engaging the 
North and fostering trust and reconciliation. Pyeongchang could be a 
symbol of a peaceful Olympics, as were the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, 
when East and West Germany competed as a unified team. Reportedly, 
South Korea has already begun to make efforts to establish a unified 
Korean team for Pyeongchang. The formation of a unified team would 
provide many opportunities for joint planning and training as well as 
for multilateral coordination with the United Nations Office on Sports 
Development and Peace (UNOSDP). 
Unfortunately, UN and bilateral sanctions pose various obsta-
cles to sports in the DPRK and sports exchanges with it. These include 
the classification of some sports equipment and facilities as banned 
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“luxury goods.” The ROK government should actively pursue ways to 
ensure that sanctions do not inadvertently prevent valuable exchanges 
and cooperation with the North. Moreover, the ROK should recon-
sider along with its allies and partners in the international community 
whether sanctions on “luxury goods” in general should be maintained. 
They have proven to be neither effective nor sensible. Many states, in-
cluding China, have not even made their definitions of “luxury goods” 
public, making sanctions difficult to enforce. The Masik Ski Resort, for 
example, is equipped with Canadian snowmobiles, Swedish snowblow-
ers, and Italian and German snowplows, yet no one really knows how 
North Korea was able to obtain the equipment despite UN sanctions. 
Moreover, sanctions against so-called luxury items are based on the 
fundamentally mistaken belief that members of the North Korea elite 
are loyal to the regime largely because it supplies them with luxury 
goods.
Media and Popular Culture 
Media could be another effective area for inter-Korean cooperation. 
North and South Korean media outlets in the past have engaged in joint 
production in areas such as film, TV drama, commercials, children’s 
cartoons, and children’s books. During a South Korean media delega-
tion’s visit to the North in September 2000, Kim Jong-il expressed his 
hope for inter-Korean media cooperation: “If the North and the South 
cooperate on media production, the North gets 50 percent [of profits] 
and the South gets 50 percent. For what are we to cooperate with oth-
er countries?”91 In 2002, the two sides signed a broadcasting exchange 
cooperation agreement.
While exchanges under the 2002 agreement occurred mostly at 
the corporate level, the most notable example of inter-Korean media 
cooperation was the co-production of the television drama Sayuksin 
(Six martyred ministers). North Korea’s Korean Central Television pro-
duced twenty-four 70-minute-long episodes for South Korea’s Korean 
Broadcasting System (KBS) that were aired in 2007. Sayukshin was writ-
ten by Pak In So and Kim Il Jung, famous in North Korea for their work 
on television dramas and feature films, and directed by North Korean 
Chang Yong Bok, while South Korean scriptwriters Lee Seung-hui and 
Park Cheol participated in the script revision process. KBS funded the 
total production costs of nearly 20 billion won ($22 million), with two-
thirds provided in the form of equipment such as power trucks, light-
ing trucks, and editing equipment. Sayuksin reflects the North Korean 
popular imagination about the six martyrs, high-ranking officials in 
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King Danjong’s court during the fifteenth century who were executed 
for plotting to restore Danjong to the throne after he was, in their view, 
wrongly removed from power. So far, Sayukshin stands as the only in-
ter-Korean television drama. Although the series did not garner great 
popularity among the South Korean audience, the fact of the co-pro-
duction suggests that further collaboration is possible. 
As noted, other inter-Korean media cooperation has included 
movies, children’s cartoons, commercials, and children’s books. The 
most well-known joint production is Pororo the Little Penguin, one of 
South Korea’s biggest cultural exports of the past few years. In the early 
2000s, the animation production company Iconix decided to produce 
much of the first two seasons using animators with the North Korean 
company Samcholli. Pororo has aired in Australia, France, Taiwan, In-
dia, Italy, Norway, Puerto Rica, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and 
Vietnam, and is beloved by a wide range of fans all over the world. 
However, Pororo’s North Korea–connection raised concerns in 2011 
that the penguin might not be welcome in the United States, as new 
U.S. sanctions banned the import of all goods, services, and technol-
ogy from North Korea. Ultimately, however, Pororo was classified as 
“information” and was thus exempted from the ban. Although Iconix 
dropped its collaboration with Samcholli in 2005 as inter-Korean ten-
sions rose, Pororo symbolizes the possibility of further such media co-
operation between the two Koreas.
As these examples suggest, for the time being, most inter-Korean 
media cooperation will need to be funded by South Korean entities. 
Such cooperation is of mutual benefit, however, because North Kore-
ans reciprocate by providing talent and labor, materials, and settings. In 
view of the many political and practical difficulties, some have argued 
that these types of productions do not make for true cooperation and 
do not rise to the level of exchanges. Given the importance and state of 
inter-Korean relations, however, even these mere “exchanges” are well 
worth pursuing. Unfortunately, all forms of inter-Korean media coop-
eration had come to a halt by the time of the rise of tensions in 2010. 
Food 
An essential element of culture that should receive greater emphasis 
in inter-Korean exchanges is food. The two Koreas have somewhat di-
vergent cuisines due to ancient regional differences and, more recently, 
to national division. However, North and South Koreans are curious 
about the other’s kitchen. Pyongyang-style cold noodle (naengmyun) 
houses in Seoul are packed, and North Koreans have used South Korean 
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“Choco Pies” (based on the American MoonPie) as a kind of currency. 
At the Kaesong Industrial Complex, South Korean managers have par-
celed out untold thousands of Choco Pies as bonuses to North Korean 
workers, who in turn have contributed to a burgeoning black market 
in the confection. In fact, Choco Pies became so popular that North 
Korean authorities recently limited the number that can be distributed 
at Kaesong.
Still, cultural engagement projects could utilize food without nec-
essarily running afoul of North Korean authorities. In 2007, a South 
Korean-style chicken restaurant, Rakwon, opened in Pyongyang at the 
initiative of South Korean Choi Won-ho. His North Korean partner, 
Rakwon Trading Corporation, provided the building and staff, while 
Choi was responsible for management, interior decorating, ingredients, 
and recipes. Rakwon served the same menu as Choi’s franchises in the 
South. Choi’s North Korean venture prospered and he even introduced 
a food delivery service in Pyongyang. Choi reported he earned about 
$1,000 each day while the business was in full operation.
However, Choi’s North Korean business suffered reverses in 2008 
due to changing political circumstances, and collapsed in 2010 after the 
May 24 Measures put a complete ban on the shipment of raw materials 
and ingredients to the North. Nevertheless, his effort was a noteworthy 
example of a successful food exchange with North Korea. Choi him-
self hopes for a comeback—and even an expansion—of his business 
in Pyongyang when political conditions improve. In addition to such 
commercial enterprises, there are many other possibilities for food co-
operation. Joint food festivals and food demonstrations would be apo-
litical and could prove popular in both countries. Rather than leaving 
such events as one-off affairs, ideally they should be linked to standing 
cooperation by the hosting North and South Korean entities. 
Despite—indeed, because of—the political difficulties on the 
Korean Peninsula, cultural exchange is a form of engagement that 
should be pursued much more actively. Following is a discussion of 
some examples of how cultural exchanges can be pursued in ways con-
sistent with the principles of tailored engagement.
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1. Cultural engagement projects should be to the mutual interest and 
benefit of  both sides. 
The largest inter-Korean tourism project is the Mount Kumgang 
Tourist Region. Built with South Korean funding in scenic southeastern 
North Korea, the resort was visited by nearly two million South Koreans 
from 1998 until its suspension in 2008 after a South Korean tourist was 
shot and killed by a North Korean guard when she wandered into a 
military area. For many South Koreans, the Mount Kumgang resort 
represents a major inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation project 
and symbolizes the hope for unification. On the other hand, in addition 
to South Korean government concern about the safety of its citizens, 
critics have argued that the project results in hard currency flowing di-
rectly to the regime and that most of the local workers are not North 
Koreans but Chinese of Korean ethnicity. In 2010, the North Korean 
government seized the site on the ground that South Korea was not 
keeping its part of the bargain, and has since only allowed non-South 
Korean tours of the resort. 
The authors acknowledge that the Kumgang resort is problematic 
in terms of tailored engagement, because it plays primarily to South 
Korean national sentiment and does not represent a good balance of 
mutual benefits. The desire of South Koreans to set foot on North 
Korean territory is understandable, but there is no substantial con-
tact with North Koreans and the proceeds underwrite the Pyongyang 
government. Nevertheless, we support renewed South Korean efforts 
to negotiate the conditions for a resumption of the project. Doing so 
would demonstrate, in general, the ROK’s goodwill and, in particular, 
its intention to respect existing inter-Korean governments. The amount 
of hard currency that Pyongyang would receive from a resumption is 
significant but not enormous. The South Korean government should 
make it clear to North Korean authorities that it does not see Kumgang 
as a model for other inter-Korean tourism and that it will not subsidize 
the expansion of the Kumgang project, should it be resumed. The ROK 
should also link a resumption of the Kumgang project to a regular 
schedule of inter-Korean family reunions there, including an offer of 
South Korean subsidies for the travel of North Korean family members 
to the site. 
Sports exchanges should be aimed primarily to promote a sense 
of unity between the people of the two Koreas. The most effective 
means of doing so is to create unified Korean teams whenever possi-
ble for international competitions. Under the current circumstances, 
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inter-Korean competition, even if called “friendship matches,” runs the 
risk of actually increasing the sense of differences and raising bilat-
eral tensions. Fortunately, the ROK itself will soon host a number of 
international competitions that could serve as occasions to field joint 
teams. The fact that Pyongyang may feel further isolated to see the in-
ternational community gathered on the other side of the peninsula for 
major competitions is all the more reason for the ROK to be proactive 
and generous in seeking to form joint teams. The ROK should begin 
now to try to form a joint team for the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. 
As part of such efforts, the ROK should provide material and technical 
assistance to North Korean athletic efforts and, where possible, engage 
in joint training. 
Engagement in the media and popular cultural sectors would be 
most meaningful if products were jointly made by both sides working 
as one team and if the resulting products were released in both Koreas. 
Initially, this will generally not be possible. However, even if projects 
take the form of South Korean outsourcing to North Korea, and even 
if North Korea decides not to release, televise, or publish the products 
of joint-production within its borders, most forms of engagement in 
popular culture would nevertheless contribute to narrowing the gap 
between the two countries’ ways of conducting business and their per-
ceptions of history. In other words, the process itself may be even more 
significant than the product, at least initially. 
North-South research cooperation on traditional foods, includ-
ing wild ginseng and other plants that grow throughout the peninsu-
la, would be productive and meaningful, both now and for the future 
of a unified Korea. It would combine the knowledge of experts on 
both sides of the peninsula, contributing to the further development 
of Korean cuisine. It could serve to improve food and nutrition in the 
North. Over the longer term, the two Koreans could together promote 
Korean food culture globally. Apolitical and of great popular interest, 
such efforts could contribute to other forms of food cooperation, such 
as the opening of North-South traditional food restaurants in Pyong-
yang and Seoul. Along these same lines, North-South research coop-
eration on traditional Korean medicine could also be helpful. The two 
Koreas could exchange useful research and techniques and work to-
gether to contribute to the advancement abroad of traditional Korean 
medicines and practices. 
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2. Cultural engagement projects should apply market principles when-
ever possible.
The ROK should seek to ensure that inter-Korean tourism proj-
ects with the North are as “normal” as possible, including in the ap-
plication of market principles. The ROK government should encour-
age inter-Korean tourism but should not subsidize it. Rather than the 
Kumgang model, the ROK should encourage projects such as the (also 
currently suspended) tours of Kaesong. The ROK should also consider 
indicating to North Korea its support in principle for an expansion of 
inter-Korean tourism to locations such as Mt. Paekdu and Masik Ski 
Resort. The ROK should insist on the establishment of consular liaison 
offices in both Pyongyang and Seoul in connection with such an expan-
sion of inter-Korean tourism, consistent with President Park’s own call 
for similar liaison offices made in her Dresden Declaration. 
Food entrepreneurialism, as discussed earlier, should be encour-
aged as a means of engaging North Korea economically, culturally, 
and in humanitarian ways. North Korea has actively cooperated with 
other countries in the business of food. Hundreds of so-called PRC-
DPRK Friendship Restaurants are in operation on the Chinese side of 
the North Korean–Chinese border and in other parts of China. When 
appropriate conditions are met, the ROK government should support 
food businesses that seek opportunities in the North (or possibly in 
third countries in partnerships with North Korea). In addition, while 
Choi’s chicken restaurant supplied all of its ingredients from the South, 
future businesses should seek to procure supplies from North Korean 
farmers, so as to engage a wider range of North Koreans and vitalize 
markets in the North.
3. Cultural engagement projects should engage other countries or in-
ternational organizations and third-party companies (or NGOs). 
The inclusion of third-party countries and organization in vari-
ous inter-Korean cultural exchanges could serve to facilitate exchanges 
between the two Koreas. The ROK government should consider ways in 
which this might be accomplished.
For sporting exchanges, coordination with international organi-
zations such as the United Nations Sport for Development and Peace 
(UNOSDP) is needed. In 2013, the Kangwon provincial government 
in South Korea and UNOSDP signed an agreement to cooperate on 
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the peaceful hosting of the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, the 
development of young athletes, the fostering of inter-Korean sporting 
exchanges, and the establishment and participation of a Korea unified 
team for Pyeongchang. The involvement of international organizations 
would be an additional incentive for North Korea to be cooperative in 
the discussion of and preparation for collaborative efforts. 
4. Cultural engagement projects should be pursued both as state-level 
initiatives and bottom-up exchanges.
The ROK government should encourage and support cultural ex-
changes at all levels, including by resuming, improving, and expanding 
South Korean tours of the North, working toward a unified Olympic 
team and joint sports training, and facilitating joint cheering squads 
for the Olympics and other international sports events. 
For sporting exchanges, the ROK government could support, as 
it did prior to the Lee administration, exchanges between professional 
sports teams and between amateur and youth teams, including mid-
dle and high school teams. Such exchanges would constitute excellent 
learning opportunities for players from both sides. The ROK could of-
fer to provide training to North Korean athletes and should request 
North Korean training of South Koreans in sports in which the North 
Koreans excel. Priority should be placed on team sports rather than on 
individual sports, although those too should not be neglected if good 
opportunities for exchanges present themselves.
IV. Economic Engagement
Internationally, economic engagement with North Korea is controver-
sial, including in South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Europe. In 
addition to the political risk and the practical obstacles to engaging in 
business in North Korea, there is concern that economic engagement 
has done little to promote North Korean reform, while providing the 
regime with access to hard currency. This concern has become increas-
ingly salient as Pyongyang has continued to pursue its nuclear weapons 
development program. 
The authors believe, however, that establishing a mutually ben-
eficial economic relationship with North Korea through trade, invest-
ment, and other forms of economic partnership will slowly but surely 
deepen inter-Korean relations at the personal, institutional, and polit-
ical levels. The longer and the more extensive such cooperation, the 
greater will become North Korea’s interest in maintaining it. This will 
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greatly improve the North Korean people’s standard of living in prepa-
ration for peaceful unification. It is thus of key importance to vitalize 
the North Korean economy through inter-Korean as well as multilater-
al economic engagement. 
Economic engagement with the North based on the principles 
of tailored engagement will require change in North Korean practices, 
and attitudes will eventually follow. It will not undermine international 
efforts to press North Korea to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons; 
indeed, over the mid- to long-term, it will encourage and support the 
kind of change in North Korean attitudes necessary to make progress 
on the nuclear issue. North Korea will earn more hard currency, but 
that should reduce its tendency to rely on earnings from illicit activities.
We focus here on the major existing economic engagement proj-
ect, the Kaesong Industrial Complex. It serves as a testing ground for 
further economic cooperation, including possibly in the other special 
economic zones (SEZs) that the North Korean government has an-
nounced.
Kaesong has become a barometer of inter-Korean cooperation 
and it also suggests how much more successful economic cooperation 
could be under the right circumstances. Already, Kaesong is serving 
the interests of both countries and yielding mutual benefits. For the 
North, Kaesong has created relatively well-paying jobs for its work-
ers, provided a legal means of earning hard currency, and introduced 
new technology and management procedures. For the South, Kaesong 
offers inexpensive but productive labor, demonstrates ROK goodwill 
and introduces up-to-date methods to both the North Korean workers 
and, indirectly, North Korea society as a whole,92 creates new stake-
holders in the North, will lower the burden of reunification by raising 
the standard of living in the North, and may serve as an additional 
link between the South and the rest of Asia through President Park’s 
Eurasia Initiative. 
Nevertheless, Kaesong faces numerous challenges. Above all, 
North Korea’s arbitrary threats to shut down the complex have re-
sulted in an unstable atmosphere for both the North Korean workers 
and the South Korean companies. The DPRK’s refusal to act in accor-
dance with normal standards of management and operation, including 
on communications and logistics and the selection and treatment of 
workers, likewise makes it difficult for companies in Kaesong to attract 
investors and partners. Although we believe that the project has had a 
large impact on the North Korean workers and, beneath the surface, on 
North Korean society, Kaesong remains formally isolated from North 
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Korean economic and social life. In many countries, high tariffs remain 
on goods produced in North Korea, including at the Kaesong complex. 
Foreign companies worry that their reputations could be tarnished 
by manufacturing in a country pursuing nuclear weapons contrary to 
United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as having an abys-
mal human rights record. 
One year after Pyongyang’s temporary withdrawal of work-
ers from Kaesong, production at the complex has nearly returned to 
pre-crisis levels.93 While the ROK has not approved any new South 
Korean investment in the complex since the May 24 Measures went 
into effect, the ROK has encouraged the concept of international in-
vestment at Kaesong as, among other things, a means of stabilizing its 
operation. In the international community, former Italian prime min-
ister Enrico Letta has voiced his political support for Kaesong, and a 
German firm, Me & Friends, reportedly plans to conclude an MOU 
later this year to work with the South Korean company Samduk in Kae-
song. Companies such as Korean-American apparel wholesalers and a 
number of Chinese and Russian firms have also expressed interest in 
entering Kaesong. 
Perhaps influenced by the success of Kaesong, North Korea seems 
increasingly focused on making use of SEZs to develop its economy. In 
2013, Pyongyang promulgated a law requiring each of the country’s 
nine provinces to establish one or more SEZs. There are now thirteen 
SEZs in the planning or construction stages. North Korean leaders 
appear to be serious about establishing these SEZs, but the country’s 
capacity to realize this bold ambition is limited. North Korea lacks 
both infrastructure and personnel with an understanding of market 
economy mechanisms and global markets. A high level of international 
involvement will be needed for North Korean SEZs to succeed. SEZs 
along the border with China may be able to leverage proximity to the 
Chinese market and ocean access; other SEZs will likely face greater 
difficulties. 
We believe that inter-Korean economic engagement based on the 
principles of tailored engagement can be expanded, and that this will 
be in the interests of both North and South Korea.
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1. Economic engagement should aim to pursue mutual interests and 
benefits, and an improved version of  the Kaesong project should 
serve as a model for other SEZs and other economic projects. 
Many aspects of the Kaesong Industrial Complex offer good 
working models for broader inter-Korean economic cooperation. How-
ever, some conditions at Kaesong will need to be improved in order to 
attract more South Korean—and, ideally, also foreign—businesses to 
invest there. The most significant change following the 2013 suspen-
sion and resumption of Kaesong has been the creation of a joint man-
agement committee. Before the suspension, North Korea was solely 
responsible for overseeing the management of the complex; now both 
Koreas have an equal say in the running of the complex, at least nom-
inally. However, the management system at Kaesong will need to be 
further strengthened, especially if it is to include international stake-
holders such as China or Singapore. Most notably, increased transpar-
ency (in all areas of management, including worker selection, wages, 
and payment), infrastructure development (such as adopting an elec-
tronic identification system for daily entries and allowing for height-
ened access to markets through the creation of customs, port, and rail 
infrastructure), and logistics and communications improvements (e.g., 
access to cellphones and Internet services) are among the chief issues 
to be addressed at Kaesong. Improvements of this kind will not only 
increase productivity and efficiency at Kaesong but also attract a great-
er number of outside investments, helping to insulate Kaesong from 
inter-Korean political tensions and thus reducing political risk. 
It is important for the two Koreas to maintain, improve, and ex-
pand Kaesong. To the extent that Kaesong is successful, it can serve as a 
model for future SEZs, which will further open up the DPRK economy 
and society. Despite North Korea’s ambitions, however, it will not be 
able to develop and operate all thirteen SEZs simultaneously. The ROK 
should encourage the DPRK to prioritize the SEZs and establish them 
sequentially, starting with those most favorably situated and proceed-
ing with others as experience is gained and as resources are available. 
The ROK should consider investing in those SEZs that appear to be 
commercially viable.
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2. Economic engagement with North Korea should not simply be 
symbolic in nature but should yield profits for both Koreas and any 
country/company involved, based on market principles.
North Korean authorities should be made to understand that ad-
ditional SEZs cannot and should not be islands unto themselves. To 
help the broader North Korean economy as well as to be fully success-
ful as individual projects, SEZs should be able, as in other economies, 
to recruit local workers and draw on the local economy for other inputs. 
Currently all workers at Kaesong are selected by the North 
Korean government and contracted out to companies. Companies may 
interview the selected workers and decline to employ them, but there 
exists no free labor market environment in which companies may re-
cruit and hire their own workers. Salaries and pay are set by contract 
between the North and South. South Korean firms are unable to pay 
North Korean workers directly (companies pay the North Korean gov-
ernment, which then pays the workers). South Korean companies also 
have only a limited ability to provide direct cash incentives to reward 
North Korean workers for quality and productivity. The ROK govern-
ment should encourage the North to support market-based wage and 
employment practices. 
Another important long-term objective for Kaesong should be 
backward integration into the North Korean economy. Ultimately, 
backward integration is crucial in inducing long-term marketization 
of the North Korean economy as well as to increase the likelihood of 
profitability for SEZs. So far, there has been only minimal backward 
integration: only a nominal amount of construction materials and raw 
materials have been imported from other parts of North Korea into 
Kaesong. One of the main aims of ROK economic engagement of the 
DPRK should be finding ways to normalize trade and investment re-
gimes in the North Korean economic system. New business models 
should be pursued for Kaesong that stress backward linkages to North 
Korean small and medium enterprises, and these in turn should be ap-
plied to new SEZs. 
The ROK government should also acknowledge that the incen-
tives for investing in Kaesong are different for South Korean firms than 
for foreign firms. South Koreans tend to view Kaesong as a grand na-
tional project for economic cooperation and integration, and some 
South Korean firms participate in the project partly for this reason. 
For similar reasons, the South Korean government provides significant 
support to South Korean investors at Kaesong, including tax breaks 
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and insurance benefits. South Korean investors also have the advantage 
of speaking the same language as their North Korean counterparts and 
laborers. 
Foreign firms lack these advantages and do not have these nation-
alistic motivations to invest in Kaesong, and their own governments 
are unlikely to provide any special incentives. Profitability is for them 
by far the most important factor in deciding whether to invest in Kae-
song or elsewhere in North Korea. To offset the many disadvantages 
of investing in North Korea, especially political risk, foreign firms will 
require improved conditions and tangible incentives if they are to in-
vest. The ROK should work with interested third-country governments 
and companies to determine what conditions and incentives are need-
ed, and then consult separately and, ideally, jointly with North Korean 
authorities about how these might be realized. Among other things, 
the current political risk insurance that South Korea offers for Kaesong 
must be reformed, ideally replaced by a joint insurance to which the 
North contributes as well. In the event that North Korea again decides 
to shut down the project, a new system should ensure that it must suf-
fer a greater loss than just its share of worker income. Such a reformed 
system should be applied in other SEZs and to third-party investors. 
However, the fact that Kaesong has required direct and indirect 
subsidies from the ROK government has left the project vulnerable to 
criticism that it is at least partly a state-supported entity rather than 
a true commercial base. Unless Kaesong eventually becomes self-suf-
ficient, its usefulness as a model for future SEZs will be limited and 
its impact on the North Korean economy and society will be stunted. 
As circumstances permit, it will be important for the ROK and other 
members of the international community to impress this upon North 
Korean authorities. 
3. International standards should be applied to economic engagement 
with North Korea, including Kaesong and other Special Economic 
Zones, with the goal of  internationalization.
Applying international standards is vital to improving transpar-
ency and creating a better investment environment in Kaesong. A care-
ful evaluation of legal and financial systems needs to be carried out 
to identify and realize modalities for international cooperation. Under 
the current circumstances, only third-party companies that have a high 
tolerance for risk and come from ideologically non-threatening nations 
are likely to be willing to consider participation in Kaesong. North 
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Korea will also need to educate a generation of young people in mar-
ket economics and allow them the global exposure necessary to under-
stand, connect with, and monitor trends in the global economy. Con-
sidering the relative success in international economic engagement by 
Vietnam, it is certainly possible for North Korea also to make progress 
with its SEZs. North Korea will, however, have to make much greater 
efforts to meet global business standards before many foreign compa-
nies will consider participating in Kaesong. 
Supported by a number of ROK experts, President Park has 
stressed the need to internationalize Kaesong. However, existing bilat-
eral and multilateral sanctions on North Korea pose major obstacles. 
A first step in the internationalization of Kaesong will be the removal 
or easing of the May 24 Measures, which not only prohibit new South 
Korean investment in Kaesong but also greatly limit the project’s abil-
ity to attract international firms. If the South Korean government is 
not willing to support increased participation by its own businesses in 
Kaesong, very few foreign firms will be willing to take the political risk 
to invest there. 
China has a special role to play in the internationalization of 
Kaesong. China and North Korea have closely cooperated on the joint 
development of SEZs, such as those at Hwanggumpyeong Island and 
Rason. These zones, along with the thirteen new SEZs that the DPRK 
has announced, are designed for Chinese investment. Cross-investment 
between Kaesong and North Korea’s other Special Economic Zones—
over which China has a near-monopoly—is desirable. Logistic connec-
tions between zones are also key, and  they would provide an economic 
incentive to improve road and rail infrastructure. North Korea has been 
willing to establish special zones but unwilling or unable to provide the 
infrastructure that would make these zones attractive to foreign invest-
ment. With logistic connections between SEZs, a South Korean firm 
in Kaesong could send parts to a Chinese factory in another zone for 
assembly there and export to a third country. Another potential benefit 
is that more of the products produced in North Korean SEZs might be 
eligible for tariff reductions under various free trade agreements. The 
ROK should work with China and other interested countries to make 
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4. Economic engagement with North Korea should be pursued both as 
state-level initiatives and bottom-up exchanges within and outside 
of  South Korea.
Economic engagement with North Korea should be multilevel. 
China’s three northeast provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning) de-
serve close attention, as this region holds strategic importance for the 
ROK and allows for effective economic engagement with North Korea 
at both the state and the grassroots level. Noteworthy are the huge in-
dustrial and logistical centers under construction in the Chinese border 
city of Hunchun and the North Korean port city of Rason, connecting 
inland regions to the sea. Economic cooperation with North Korea is 
indispensable to the economic development of China’s three north-
eastern provinces, and China is rapidly increasing its influence in the 
region. North Korea is potentially important as a source of cheap labor 
and resources for the three northeastern provinces. Already, a signifi-
cant number of North Koreans work on the Chinese side of the border, 
some legally, some illegally, and regional PRC investment in the DPRK 
is increasing. 
Most of North Korea’s thirteen new SEZs are concentrated on 
the coast and on the North Korea-China border. Only one new North 
Korean SEZ seems to have been planned with South Korea in mind—
the Kaesong high-tech development zone located next to the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex. This strongly suggests that North Korea is focused 
on China as its long-term partner for economic development. Report-
edly, when the May 24 Measures went into effect, PRC-DPRK trade 
received a major boost. Thus, the sanctions had little impact on the 
North Korean economy as a whole (but did have a major detrimental 
effect on South Korean companies doing business with the North). The 
PRC city of Dandong, which handles about 70 percent of PRC-DPRK 
trade, is set to open a new PRC-DPRK Friendship Bridge this year. With 
the Dandong New District located immediately on the border with 
North Korea now ready to receive tenants and businesses, PRC-DPRK 
China’s three northeast provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, 
Liaoning) deserve close attention, as this region holds 
strategic importance for the ROK and allows for effective 
economic engagement with North Korea at both the state and 
the grassroots level.
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cross-border trade is only expected to grow—further integrating the 
two economies. 
While sustained efforts are needed to reintegrate the two Koreas 
directly, the ROK should pay very close attention to economic integra-
tion with the North in a broader, regional framework. South Korea 
must be competitive with China in economically engaging North 
Korea in the region of China’s three northeastern provinces. If North 
Korea, already economically dependent on China, is absorbed into a 
“Greater China Economic Sphere,” South Korea will lose its leverage 
over economic engagement with North Korea. This region is a bridge 
to Northeast Asian economic cooperation. It would serve as a detour 
route for South Korean investment in and with North Korea until direct 
investment and business in the North become feasible. Currently, South 
Korean corporations including SK, POSCO, Lotte, Kumho Asiana, and 
Hana Bank have entered the PRC side of the region, and other glob-
al companies such as Samsung, LG, Hanwha, and CJ are reportedly 
looking into such opportunities as well. As of 2013, approximately 14 
percent of the companies in Dandong that traded with North Korea 
were owned by South Koreans, 23 percent by Korean Chinese, and 
43 percent by Han Chinese.94 Nevertheless, the total trade volume of 
South Korean companies in the region (with North Korea) has fallen 
significantly, from more than $20 million in 2009 to $10 million in 2011, 
as a result of the May 24 Measures.95 There exist many opportunities 
for small-scale enterprises in the region, and the importance of such 
opportunities should not be overlooked. Moreover, they could be pur-
sued within the framework of President Park’s proposal for a “Eurasia 
Initiative.”
V. Developmental Engagement
North Korea would benefit greatly from the development of its infra-
structure to support economic modernization. Improved infrastructure 
would attract foreign capital and raise the productivity of its labor 
force, increasing the standard of living of ordinary North Koreans and 
reducing the temptation of the regime to resort to illicit activities to 
earn hard currency. It would facilitate the exploitation of the North’s 
abundant natural resources, which would generate capital that could be 
used for further economic investment and development.
South Korea would also benefit in many ways by contributing to 
the development of the North’s infrastructure. Tensions on the pen-
insula could be eased. South Korean businesses, especially in the con-
struction sector, would profit. South Korean influence in Pyongyang 
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would increase, and economic and social progress in North Korea 
would smooth the road to peaceful unification. South Korean develop-
ment of the North’s infrastructure would be consistent with President 
Park’s Vision Korea Project, which has highlighted the possibilities and 
merits of ROK support for North Korean infrastructure development 
and natural resources exploitation.
On the other hand, South Korean support for North Korean in-
frastructure and natural resource development raises a host of com-
plex concerns. Most such projects are large-scale undertakings requir-
ing sustained funding and political commitment on the part of both 
donor and recipient. Their long-term nature renders them vulnerable 
to shifting political and security winds on the Korean Peninsula and 
elsewhere in the region. Pyongyang may seek to exploit ROK capital to 
profit the regime more than the people of North Korea, and the regime 
could use increased revenues to support its nuclear weapons program. 
South Korean support for North Korea economic development could 
be problematic under current UN sanctions related to the North’s nu-
clear program.96 The ROK’s own May 24 Measures make infrastructure 
and natural resource development in North Korea possible only if the 
DPRK moves first on the nuclear weapons issue, and President Park’s 
Vision Korea Project also conditions such assistance to progress on de-
nuclearization. 
Despite the myriad problems, the potential importance of infra-
structure development for the situation on the Korean Peninsula war-
rants close ROK consideration of the various possibilities and condi-
tions of its involvement. The Park administration already appears to 
be exploring some options. While all developmental engagement with 
the DPRK halted with the May 24 Measures, the Park administration 
recently made an exception to those sanctions and signed an agree-
ment with Russia to take part in a Russian-led rail and port develop-
ment project in North Korea. Hopes are that this project will help to 
reduce tensions on the peninsula as it opens a new logistical link be-
tween Korea and Europe. The $340 million project, launched in 2008 
by North Korea and Russia, is intended to develop North Korea’s ice-
free northeastern port of Rason into a logistics hub connected to Rus-
sia’s Trans-Siberian Railway. A double-track rail link reopened between 
Rason and the nearby Russian town of Khasan in 2013 after years of 
renovation. Once the modernization of the Rason port is completed, it 
can be used as a hub to send cargo by rail from East Asia to as far as 
Europe. Thus, South Korean firms would be able to transport exports 
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by ship to Rason, where they would be transferred to railroad cars and 
forwarded to Europe via the Russian rail system. 
As security, political, and business conditions permit, the ROK 
should pursue developmental engagement efforts in North Korea, per-
haps beginning with the selective reactivation of joint projects previ-
ously agreed upon by the two Koreas. Prior to the May 24 Measures, 
the two sides had agreed on many such projects, and some were nearly 
implemented. Examples include humanitarian energy supply for resi-
dential heating, energy supply for the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region, 
the Tanchon Three Mines development project, and the Chongchon 
Graphite Mine development project. 
The criteria for selecting projects to resume or initiate should be 
based on the following principles, which should also serve as guidelines 
for the planning, implementing, and operating stages of such engage-
ment. 
1. Developmental projects should yield mutual benefits to both Koreas 
and other involved parties, through a careful selection and/or se-
quencing of  projects based on mutual interests. 
Once political and security conditions are met, the ROK govern-
ment could start with demonstration projects promising mutual ben-
efits, modifying the already initiated projects that were interrupted by 
the May 24 Measures. Coal mining projects in the Nampo-Pyongyang 
region, for instance, offer a relatively easy opportunity, as old coal mines 
there need only to be rehabilitated. The Musan Iron Mine, the largest 
iron mine in Asia, already has local energy sources in place, and once 
developed could supply iron to South Korea as well. Development of 
the Common Power Complex in the Pyongyang-Nampo region would 
generate enough electricity to support the entire region, with enough 
left over to supply Seoul as well.
The development of DPRK-Russia-ROK energy networks of-
fers another opportunity to cooperate and will become feasible when 
a more supportive environment is in place. The ROK-Russia Pipeline 
As security, political, and business conditions permit, the 
ROK should pursue developmental engagement efforts in 
North Korea, beginning with the selective reactivation of joint 
projects previously agreed upon by the two Koreas.
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Natural Gas (PNG) project remains at the stage of commercial nego-
tiations, but it could open up a new logistical link between East Asia 
and Europe together with the recently signed ROK-Russia railroad 
connection project, in line with President Park’s “Eurasia Initiative.” It 
currently takes at least four weeks to transport freight to Europe by sea. 
The new railway would halve shipping times, slashing transportation 
costs and thus enhancing the competitiveness of South Korean exports. 
North Korea might welcome ROK-led investment in infrastruc-
ture near cities and SEZs, such as the construction of power plants 
and transportation systems and the upgrading of communications in-
frastructure. Currently, the only public transportation systems are be-
tween large provinces, and this lack of transportation infrastructure 
is a main factor in preventing sustainable economic growth in North 
Korea. One of the greatest obstacles to carrying through on the SEZs 
that North Korea has announced is the government’s unwillingness or 
inability to provide the necessary infrastructure. For example, roads 
between most of these zones and China remain unpaved. In the case of 
Rason, a lack of infrastructure, especially electricity, continues to limit 
the zone’s potential. Building the proper infrastructure will be critical 
to the success of North Korea’s SEZs, including attracting foreign cap-
ital and foreign direct investment.
2. Market principles and international standards should be applied in 
developmental engagement with North Korea.
Developmental projects with the DPRK should utilize the mech-
anisms of the market economy. While government subsidies may be 
inevitable sources of funding for developmental projects in the initial 
stages, the ROK government should seek to minimize such subsidies 
and encourage projects to be sustainable on their own to the greatest 
extent possible under normal market principles. The ROK should con-
tinue to provide political support even after the implementation stages 
to ensure the success of infrastructure projects, but continuing govern-
ment financial subsidies would only more deeply link projects to the 
political situation—which, as seen in many previous cases, could jeop-
ardize the success of projects in the long term.
In addition, the ROK should advocate for the involvement in 
North Korea of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially 
with the United States and Japan, initially not for funding but for their 
know-how and expertise. IFIs and the United Nations Development 
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Program (UNDP) can address weaknesses in DPRK government capac-
ity and increase the North’s understanding of international financial, 
economic, and business practices. Of course, North Korea itself must 
want to build a relationship with the IFIs, and both the ROK and China 
should seek to impress this upon North Korea—a topic for cooperation 
and coordination between ROK and China.
Experience has shown that even limited IFI engagement is useful. 
In the case of Myanmar, for example, IFI involvement provided a plat-
form of information and relationships on which to build rapidly when 
the government was ready to pursue a robust economic reform agen-
da. It also served to encourage pro-reform elements within the govern-
ment to seek change from within the system in a difficult domestic and 
international political environment. It also enabled the international 
community to develop a more realistic understanding of the country’s 
circumstances and of the opportunities to address development chal-
lenges. IFI engagement can provide important input to the strategic 
thinking of concerned countries about how developmental engagement 
could help them ultimately achieve their goals in relations with North 
Korea. 
International official development assistance (ODA) rules and 
standards, as set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), should be adhered to in developmental assis-
tance to North Korea whenever possible. Doing so will increase the 
coherency of policy, transparency of operation, and level of cooper-
ation. While North Korea is among the world’s poorest countries, it 
receives very little in the way of ODA due to its nuclear weapons pro-
gram, human rights situation, and reluctance to comply with interna-
tional monitoring standards. North Korea has publicly expressed its 
interest in receiving ODA, but it has not shown itself to be committed 
to meeting the requirements for becoming a responsible ODA recipient 
country. 
South Korea’s humanitarian and development assistance to North 
Korea has not been treated formally as overseas development assistance 
because the ROK does not regard North Korea as a foreign country. 
Thus, ODA standards, rules, and regulations have never been applied 
to South Korean assistance to North Korea. Some have argued for ap-
plying ODA practices to South Korean assistance to the North, but it 
has not proven to be feasible. Still, the ROK should attempt to adhere 
as much as possible to international ODA standards when providing 
developmental assistance to North Korea. Doing so will enhance polit-
ical support within South Korea for increased assistance to the North. 
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It will also help to insulate such assistance from inter-Korean political 
vicissitudes. Increased ROK assistance to the North on the basis of in-
ternational standards will increase North Korea’s attractiveness as an 
aid recipient within the international community as well.
3. Developmental projects should be internationalized to bring in oth-
er countries and third-party companies as stakeholders.
Trilateral or other multilateral developmental cooperation proj-
ects are less likely to fall through than bilateral inter-Korean coopera-
tion projects, as the presence of other stakeholders incentivizes North 
Korea to isolate such projects from inter-Korean political issues. Such 
considerations appear to have been behind the South Korean govern-
ment’s decision to make the Rason-Khasan railroad project the first 
step in resuming developmental engagement with North Korea. In 
April 2014, despite the ban on South Korean individuals having con-
tact with North Korean individuals or visiting North Korea, the South 
Korean government approved a visit to North Korea by Korea Railroad 
Corporation (KORAIL) CEO Choi Yeon Hye and four other officials 
to attend an Organization for Cooperation of Railways (OSJD) confer-
ence in North Korea, along with top rail officials from China, Russia, 
and twenty-five other member states. Significantly, Choi was the first 
head of a South Korean state company to visit the North since the pre-
vious Lee Myung-bak administration took office in early 2008, and her 
visit renewed hopes for inter-Korean economic cooperation, including 
restoration of the severed railway. Russian Railways has a 70 percent 
stake in this joint venture, with the North holding the remaining 30 
percent. It has been reported that a South Korean consortium com-
posed of three South Korean companies—the state-run railroad oper-
ator KORAIL, POSCO, and Hyundai Merchant Marine Company—
plans to buy about half the Russian stake.97 This purchase could have 
been in violation of the May 24 Measures, which ban any new invest-
ments in North Korea, even though it is only an indirect investment via 
Russia. However, the project was exempted from the May 24 Measures 
because it fits well into President Park’s “Eurasia Initiative,” which calls 
for binding Eurasian nations closely together by linking roads and rail-
ways to realize what she has called a “Silk Road Express” running from 
South Korea to Europe via North Korea, Russia, and China. If this 
project makes progress, it could pave the way for other indirect and, 
eventually, direct investments in the North. 
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Other projects that Russia and South Korea have agreed to coop-
erate on as long-term ventures include building a natural gas pipeline 
linking Russia and South Korea via the North and developing Arctic 
shipping routes to reduce shipping distances and times between Asia 
and Europe. In April 2014, Russia decided to write off $10 billion of 
North Korea’s debt (90 percent of North Korea’s total debt to Mos-
cow) in a deal expected to facilitate the building of the gas pipeline,98 
which would make it possible for Russia to diversify its energy sales 
to Asia away from Europe. Also, at the end of April, Russian deputy 
minister Yury Trutnev visited North Korea to promote other major tri-
lateral (Russian Federation-DPRK-ROK) infrastructure projects: unit-
ing the railroads in both Koreas with the Tran-Siberian Railway and 
constructing gas pipelines and power lines from Russia to South Korea 
through North Korea, projects in which Russia has already invested 
significant funds.99 The South Korean and Russian delegation visits to 
North Korea could help to begin a new phase not only in trilateral eco-
nomic and developmental cooperation among the three countries but 
also in South Korea’s and Russia’s bilateral relationships with North 
Korea. This multilateral cooperation may provide a useful model for 
future developmental engagement in North Korea, possibly involving 
partners other than Russia as well.
4. Developmental projects should bring about change both at the state 
level and at the popular level. 
Infrastructure and resource development could be among the 
most effective forms of engagement cooperation to induce the DPRK 
state to greater cooperation with the international community, as well 
as to develop the North Korean economy and society. For these types of 
projects to succeed, however, the DPRK will first have to demonstrate 
both its commitment to them and its trustworthiness as a partner. The 
latter will entail also taking a more responsible attitude on the nuclear 
front as well. 
The DPRK’s energy shortage is arguably its most fundamental 
resource problem and development bottleneck. In an effort to overcome 
it, Pyongyang has devoted considerable efforts. Large-scale ROK as-
sistance in energy procurement and development should be linked to 
progress on the nuclear issue. Conducting joint surveys and planning, 
however, could be done before a resolution of the nuclear issue is in 
prospect. Doing so could increase the credibility of ROK offers of en-
ergy development assistance in conjunction with the Six-Party Talks. 
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Infrastructure development such as road construction can also 
bring about important change at the popular level. Human mobility 
is politically restricted and practically limited in North Korea. Roads 
are so poor that even travel to a neighboring village can be difficult. 
Such conditions reduce ordinary people’s ability to find food, access 
hospitals, and have substantial interaction with those outside of their 
own community, especially in rural areas. With China and Russia show-
ing increasing interest in connecting to North Korea’s transportation 
networks, Pyongyang appears increasingly aware that improving its 
transportation system will be key to economic growth. In the mid- to 
long- term, transportation development will also contribute to positive 
social change in the North. 
VI. The Demilitarized Zone International 
Peace Park
President Park unveiled her initiative to establish a “DMZ Internation-
al Peace Park” in an address to the U.S. Congress in May 2013. The 
plan would transform an area of ongoing military confrontation into 
a park symbolizing aspirations for peace and harmony between North 
and South and between man and nature. Previous ROK governments—
the Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Lee Myung-bak administra-
tions—announced their own plans for peaceful use of the DMZ but 
none was ever realized, primarily due to rejection by the DPRK, led by 
its military.
In an attempt to overcome North Korea’s objections to any 
changes to the 160-mile-long, 2.5-mile-wide DMZ, President Park has 
proposed that the international peace park begin small, as what some 
have called a peace “bubble” within the zone. Later, other such areas 
could be carved out within the DMZ and eventually virtually the entire 
DMZ could become a peace park and nature preserve. The “demili-
tarized” zone is actually the world’s most “militarized” front, with 70 
percent of the troops of both Koreas stationed nearby. Thus, the estab-
lishment of even a very small peace zone initially would be, as President 
The establishment of even a very small peace zone 
initially would be an important step toward building and 
accumulating trust, cooperation, and commitment for 
peaceful coexistence between the Koreas. 
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Park has repeatedly stressed, an important step toward building and 
accumulating trust, cooperation, and commitment for peaceful coexis-
tence between the two Koreas. 
The United Nations has expressed support in principle for the 
plan. In August 2013, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told reporters 
that “the international body would actively assist” and that, in fact, 
the UN had begun an internal review of ways to support the project.100 
He noted, however, that the United Nations could assist only if North 
Korea agreed, including on all the particulars of the project. That such 
agreement will be far from easy to obtain is evident from North Korean 
statements such as one accusing South Korea of attempting to “dis-
grace the people of Korea by bringing tourists to them as to monkeys 
in a zoo.”101 
President Park has been working to secure further international 
attention and support for the plan. The Republic of Korea has a solid 
basis on which to do so. Sixty-seven states provided assistance to the 
ROK during the Korean War, at the end of which the DMZ was created 
by the Armistice Agreement. A number of NGOs in the United States 
and other countries have long supported similar concepts, such as uti-
lizing the DMZ as a nature preserve. Strong international support will 
prove useful when inter-Korean relations have made enough progress to 
allow the commencement of bilateral talks on the DMZ International 
Peace Park.
In addition to North Korea’s objection in principle, a number of 
practical problems will eventually have to be resolved. The opening of 
any part of the DMZ would pose risks as long as tensions remain high, 
as the tragic shooting of a South Korean tourist at Mount Kumgang 
underlined. Inter-Korean political and military tensions must thus be 
reduced, and inter-military communication and cooperation mecha-
nisms will have to be developed. Land mines still buried throughout 
the DMZ, their locations generally no longer known, will have to be 
located and removed. Preparatory to final agreement on an initial peace 
park venue, South Korea should persuade the North to conduct a joint 
natural resources study of the entire DMZ; this itself would serve as a 
much-needed pilot project. 
Internationally, there are a number of cases in which nature parks 
were established to defuse border disputes and promote peace. Poland 
and the former Czechoslovakia converted the Tatra Mountains into 
a contiguous nature reserve to rebuild bilateral trust and settle their 
World War I border dispute. In southern Africa, ten peace parks, in-
cluding the Lubombo area between Swaziland and Mozambique, rep-
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resent efforts at cross-border cooperation through conservation and 
ecotourism. At the Chile and Peru maritime boundaries, a territorial 
dispute has been resolved after a decade of political and legal contro-
versy. According to the decision of the International Court of Justice, 
a border settlement, the Santa Rosa Concordia, will be built on the 
territory of Tacna; it is expected to attract business to the region and 
facilitate cross-border trade.
Despite the myriad difficulties, the authors believe that the DMZ 
International Peace Park is well worth pursuing, in small sequential 
steps, as President Park herself advocates. In doing so, it is recommend-
ed that the following set of principles play a guiding role in the process 
of consultation with North Korea, as well as in the planning and imple-
mentation stages of the project. 
1. The ROK should attempt to achieve national consensus on this proj-
ect as a first step.
While most South Koreans favor the concept of a DMZ peace 
park, the difficulty in overcoming North Korea’s objection has damp-
ened enthusiasm for it in the South. The ROK government should seek 
bipartisan support and the authorization of a sufficient budget for 
the project, so that the ROK will be able to move quickly when North 
Korea indicates it is willing to consider the project. All concerned gov-
ernment agencies, including the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, 
Unification, and Environment, as well as the National Assembly and 
the Blue House, should coordinate on the policy, budget, and planning 
for implementation. Consideration should be given to assigning the 
Presidential Preparatory Committee for Unification, launched in July 
2014, the role of coordinating interagency cooperation on this diffi-
cult and complex effort. (The suprapartisan Committee’s membership 
encompasses leaders of all concerned government agencies as well as 
thirty civilian experts.) Taking these actions will demonstrate the gov-
ernment’s seriousness to the people of South Korea as well as to the 
international community. This will in turn increase the likelihood that 
the DPRK will eventually give the project its attention.
Unless, however, the ROK can bring Pyongyang to see clear 
benefits and advantages in the project, the plan to build a peace park 
will continue to be only a South Korean dream. South Koreans view 
the DMZ as a green belt, but North Koreans see it as a black belt—a 
constant reminder of war. South Korean government officials need to 
develop plans and arguments that will appeal to the North Koreans, 
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especially the military, and then find an appropriate way to begin to 
communicate their proposal to North Korea. 
In this respect, a unilateral “demonstration model” or a “tran-
sitional model” in which South Korea builds a park on South Korean 
territory just south of the DMZ could be a starting point. It would be 
intended to demonstrate the South’s good will as well as the feasibility 
of the DMZ peace park. 
2. The DMZ Peace Park should bring mutual benefits to both Koreas.
The DMZ International Peace Park would offer a number of op-
portunities for both Koreas. Most importantly, even a relatively small 
symbolic area of civilian co-management in the DMZ would contrib-
ute to inter-Korean military confidence-building, easing tensions, and 
helping to stabilize the security situation between the two countries. 
The serene landscape and undisrupted wildlife of the DMZ would 
bring in revenue from ecotourism for both Koreas. The gradual ad-
dition of more peace “bubbles” within the DMZ could eventually be 
linked to peace treaty negotiations. Cooperation on DMZ peace parks 
could also be linked to inter-Korean cooperation outside the DMZ on 
environmental protection, including anti-pollution measures, flood 
control, carbon sequestration, and water purification. Possible other 
areas of mutual interest include locating and retrieving the remains of 
Korean War dead buried in the DMZ and excavating cultural artifacts. 
The two sides could also cooperate to prevent flooding of the Imjin 
River flowing from the North into the South through the DMZ. (Mis-
communications between the two Koreas’ water management authori-
ties have led to fatalities during past monsoon seasons.) 
North Korea may be particularly receptive if the ROK under-
scores the immediate economic and financial benefits to the North 
from a DMZ cooperation project. The DMZ peace park could serve 
as another form of joint economic complex, creating jobs, investment, 
and infrastructure. One plausible sub-project might be a clean water 
fund, in which South Korea, which uses water that crosses the DMZ 
from North Korea, would pay North Korean farmers to keep the up-
stream water clean. As part of this effort, South Korea could diplomat-
ically support DPRK membership in the Ramsar Convention (formally 
known as the “Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 
especially as Waterfowl Habitat”). 
As President Park has argued, an area as small as two hundred 
and fifty acres could provide an adequate starting point. The ROK gov-
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ernment should be able to explain to the North that a symbolic area of 
this size would not have any negative military impact on North Korea 
but would rather bring in immediate revenue as well as much greater 
long-term benefits for them. 
3. The ROK should achieve international support on this project and 
collaborate with other countries as much as possible.
An anonymous North Korean official reportedly has said that if 
talks were to begin on this issue, North Korea’s negotiation counterpart 
would have to be the United States rather South Korea. (The argument 
is apparently based on the fact that the armistice was signed by North 
Korean, American, and PRC generals, but not by an ROK representa-
tive.) This argument can be overcome, as it was when North and South 
agreed to reconnect their west coast rail line. The United States will not 
wish to interfere in South Korean efforts to establish a DMZ peace park 
but as the head of the United Nations Command, responsible for DMZ 
management, the United States, especially its military, will want to be 
assured that the project is conducted in such a way as not to weaken de-
terrence and military defenses. The ROK should already be consulting 
and coordinating with the United States in the United Nations Com-
mand about the proposed project. The ROK should also inform and 
consult with China about the project. China no longer plays an active 
role in DMZ management but will appreciate being consulted, and its 
support for the project could eventually prove valuable. 
The abundant ecological resources within the DMZ, untouched 
by humans for six decades, have also garnered the interest of many in-
ternational environmental NGOs such as the Nature Conservancy and 
the Wildlife Conservation Society. An ecotourism-themed peace park 
would certainly attract the international conservation community. Ac-
cording to the UN World Tourism Organization, ecotourism, the most 
beneficial type of tourism, has grown more than 30 percent annually 
since 1990. Moreover, ecotourism has offered the best means of revital-
izing economically poor yet environmentally rich areas. International 
cooperation and collaboration could serve as an engine to drive the 
project forward in a more sustainable manner and could induce North 
Korean interest and cooperation as well. 
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Afterword
In her Liberation Day speech on August 15, 2014, President Park pro-posed that the two Koreas engage first in small, “practical projects” 
such as environmental cooperation and joint archaeological research.102 
Even in the weeks before this speech, President Park’s administration 
had already begun to permit a resumption of some contacts by South 
Korea scholars and humanitarian organizations with North Korea, and 
the South Korean government itself provided a modest amount of hu-
manitarian assistance for the people of North Korea. 
As discussed in this study, we strongly support pragmatic initia-
tives such as those President Park proposed, but they alone are not suf-
ficient to address the situation facing the Republic of Korea. Since the 
authors participated in three conferences in February and March of 
this year involving American, South Korean, and Chinese experts on 
North Korea and began drafting the body of this report, the fundamen-
tal trends on the Korean Peninsula have only worsened. 
• North Korea continues with the unfettered development of its 
nuclear weapons program, based now not only on plutonium re-
processing but also on uranium enrichment. It also appears likely 
to be ready as soon as this fall to test a rocket even larger than the 
one in 2012 that successfully boosted a satellite into orbit.103
• The visit of President Xi Jinping to Seoul in July underlined the 
limits to the PRC’s willingness to press Pyongyang on the nuclear 
issue. 
• The worsening problems in the Middle East and South Asia, and 
now the crisis in Ukraine, make it even less likely that the Obama 
administration would change its approach to North Korea. 
It has become even more evident that only the Republic of Korea 
has both the need and the potential influence to change this dangerous 
trajectory on the Korean Peninsula. To do so, however, requires that 
the Park administration recalibrate its policy toward inter-Korean re-
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lations, since trustpolitik describes only a process and the unification 
“jackpot” concept represents the ultimate goal. What is missing is a 
road map that could be realized. 
The authors have proposed that such a road map include much 
more emphasis on engagement along with a de-emphasis on unifica-
tion. We fully support unification that would occur peacefully, ensure 
democracy, and be sustainable. Unfortunately, the circumstances for 
such a unification do not currently exist. The “tailored engagement” 
we recommend would at least reduce tensions, help the ordinary people 
of North Korea, and promote inter-Korean social convergence. Eventu-
ally, it could also contribute to a resolution of the more basic issues on 
the Korean Peninsula that prevent peaceful and democratic unification.
To implement tailored engagement, the Park administration 
needs to reorganize and streamline its organization for North Korea 
policymaking. In this regard, we have recommended that President 
Park appoint a “Korean Bill Perry.” The Park administration also needs 
to clarify what kinds of projects, under what circumstances and in what 
sequence, can be pursued without reducing pressure on North Korea to 
abandon nuclear weapons. Similarly, the May 24 sanctions should be 
eased or superseded by a new approach to dealing with the incidents 
that prompted them. In future as well, sanctions against North Korea 
need to be carefully considered and targeted so as not to undermine 
worthwhile engagement efforts. 
South Korean leaders and citizens alike need to have more confi-
dence in their country’s ability to shape developments on the Korean 
Peninsula; the Republic of Korea is considerably more powerful and 
influential than it was even a decade ago. The key to exercising that 
influence is achieving a measure of domestic consensus on North Korea 
policy. When South Koreans are divided, their neighbors will only listen 
to those South Korean voices they choose to. Moreover, domestic con-
sensus will help to ensure the consistency and sustainability of ROK 
policy toward North Korea across administrations, further enhancing 
its effectiveness.
We believe that the Park administration can make such a policy 
adjustment, but the time to do so before the end of her single term in 
office ends in February 2017 is passing quickly. Already in the second 
half of her second year, President Park, like her predecessors, will ex-
perience reduced influence after the general election for the Nation-
al Assembly in April 2016. However, President Park retains the strong 
support of her conservative base, thanks to which she has the “Nixon 
to China” opportunity to adopt and implement a bold and confident 
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tailored engagement approach toward North Korea. The Republic of 
Korea should take advantage of this important, and possibly unique 
opportunity to promote inter-Korean reconciliation and eventual uni-
fication.

99
Notes
1 “The North Korea Problem and the Necessity for South Korean Leadership,” 
policy report, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, March 
4, 2013, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/24020/North_Korea_Problem_and_Neces-
sity_for_South_Korea_Leadership.pdf.
2 Participants in these three workshops are listed in the appendices to this 
study.
3 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “In the coming years, insta-
bility on the Korean Peninsula could produce a regional crisis involving China’s 
military.” See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Mil-
itary and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of  China 2014, 
April 24, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf.
4 The constitution was amended in 2012, including a revised preamble that 
reads in part: “Amid the collapse of the world’s socialist system and the vicious 
anti-Republic oppressive offensive by the imperialists’ joint forces, Comrade Kim 
Jong Il honorably defended through military-first politics the gains of socialism 
that are Comrade Kim Il Sung’s lofty legacy; changed our fatherland into a polit-
ically and ideologically powerful state that is invincible, a nuclear-possessing state 
[haekboyuguk], and a militarily powerful state that is indomitable; and paved a 
brilliant main road in building a powerful state.” English translation based on“The 
DPRK’s Nuclear Constitution,” NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 13, 2012, http://nau-
tilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/the-dprks-nuclear-constitution/.
5 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “North Korea’s long-range 
missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs—particularly its pur-
suit of nuclear weapons in contravention of its international obligations—consti-
tutes a significant threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in 
Northeast Asia and is a growing, direct threat to the United States.” [italics added] 
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, March 4, 2014, http://
www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
6 These figures include politician and businessman Chung Mong-joon, son of 
the Hyundai conglomerate’s founder, in South Korea and former finance minister 
Shoichi Nakagawa in Japan. See David E. Sanger, “In U.S., South Korean Makes 
Case for Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, April 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/04/10/world/asia/in-us-south-korean-makes-case-for-nuclear-arms.html, 
and Danielle Demetriou, “Japan ‘should develop nuclear weapons’ to counter 
North Korea threat,” The Telegraph, April 20, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
100
news/worldnews/asia/japan/5187269/Japan-should-develop-nuclear-weapons-to-
counter-North-Korea-threat.html. 
7 In a speech on July 27, 2014, Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong So, director of 
the Korean People’s Army General Political Bureau, said: “If  the U.S. imperi-
alists threaten our sovereignty and survival.  .  . our troops will fire our nuclear-
armed rockets at the White House and the Pentagon—the sources of all evil.” 
See James Rush, “North Korea threatens to launch nuclear strike on ‘the sources 
of  all evil’,” Mail Online, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2709250/
North-Korea-threatens-launch-nuclear-strike-sources-evil-White-House-Pen-
tagon-accuses-Washington-raising-military-tensions-Korean-peninsula.htm-
l#ixzz39BMH2o7t. For examples of  earlier threats, see Guy Taylor, “North 
Korea threatens attack, including nukes, on U.S.,” Washington Times, April 3, 
2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/3/north-korea-threat-
ens-attack-including-nukes-us/ and “North Korea Threatens Preemptive At-
tack on U.S., South Korea,” NTI, October 7, 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/
article/n-korea-threatens-carry-out-preemptive-attack-us-s-korea.
8 See Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of  
America’s Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 
89–92, for a discussion of high-level U.S. government concern about possible esca-
lation after the Yeonpyeong shelling.
9 Scott Snyder, “China-North Korea Trade in 2013: Business as  Usual,” 
Forbes, March 27, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2014/03/27/44/.
10 In an unusually frank exchange on April 10, 2014, former U.S. National 
Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said that “. . . North Korea is as potentially divi-
sive of the relationship between the United States and China as Taiwan is, so it’s in 
some sense a ticking time bomb in the relationship.” PRC ambassador to the United 
States Cui Tiankai responded: “. . . one thing that worries me a little bit, and maybe 
more than a little bit, is that we’re very often told that China has such an influence 
over DPRK and we should force the DPRK to do this or that. Otherwise the United 
States would have to do something that will hurt China’s security interests. You 
see, you are giving us a mission impossible. . . . [I don’t] think that this is very fair, 
I don’t think that this is a constructive way of working with each other.” See “U.S.-
China Cooperation in Peace and Security with Ambassador Cui Tiankai,” video, 
United States Institute of Peace, April 10, 2014, 41:54–48:34, http://www.usip.org/
events/us-china-cooperation-in-peace-and-security-ambassador-cui-tiankai. 
11 For example, President Richard Nixon told Zhou Enlai in 1972: “The Kore-
ans, both the North and the South, are emotionally impulsive people. It is import-
ant that both of us exert influence to see that these impulses, and their belligerency, 
don’t create incidents which would embarrass our two countries. It would be silly, 
and unreasonable to have the Korean Peninsula be the scene of a conflict between 
our two governments. It happened once, and it must never happen again [italics 
added]. I think that with the Prime Minister and I working together we can pre-
vent this.” Memorandum of Conversation, February 23, 1972, 2:00 p.m.–6:00 p.m., 
The President’s Guest House, Peking, in Foreign Relations of  the United States, 
1969–1976, vol. 17, 732–33. Cited in “Getting to Know You—The US and China 
Shake the World, 1971-1972,” USC US-China Institute, February 21, 2012, http://
china.usc.edu/showArticle.aspx?articleID=2705.
101
12 Mark E. Manyin, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Foreign Assistance to North 
Korea, Congressional Research Service, 2, table 1, April 2, 2014, http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf.
13 As Secretary of State John Kerry stated, “And the United States—I want to 
make this clear—is absolutely prepared to improve relations with North Korea if 
North Korea will honor its international obligations. It’s that simple. But make no 
mistake we are also prepared to increase pressure, including through strong sanc-
tions and further isolation if  North Korea chooses the path of  confrontation” (ital-
ics added). U.S. Department of State, “Remarks With Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop, and Australian Minister 
of Defense David Johnston, Admiralty House, Sydney, Australia, August 12, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230525.htm.
14 North Korean authorities state that Kim was born on January 8, 1982, but 
his actual birthdate is widely believed to be January 8, 1983.
15 About half of senior cabinet, party, and military officials have been re-
placed since Kim Jong-un took power. Lee, Kwan-se, “Why Kim Jong Un’s Regime 
Opted for Stability Over Change, IFES Issues and Analysis No. 3 (2014-03), Insti-
tute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, April 15, 2014, and Choe Sang-
Hun, “North Korean Leader Tightens Grip With Removal of His Top General,” 
New York Times, October 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/11/world/
asia/north-korean-leader-tightens-grip-with-removal-of-top-general.html.
16 Gi-Wook Shin and David Straub, “North Korea’s Strange, Bloody Mis-
take,” Bulletin of  the Atomic Scientists, December 20, 2013, http://thebulletin.org/
north-korea%E2%80%99s-strange-bloody-mistake.
17 Aidan Foster-Carter, “Kimmy No-Mates: Why no meeting and 
greeting?” NK News, May 14, 2014, http://www.nknews.org/2014/05/
kimmy-no-mates-why-no-meeting-and-greeting/.
18 “It is our party’s resolute determination to let our people who are the best 
in the world —our people who have overcome all obstacles and ordeals to uphold 
the party faithfully —not tighten their belts again and enjoy the wealth and pros-
perity of socialism as much as they like.” “English transcript of Kim Jong Un’s 
speech,” unofficial translation, delivered on April 15, 2012, at Kim Il-sung Square 
in Pyongyang, North Korea Tech, http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/04/18/
english-transcript-of-kim-jong-uns-speech.
19 North Korea GDP grew by 1.3 percent in 2012, according to South Ko-
rean estimates. See “Gross Domestic Product Estimates* for North Korea in 2012,” 
news release, The Bank of Korea, July 12, 2013, http://www.ncnk.org/resources/
publications/BoK_GDP_of_North_Korea_in_2012.pdf.
20 For example, “…the Policy Department of the NDC [National Defense 
Commission] of the DPRK once again serves the following strong warning to 
Park and her group: First, they should not dare utter words about the nukes of the 
DPRK and its line of simultaneously pushing forward economic construction and 
the building of nuclear force any longer.” See “NDC Policy Department of DPRK 
Slam’s Park Geun Hye’s Sophism during Her Foreign Trip,” KCNA (Pyongyang), 
November 14, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201311/news14/20131114-
28ee.html.
21 Tania Branigan, “North Korea: The New Generation Losing Faith in the 
102
Regime,” The Guardian, April 21, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
apr/22/north-koreans-turning-against-the-regime.
22 Dae-Kyu Yoon, “The Trickle-Down Effect of China’s Growth on North 
Korea,” The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, May 23, 2014, http://ifes.kyungnam.
ac.kr/eng/FRM/FRM_0401V.aspx?code=FRM140523_0001.
23 Jeffrey A. Bader, “North Korea: Breaking the Pattern,” in Obama and Chi-
na’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of  America’s Asia Strategy (Brookings Institution 
Press: Washington, D.C., 2012).
24 Staff Sgt. Kathleen T. Rhem, “Korean War Death Stats Highlight Modern 
DoD Safety Record,” American Forces Press Service, June 8, 2000, http://www.de-
fense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45275
25 North Korea is far more hostile to the United States. The regime has en-
gaged in a massive educational and propaganda effort against the United States 
both at home and abroad ever since the Korean War. Moreover, “hostility,” no 
matter on which side, is not the problem but a symptom or the result of what are 
actually the fundamental issues. 
26 See Gi-Wook Shin, One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a 
New Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), especially chapter 6, 
“Dealing with the ‘Axis of Evil,’” for an analysis of major American newspapers’ 
coverage of North Korea and U.S.–North Korean relations from the first North Ko-
rean nuclear crisis in 1992 to the second in 2003. Among the findings: “. . . Amer-
ican skepticism of North Korea is deep rooted. Newspapers in the United States 
tend to present a fairly unified image of North Korea, first, as a threat to U.S. 
security, and second, as a closed communist regime in violation of basic human 
rights” (137). 
27 A 2014 Gallup poll found 84 percent of Americans holding unfavorable 
views of North Korea. See “Country Ratings,” Gallup, February 6–9, 2014, http://
www.gallup.com/poll/1624/perceptions-foreign-countries.aspx. If  the presumed 
confusion of some American respondents about whether North or South Korea 
is the United States ally were taken into account, North Korea’s favorability rank-
ing would likely be even worse. See also Joy Wilke, “North Korea Least Favorable 
Among Nations,” Gallup, February 19, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/167489/
north-korea-least-favorable-among-nations.aspx.
28 While it is not widely known, the treaty between the PRC and DPRK signed 
by Zhou Enlai and Kim Il-sung on July 11, 1961, remains in effect. Article II reads, 
in part, “In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the 
armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state 
of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other as-
sistance by all means at its disposal” (See “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance Between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea” Chinese Communism Subject Archive, transcribed 
from Peking Review 4, no. 28, p. 5, https://www.marxists.org/subject/china.docu-
ments/china_dprk.htm). That said, for over a decade, Chinese officials and spokes-
persons have avoided repeating the clause. Some Chinese have said it is no longer 
operative but China cannot state this publicly. Still others have asserted that China 
would only act to defend North Korea if it were subject to an unprovoked attack or 
if China’s own security interests were at risk.
103
29 Dae-Kyu Yoon, “The Trickle-Down Effect of China’s Growth on North 
Korea,” Institute for Far Eastern Studies, May 23, 2014, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/
eng/FRM/FRM_0401V.aspx?code=FRM140523_0001; “North Korea,” CIA World 
Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
kn.html; Scott Snyder, “China–North Korea Trade in 2013: Business as Usual,” 
Forbes,  March 27, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2014/03/27/44/; 
Aidan Foster-Carter, “How Seoul Distorts Pyongyang’s Trade Statistics,” Wall 
Street Journal, May 30, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/05/30/
how-seoul-distorts-pyongyangs-trade-statistics/.
30 See Ambassador Cui’s remarks, “U.S.-China Cooperation in Peace and 
Security with Ambassador Cui Tiankai,” video, United States Institute of Peace, 
April 10, 2014, 41:54–48:34. 
31 President Obama has stated, “I think what’s most promising is we’re star-
tin’ to see the Chinese, who historically have– tolerated misbehavior on the part 
of the North Koreans because they’re worried about– regime collapse and how 
that could spill over to them. You’re startin’ to see them recalculate and say, ‘You 
know what? This is startin’ to get outta hand.’ And, so, we may slowly be in a po-
sition where we’re able to force– a recalculation on the part of North Koreans….” 
“Transcript: President Obama’s Exclusive Interview With George Stephanopou-
los,” ABC News, March 13, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/03/
transcript-president-obamas-interview-with-george-stephanopoulos/.
32 Seong-hyon Lee, “Firm Warning, Light Consequences: China’s DPRK 
Policy Upholds Status Quo,” The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 13, no. 23 
(November 22, 2013), 10–12, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/China_
Brief_Vol_13_Issue_XXIII_02.pdf.
33 Email to the authors from Dr. Sunny Seong-hyon Lee, November 25, 2013.
34 David Straub and Daniel C. Sneider, “North Korea’s Distorted View of the 
United States and Japan,” in Troubled Transition: North Korea’s Politics, Economy, 
and External Relations, ed. Choe Sang-Hun, Gi-Wook Shin, and David Straub 
(Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2013), 180–83.
35 Joon-Woo Park, Gi-Wook Shin, and Donald W. Keyser, eds., Asia’s Middle 
Powers?: The Identity and Regional Policy of  South Korea and Vietnam (Stanford, 
CA: Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2013).
36 Video and audio of Park’s speech available at “Madam Park Geun Hye 
Addresses U.S.-Korea Relations in a Changing World,” Shorenstein-APARC Korea 
Studies Program, May 6, 2009, http://ksp.stanford.edu/news/madam_park_geun_
hye_addresses_us__korea_relations_in_a_changing_world_20090506/; Park 
Geun-hye, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang,” 
Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (September–October 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/68136/park-geun-hye/a-new-kind-of-korea.
37 Ministry of Unification, Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula 
(Seoul: Ministry of Unification, September 2013), available at http://eng.unikorea.
go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_000000203001003000.
38 North Korea has long demanded a peace treaty with only the United States, 
arguing that the United States was the initiator of the Korean War and that it re-
mains the main threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea rejects the 
notion than any eventual peace treaty should also be signed by the Republic of 
104
Korea, on the legalistic ground that the Republic of Korea did not sign the Armi-
stice Agreement. North Korea has at times also argued that the 1991 North-South 
Basic Agreement settled the peace issue between Seoul and Pyongyang, in spite of 
the fact that the agreement was not implemented and Pyongyang has since repu-
diated it. Progressive South Korean governments have argued that North Korean 
leaders are fearful of the United States and the U.S.-ROK alliance, and that a North 
Korea peace treaty with the United States would serve to reassure North Korea and 
thus reduce tensions and the threat of war on the peninsula. Like her conservative 
predecessors, President Park evidently is not prepared to support a bilateral U.S.-
North Korea peace treaty. Like the United States, she apparently will not support 
negotiation of a peace treaty if South Korea is not included in the process and not 
until progress is being made on the nuclear issue.
39 Ministry of Unification, Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula, 
23.
40 Choi Hyun-june, “Park’s Private Sector Aid to North Korea Falls to All 
Time Low,” Hankyoreh, June 16, 2014, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edi-
tion/e_northkorea/642563.html.
41 The Unification Ministry’s Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula 
makes no mention at all of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). On p. 13, as the second 
of four “policy directions,” it states that “The ROK government will respect and 
adhere to. . . existing inter-Korean agreements . . .to build on trust.” However, it 
immediately qualifies this by adding that “Our trust-building endeavor will also 
entail assenting to provisions that can be implemented [italics added] and carry-
ing out those agreements without fail.” The language is further qualified on p. 31: 
“The ROK government respects and intends to implement the agreements signed 
between the two Koreas including the  .  .  . October 4 Declaration [by President 
Roh Moo-hyun and Chairman Kim Jong Il]. The detailed methods of carrying out 
these agreements, however, will be determined by comprehensive reviews of  public 
consensus and national security, among others [italics added].”
42 Yonhap, “Park Cautions Against Letting N. Korea Abuse Nuclear Talks,” Global 
Post, November 4, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-
agency/131104/park-cautions-against-letting-n-korea-abuse-nuclear-talks.
43 “‘Unification is like hitting jackpot,’” Korea Times, January 6, 2014, http://
www.koreatimesus.com/unification-is-like-hitting-jackpot/.
44 Gi-Wook Shin, “Realistic Approach to Obtain ‘Unification Bonanza,’” 
Korea Focus, February 15, 2014, http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design3/politics/view.
asp?volume_id=148&content_id=105203&category=A; original Korean-language 
version at http://news.donga.com/Column/3/all/20140214/60879487/1#.
45 The full text of the speech is available at the Republic of Korea English 
website, http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/speeches.php?srh%5Bboard_
no%5D=24&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=5304&srh%5B-
detail_no%5D=27.
46 See, for example, Aidan Foster-Carter, “Jackpot or Crackpot: Park on Uni-
fication,” Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/koreareal-
time/2014/01/22/jackpot-or-crackpot-park-on-korean-reunification; and Stephan 
Haggard, “On Jackpots,” North Korea: Witness to Transformation, March 25, 
2014, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=12997.
105
47 “Rodong Sinmun Dismisses ‘Confidence-Building Process’ as Hypo-
critical,” KCNA, November 2, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201311/
news02/20131102-12ee.html.
48 NDC Policy Department of  DPRK Slams Park Geun Hye’s Sophism 
during Her Foreign Trip,” KCNA, November 14, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/
item/2013/201311/news14/20131114-28ee.html. North Korean authorities’ rejec-
tion of any linkage to the nuclear issue remains absolute. See, for example, KCNA’s 
coverage of commentary in the party newspaper, which stressed that “. . . building 
of an economic power and a thriving socialist nation in the DPRK would be un-
thinkable apart from bolstering the nuclear force. . . [and] nuclear deterrence can 
never be subject to political bargaining and economic dealings.” “DPRK Will Make 
No Concession and Compromise: Rodong Sinmun,” KCNA, June 16, 2014, http://
www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201406/news16/20140616-11ee.html. 
49 Commenting on President Obama’s visit to Seoul in April 2014, the North’s 
Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea wrote, “What Park did before 
Obama this time reminds one of an indiscreet girl who earnestly begs a gangster 
to beat someone or a capricious whore who asks her fancy man to do harm to 
other person while providing sex to him.” “Challengers to DPRK Will Never Be 
Pardoned: CPRK Spokesman,”
KCNA, April 27, 2104, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201404/news27/2014-
0427-20ee.html.
50 “NDC of DPRK Sends Special Proposal to S. Korean Authorities,” KCNA, 
June 30, 2014, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201406/news30/20140630-17ee.
html; the first such NDC statement in this series was made by the NDC on Jan-
uary 16, 2014—see “NDC of DPRK Advances Crucial Proposals to S. Korean 
Authorities,” http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201401/news17/20140117-02ee.
html; for the original New Year’s address, see “Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s 
New Year Address,” January 1, 2014. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201401/
news01/20140101-01ee.html.
51 Rodong Sinmun wrote that the DPRK did not expect relations with the 
South to improve as long as Park is president: “Nothing will be resolved in in-
ter-Korean relations as long as Park remains in power.” See “N. Korea says it sees 
no improvement in ties with S. Korea,” Yonhap News, May 28, 2014, http://en-
glish.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/05/28/42/0401000000AEN201405280034
00315F.html. North Korea’s KCNA news service quotes Rodong Sinmun as com-
menting: “The prevailing situation shows that in order to improve the inter-Korean 
relations, achieve the peace and reunification and carve out the bright future of the 
nation, all Koreans should turn out as one to resolutely remove traitor Park, the 
root cause of national disaster. “Rodong Sinmun Calls for Removing Traitor Park 
Geun Hye, Roost Cause of National Disaster,” May 28, 2014, http://www.kcna.
co.jp/item/2014/201405/news28/20140528-06ee.html.
52 See, for example, James Church, “Rough Seas, Rocky Roads,” 38 North, 
July 2, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/07/jchurch070214/.
53 “Remarks by President Obama and President Park of  South 
Korea in a Joint Press Conference,” White House press release, May 
7 ,  2013 ,  http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013 /05 /07 /
remarks-president-obama-and-president-park-south-korea-joint-press-confe.
106
54 See, among a number of polls with similar results, Kim Jiyoon et al., “One 
Bed, Two Dreams: Assessing Xi Jinping’s Visit to Seoul,” Issue Brief, The Asan In-
stitute for Policy Studies, July 16, 2014, http://en.asaninst.org/one-bed-two-dreams-
assessing-xi-jinpings-visit-to-seoul/. Also, see Kim Jiyoon et al., “South Korean 
Attitudes on China,” Asan Public Opinion Report, The Asan Institute for Policy 
Studies, July 3, 2014, http://en.asaninst.org/south-korean-attitudes-on-china/.
55 The text of the July 3 joint statement issued by Presidents Park and Xi is avail-
able in Korean at http://m.chosun.com/svc/article.html?contid=2014070303652.
56 Official U.S. and South Korean government statements about the Ja-
pan-DPRK talks regularly note the need for Japan to be “transparent” about them.
57 See, for example, Stephan Haggard’s critique, “Trustpolitik v. 2.0,” North 
Korea: Witness to Transformation, October 15, 2013, http://www.piie.com/blogs/
nk/?p=11979.
58 In one major series of opinion surveys, South Koreans saying that unifi-
cation is “necessary” declined from 63.8 percent in 2007 to 54.8 percent in 2013. 
Those saying “maybe yes, maybe no” and “not necessary” increased during the 
same period from 36.2 percent to 45.2 percent. See Unification Attitude Survey 
2013, Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University, table 
1, p. 21.
59 It is nevertheless only prudent for the ROK government to engage in con-
tingency planning for worst-case scenarios, but this should be done confidentially. 
Much more important than contingency planning is broadening the domestic con-
sensus in South Korea about North Korea and strengthening the ROK’s polity and 
economy, which will help ensure the availability of necessary resources when unifi-
cation occurs, no matter how it occurs.
60 In their “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America 
and the Republic of Korea,” issued on June 16, 2009, Presidents Obama and Lee 
Myung-bak declared: “Through our Alliance we aim to build a better future for all 
people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and 
leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of  free democracy and a market 
economy” (italics added), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vi-
sion-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea 
Note, however, that during an extended press conference at the same summit, nei-
ther leader referred to reunification. See “Remarks by President Obama and Pres-
ident Lee Myung-Bak of the Republic Of Korea in Joint Press Availability,” White 
House press release, June 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-President-Obama-and-President-Lee-of-the-Republic-of-Korea-in-
Joint-Press-Availability. 
61 U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper testified in January 
2014:
North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several 
countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a 
nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities. 
Despite the reaffirmation of its commitment in the Second-Phase Actions for the 
Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement not to transfer nuclear mate-
rials, technology, or know-how, North Korea might again export nuclear technology. 
James R. Clapper, Director of  National Intelligence, “Statement for the 
107
Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community” be-
fore the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014, http://www.
dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_
SSCI_29_Jan.pdf.
62 Kim Keun-Sik, “For the Successful Trust-Building Process,” IFES 
Forum No. 13-10-10, October 10, 2013, http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/FRM/
FRM_0201V.aspx?code=FRM131010_0002.
63 Ministry of Unification, Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula, 
28.
64 See, for example, the work of human rights expert David Hawk, http://
www.davidrhawk.com/.
65 United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council, twenty-fifth 
session, agenda item 4, Report of  the Commission of  Inquiry on Human Rights 
in the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, February 7, 2014, available at http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionof-
InquiryDPRK.aspx.
66 Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. Panel Says North Korean Leader Could Face 
Trial,” February 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/world/asia/un-panel-
says-north-korean-leader-could-face-trial.html.
67 Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea 
and Iran:
A Comparative Analysis, FAS Issue Brief, Federation of American Scientists, 
June 2012, http://fas.org/pubs/_docs/IssueBrief-Sanctions.pdf.
68 The National Committee on North Korea, “H.R. 1771 Revisions NCNK 
Issue Brief,” n.d., http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/HR_1771_Revi-
sions_Issue_brief.pdf.
69 Peter D. Feaver and Eric Lorber, “Penalty Box: How Sanctions Trap 
Policymakers,” Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/141526/peter-d-feaver-and-eric-lorber/penalty-box.
70 Ibid.
71 “The President Meets with Main Architects of German Unification,” Re-
public of Korea Blue House website, March 27, 2014, http://english1.president.
go.kr/activity/briefing.php?srh%5Bpage%5D=2&srh%5Bview_mode%5D=de-
tail&srh%5Bseq%5D=5288&srh%5Bdetail_no%5D=145#sthash.aXewXkxh.
dpuf.
72 Hong Chesŏng, “Roh Moo-hyun ‘mi, puk’an kongjŏnghage an taehae’—
Wik’I” (Roh Moo-hyun: “U.S. doesn’t treat North Korea fairly”—WikiLeaks), 
Yonhap, September 17, 2011, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2011/09/17/0
501000000AKR20110917036800009.HTML.
73 For contrasting progressive and conservative frames toward North Korea, 
see Chapter 3 in Shin, One Alliance, Two Lenses.
74 This appears to be in part the result of many decades of experience in 
dealing with North Korea. For example, a recent opinion poll found that only 17 
percent of South Koreans now believe that North Korea is prepared to give up its 
nuclear weapons even if it were provided security assurances and sanctions against 
it were removed. Marcus Noland, “South Korean Attitudes Toward the North 
108
Korean Nuclear Program,” North Korea: Witness to Transformation, October 11, 
2013, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=11939.
75 Ministry of Unification, Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula.
76 Stephan Haggard, “Nae-Young Lee on Political Polarization in Korea,” 
North Korea: Witness to Transformation, August 12, 2014, http://blogs.piie.com/
nk/?p=13395. Although the survey dealt with traditional left-right divisions, in 
Korea these tend to overlap with views on North Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance.
77 “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Situation Overview and Strategic 
Objectives,” in United Nations Country Team, DPR Korea 2013: Humanitarian 
Needs and Priorities, Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea, http://www.unicef.
org/eapro/Humanitarian_Needs_and_Priorities_DPR_Korea_FINAL.pdf.
78 World Health Organization, WHO Country Cooperation Strategy, 2004-
2008: Democratic People’s Republic of  North Korea, June 2003, http://www.dprk.
searo.who.int/LinkFiles/WHO_Collaborating_Centres_CCSDPRK.pdf. 
79 “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” DPRK country profile, World 
Health Organization, http://www.who.int/countries/prk/en/.
80 Grace Oh, “WFP’s food aid to N. Korea hits all-time low in 2013,” Yonhap 
News, January 8, 2014, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2014/01/08/16
/0401000000AEN20140108003200315F.html.
81 Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North 
Korea,” Congressional Research Service, April 2, 2014, 4, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/
row/R40095.pdf.
82 Hyun-june Choi, “Park’s Private Sector Aid to North Korea Falls to All 
Time Low.” 
83 Following up on President Park’s Dresden Declaration, the South Korean 
government announced in August 2014 that it would provide North Korea with an-
other $13.3 million in humanitarian aid, including nutritional assistance to mother 
and child health services offered by the World Food Program (WFP) and essential 
medicine through WHO.
84 Katharina Zellweger, “Aid and Development Cooperation and North 
Korea: A Window of Opportunities or Pushing at a Closed Door?” (March 2013), 
4, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/7214/2012Mar_Zellweger_Harvard_Final.pdf.
85 James Reilly, “China–DPRK Economic Engagement: Don’t Blame the 
Sunshine,” East Asia Forum, November 13, 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2013/11/13/china-dprk-economic-engagement-dont-blame-the-sunshine/.
86 The most recent report on the project can be found in the June 2014 
newsletter of  the Christian Friends of  Korea, http://cfk.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/06/June-2014-Newsletter.pdf; for more details on the project, see 
Sharon Perry, “The Stanford North Korean Tuberculosis Project,” in U.S.-
DPRK Educational Exchanges: Assessment And Future Strategy, ed. Gi-Wook 
Shin and Karin J. Lee (Stanford, CA: Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Cen-
ter, 2011), 121–26, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23213/5_Perry_Stanford_
North_Korean_Tuberculosis_Project.pdf; see also Steven Borowiec, “Just how 
bad is tuberculosis in North Korea?” Global Post, January 19, 2014, http://
www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/north-korea/140107/
tuberculosis-north-korea-stanford-medical-school.
109
87 Visitors and observers of North Korea say that the Samjiyon is being in-
creasingly spotted in shops and in use by locals.
88 “Development of a joint dictionary (Gyeoremal-keunsajeon) faces crisis,” 
Hankyoreh News, October 4, 2010, Korean version at http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/
politics/politics_general/442173.html.
89 Steven Borowiec, “Two Koreas make strides to talk the same language,” 
The Guardian, July 11, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/11/
korean-peoples-comprehensive-dictionary.
90 “N. Korean students studying in Britain, Sweden: report,” Korea Herald, 
November 23, 2013, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131123000073.
91 Kim’s point was that, as partners, North and South could keep all the prof-
its in Korea rather than dividing them up with other countries. “Meeting minutes 
of Supreme Leader Kim Jong il and South Korean media delegation,” JoongAng 
Ilbo, February 23, 2002, Korean version at http://article.joins.com/news/article/ar-
ticle.asp?ctg=12&Total_ID=697428.
92 While some scholars have concluded that Kaesong’s ability to influence 
positive change inside North Korea is limited, this is based largely on interviews 
with South Korean businesspeople involved in Kaesong. The authors, however, 
strongly suspect that the impact of the Kaesong complex on North Korean society 
will, over the long run, be powerful. 
93 Production is now at 94 percent of the December 2012 level. “Inter-Ko-
rean factory park recovers to pre-halt level,” Yonhap News, March 9, 2014, Ko-
rean version at  http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2014/03/07/0200000000
AKR20140307143700043.HTML.
94 Sowon Park, “May 24 Measures as a Boomerang to South Korean Busi-
nesses,” Naeil Shinmun, February 26, 2014, Korean version at http://m.naeil.
com/m_news_view.php?id_art=97825.
95 Ibid. 
96 Under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874 (2009), 
the UNSC:
19. Calls upon all Member States and international financial and credit insti-
tutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or con-
cessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes 
directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denu-
clearization, and also calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to 
reducing current commitments; 
20. Calls upon all Member States not to provide public financial support for 
trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or in-
surance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where such financial 
support could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related 
or other WMD-related programs or activities.
97 Jae-soon Chang, “S. Korea to participate in Russian-led rail, port develop-
ment project in N. Korea,” Yonhap News, November 13, 2013, http://english.yon-
hapnews.co.kr/national/2013/11/12/10/0301000000AEN20131112007053315F.html.
98 Vladimir Soldatkin, “Russia writes off 90 percent of North Korea debt, eyes 
gas pipeline.” Reuters, April 19, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/19/
russia-northkorea-debt-idUKL6N0NB04L20140419.
110
99 Alexander Vorontsov, “Is Russia-North Korea Cooperation at a New 
Stage?” 38 North, May 8, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/05/avorontsov050814/.
100 “Secretary General Ban Says UN Will Actively Assist the DMZ Peace Park 
Proposal,” MT News, August 26, 2013, in Korean at http://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.
php?no=2013082614102989212.
101 “South Korea to Proceed with the Planning for DMZ Peace Park, Despite 
Negative Reaction from the North,” JoongAng Daily, April 24, 2014, in Korean 
at http://article.joins.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=14525893&ctg=1000.
102 “Address by President Park Geun-hye on the 69th Anniversary of 
Liberation,” April 15, 2014, http://english1.president.go.kr/activity/briefing.
php?srh%5Bview_mode%5D=detail&srh%5Bseq%5D=6984.
103 Nick Hansen, “North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Up-
grades Near Completion; Ready for More Launches?” 38 North, August 21, 2014, 
http://38north.org/2014/08/sohae082114.
111
Appendix 1
Participants of  the Sixth Annual Koret Workshop,  “Engaging North 
Korea: Projects, Challenges, and Prospects,” held February 21, 
2014, Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, Stanford University, 
and sponsored by the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. 
Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. 
Michael H. Armacost
Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow, The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-
Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University
Bradley O. Babson
Consultant; Chair, DPRK Economic Forum, U.S.-Korea Institute, 
John Hopkins School of  Advanced International Studies
Stephen W. Bosworth
Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Shorenstein APARC, Freeman Spogli 
Institute for International Studies (FSI); Senior Fellow, The Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy 
School of  Government, Harvard University
Gordon (Guem-Nak) Choe
Shorenstein APARC Fellow (2013–14)
Karen Eggleston
Director, Asia Health Policy Program, Shorenstein APARC
Karl Eikenberry
Distinguished Fellow, Shorenstein APARC; and the William J. Perry 
Fellow in International Security, Center for International Security 
and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Deborah C. Gordon
Associate Director, Preventive Defense Project at Stanford 
University
Hall Healy
Chairman of  the Board, International Crane Foundation
Siegfried S. Hecker
Professor (research), Department of  Management Science and 
Engineering; and Senior Fellow, FSI
Andrea Lee
Cofounder and CEO, Uri Tours
112
Karin J. Lee
Executive Director, National Committee on North Korea
Sunny Seong-Hyon Lee
Pantech Fellow (2013–14), Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein 
APARC
Alexandre Y. Mansourov
Adjunct Professor of  Korean Studies, SAIS, Johns Hopkins 
University
William J. Newcomb
Member, UN Panel of  Experts (on DPRK sanctions)
William J. Perry
Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus), Stanford 
University
Henry S. Rowen
Senior Fellow (emeritus), Shorenstein APARC; Senior Fellow, 
Hoover Institution; Professor (emeritus) of  Public Policy and 
Management, Graduate School of  Business, Stanford University
Gary Schoolnik
Professor of  Medicine (infectious diseases) and Microbiology & 
Immunology, Stanford University
Gi-Wook Shin
Director, Shorenstein APARC; Director, Korean Studies Program; 
Senior Fellow, FSI; and Professor of  Sociology, Stanford University
Daniel C. Sneider
Associate Director for Research, Shorenstein APARC
Troy Stangarone
Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade, Korea 
Economic Institute of  America
Kathleen Stephens
Koret Fellow (2013–14), Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein 
APARC
David Straub
Associate Director, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC
113
Appendix 2
Participants of  the joint workshop “Engaging North Korea: Projects, 
Challenges, and Prospects,” Seoul National University March 14, 
2014, co-sponsored by the Seoul National University Institute for 
Peace and Unification Studies and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific 
Research Center, Stanford University
Chang, Yong Seok
Senior Researcher, Institute for Peace and Unification Studies 
(IPUS), Seoul National University
Cho, Bong Hyun
Senior Researcher, IBK Economic Research Institute
Chun, Chae Sung
Research Director, Center for International Studies, Seoul National 
University
Jeong, Hyung-Gon
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic 
Policy
Jo, Dong-Joon
Professor of  International Relations, Seoul National University
Kim, Philo
Humanities Korea Professor, IPUS, Seoul National University
Joyce Lee
Research Associate, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC
Lee, Sang Jun
Research Fellow, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements
Park, Myoung-kyu
Director, IPUS, Seoul National University
Park, Sang Min
Professor, Center for Medicine and Korean Unification, Seoul 
National University
Park, Young-Jeong
Research Fellow, Korea Culture and Tourism Institute
Gi-Wook Shin
Director, Shorenstein APARC; Director, Korean Studies Program; 
Senior Fellow, FSI; and Professor of  Sociology, Stanford University
114
Son, Gi-Woong
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification
Song, Young Hoon
Senior Researcher, IPUS, Seoul National University
David Straub
Associate Director, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC
115
Appendix 3
Participants of  the joint workshop, “Korean Peninsula Economic 
Cooperation: History, Status, and Prospects,” March 17, 2014, 
Liaoning University, co-sponsored by the Liaoning University Korea 
Research Center and Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 
Stanford University
Ko, Jeongsik 
Professor of  Chinese Studies, Pai Chai University
Joyce Lee
Research Associate, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC
Lin, Muxi 
Professor of  Economics, Liaoning University
Liu, Hongzhong
Professor of  Economics, School of  International Studies, Liaoning 
University
Lu, Chao 
Director, North and South Korea research center, Liaoning 
Academy of  Social Sciences
Rennie Moon
Professor of  Research Method, Underwood International College, 
Yonsei University
Gi-Wook Shin
Director, Shorenstein APARC; Director, Korean Studies Program; 
Senior Fellow, FSI; and Professor of  Sociology, Stanford University
David Straub
Associate Director, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC
Zhang, Dongming
Director, Institute of  Northeast Asia; Professor of  Korean Studies, 
Liaoning University
Zhang, Yushan
Director, Center for Korean Studies, Jilin Academy of  Social 
Sciences

shorenstein aparc policy paper
Gi-Wook Shin, David Straub, and Joyce Lee
September 2014
Tailored Engagement
???? ?????
Toward an Effective and Sustainable 
Inter-Korean Relations Policy
 The Walter H. Shorenstein 
Asia-Pacifi c Research Center
Freeman Spogli Institute 
for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Phone: 650-723-9741
Fax: 650-723-6530
http://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu
Gi-Wook Shin is director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacifi c Research Center 
(Shorenstein APARC) at Stanford University.
David Straub is associate director of the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC.
Joyce Lee is a research associate at the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC.
cover photo: unification wishes hung for the chuseok thanksgiving holiday on a 
barbed-wire fence at the imjingak pavilion near the demilitarized zone. 
reuters/lee jae-won.
Tailored Engagem
ent: Tow
ard an Eff ective and Sustainable Inter-Korean Relations Policy 
sh
in
, strau
b, an
d
 lee
